

Interim Report of Operations
FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION

JULY 1965 TO DECEMBER 1966



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R. CARMODY

Interim Report of Operations
of the
1st CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMObILE)

JULY 1, 1965, TO DECEMBER 31, 1966



This Report was compiled by


CAPTAIN CHARLES S. SYKES, JR.

Office of Information and History, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division
(Airmobile)

It is edited and published by the 1st Cavalry Division Association and is distributed without charge to members of the Association who served in THE FIRST TEAM in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966.

The Association acknowledges the assistance and contributions of the men who made the history, and their help in its compilation, and in particular acknowledges the invaluable contributions of Major John J. Madigan, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), for accurate and painstaking research which has contributed significantly to the completion of this Report.

FIRST TEAM OPERATIONS
September 1965 - December 1966



MAP 2

It was my privilege and great good fortune to serve with the 11th Air Assault Division (Test), and to remain in command when that experimental unit was designated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) at Fort Benning in July 1965.

Fully aware of the proud traditions of the 1st Cavalry Division, I knew that our new Division, conceived in the heritage of Cavalry firepower and mobility, would glory in the name of THE FIRST TEAM and would add new laurels to the glorious record of the Division.

After the reorganization we moved fast, as befits Cavalry. On 28 July President Johnson announced we would go to Vietnam; by August our advance party was hand-carving our base in Vietnam; by September we had closed, had met the enemy, and had aided in repulsing his drive to divide South Vietnam.

Against adverse terrain, climate, and ruthless enemy, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) went on and on, to attain all objectives, complete all missions, defeat the guerrillas, the Main Force Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese regulars, and earn the highest commendations of our commanders.


These victories were not without cost. Many brave men fell in battle; many were wounded and maimed in the very difficult fighting. The dedication and sacrifice of our young Americans to the ideals of freedom and democracy was magnificent.

All of us who have learned to revere our patch appreciate the unique distinction that is ours; we served in THE FIRST TEAM. Let us always remember that service -- and our comrades -- with dignity and hope for a brighter future for our Division, for the Army, for our Country, and for the World.

Harry Kinnard
HARRY W. O. KINNARD
Major General. GS



MAJOR GENERAL, HARRY W. O. KINNARD, U. S. Army
(TIME - LIFE Photo)



MAJOR GENERAL JOHN NORTON, U. S. Army
Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),
May, 1966, to April, 1967



BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM A. BECKER, Assistant Division Commander
General Becker also served with the 1st Cavalry Division in World War II



LIEUTENANT WALTER J. MARM, JR.
Congressional Medal of Honor for bravery above and beyond the call of duty while
leading a platoon in the Ia Drang Valley campaign, 14 November 1965

APPRECIATION

The Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief, the senior commanders, and most Americans have repeatedly saluted the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for exemplary services and achievements in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966.

All thinking citizens of the Free World who realize that terrorism, murder, and subversion, if allowed to prevail in South Vietnam to the destruction of that Republic and to the seizure of its wealth for Communism, would then be applied in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and beyond in the same vicious strategy, have had occasion to recognize and appreciate achievements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in Vietnam. The Division's contribution to the security of the Free World has been magnificent.

The host Government of the Republic of Vietnam has expressed great admiration and sincere appreciation for the outstanding performance of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Honoring the men who have traveled 10,000 miles or more to join in the fight for the security of the Republic and the preservation of its freedom, Lt Gen CAO VAN VIEN, Chief of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF, wrote in October 1966:

"During the VN, US, and ROK combined operations north of QUI NHON, the US 1st Air Cavalry Division has recorded accomplishments which are worthy of praise, both in the destruction of the enemy and in civic actions. . . . The Division provided RVNAF and local authorities with effective assistance in relocating some 30,000 anti-communist refugees. . . . I ask that you convey to all soldiers of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division who participated in Operation IRVING, the deepest appreciation from the RVNAF and myself."

The 1st Cavalry Division Association is proud to avail itself of this opportunity to join in the acknowledgment of a deep sense of gratitude to each man who served in THE FIRST TEAM in Vietnam. The achievements and sacrifices of Troopers in defeating Communism have helped and are helping to keep the enemy from our doorstep.

"Mother" of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) has another unique distinction in having the only "Mother" among U. S. Army Divisions. Mrs. Gladys Dorcy collaborated in the design of the 1st Cavalry Division Patch in 1921 with her husband, the late Colonel Ben Dorcy, who was then the Commanding Officer, 7th U. S. Cavalry Regiment. Now a resident of Washington, D. C., "Mother" Dorcy is greatly in demand for speaking engagements as an authority on heraldry. When she is not busy lecturing, much of her time is spent (as it has been spent during the past 25 years) in writing letters to her Troopers—the men who wear the Big Bright Patch, the Men of THE FIRST TEAM.



Mrs. Dorcy is shown here with the color bearer (unidentified), then General William C. Chase who commanded the 1st Cav Div in 1945-1947 (partly hidden by the color bearer); then General Paul Freeman, Continental Army Commander (who accompanied the 1st Cav Div into Manila in February 1945); then General Harry W. O. Kinnard, Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), at ceremonies at Fort Benning, Georgia, on July 3, 1965, marking the transfer of the colors.

PART I

GETTING THERE FIRST WITH THE MOST

From Hannibal and his elephants, and Genghis Kahn and his mounted hordes, to Patton and his tanks, victory on the battlefield rewarded the Army with the most effective combination of mobility, firepower and shock action.

In the 19th Century the United States was explored, settled, developed, and expanded into a world power, with Cavalrymen preceding and protecting the pioneers in the westward surge, distinguishing themselves and extending the chivalrous traditions inherited from antiquity by their service and sacrifice, contributing their blood and sweat and often their lives to the growth of the United States.

The 20th Century found Cavalry units fighting in the pacification of the Philippines, but technology in transportation on the ground and in the air marked the diminishing usefulness of the horse in battle. In World War I, Cavalry was still useful, and in 1921 the 1st Cavalry Division was organized at Fort Bliss, Texas, with four regiments of Cavalry—the 5th, 7th, 8th, and 12th—and with supporting Artillery, Engineers, and other Services.

In the twenties and thirties, on penurious military budgets, the 1st Cavalry Division developed the esprit and the skills to maintain its proud heritage, and to prepare for the battles to come. World War II demonstrated the new techniques in mobility based on trucks, tanks, and airplanes; massed automatic weapons, mortars, artillery, and aerial bombardment eliminated the effectiveness of Horse Cavalry.

In 1943 the 1st Cavalry Division moved into the Southwest Pacific Theater of Operations, without its horses, and thereafter fought, as Sixth Army Commander General Walter Krueger, described the Division, as "My Incomparable Infantrymen." During the Second World War the 1st Cavalry Division gained battle honors and laurels, earning the approbation of General Douglas MacArthur:

"No greater record has emerged from the war than that of the 1st Cavalry Division—swift and sure in attack, tenacious and durable in defense, and loyal and cheerful under hardship. My personal connection with it in many moments of crisis has especially endeared it to me."

In the occupation of Japan, in the Korean operations, and in the surveillance of the Demilitarized Zone in Korea, from 1945 to 1965, the

1st Cavalry Division served with distinction, consolidating its reputation as THE FIRST TEAM. The Division was 22 years old when it went overseas in 1943 for the next 22 years.

VISION

Meanwhile, in the United States, leaders with vision planned new and bold steps to combine firepower and mobility into new high levels of combat effectiveness. General Hamilton H. Howze headed a board that explored concepts of using helicopters and Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) aircraft to lift men into battle, to provide them with fire support, and to reinforce, resupply, and when necessary to evacuate them. General Howze and his associates, in brief, were preparing to overcome terrain obstacles in the achievement of tactical mobility. A Cavalryman of long standing, and son of the first Division Commander, General Howze provided a profound impetus toward the adaptation of modern technology to military uses.

By 1963 the concepts developed and refined by the Howze Board had resulted in the organization of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) under the leadership of General Harry W. O. Kinnard, who told his men:

"Ours is a proud heritage. We have the history and traditions of an illustrious fighting unit on which to model ourselves. It is rare that men are afforded an opportunity such as ours to really pioneer and grow in new and exciting territory. We propose to make our future a bright one, and to make a significant contribution to the Modern Army."

In January 1964 General Kinnard established an Idea Center, creating the intellectual climate for bold thoughts and startling techniques. Also in January 1964, General Kinnard accepted for the Division the Grover E. Bell award for research and experimentation in helicopter development and heard the 11th Air Assault Division cited for its pioneering work in the application of the mobility and firepower capability provided by the helicopter to extend the Army's ground combat capabilities.

TEST

Dedicated and diligent work of all the men of the 11th Air Assault Division tested all facets of the concepts involved at all levels up to Brigade,

and endorsed these concepts as feasible. By 2 July 1964 the testing units had achieved full strength and status as a Division, and could take pride in the commendation of General Earl G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Since its establishment, the 11th has pioneered a program aimed at opening a new dimension in warfare which would increase the battlefield mobility and capability of Army units to fight land battles. In testing this concept, you have played a significant role in updating traditional ideas and have developed new and impressive techniques which will unquestionably increase the overall combat effectiveness of the Army."

Division level tests from 15 October to 15 November 1964 confirmed the feasibility of the Howze Board concepts and established the proficiency of the Division, which had completed the test task ahead of a rugged original schedule and in a manner which won the admiration and thanks of the Army's leaders.

In the fall of 1964, however, budget considerations threatened the existence of the 11th Air Assault Division. The Department of Defense announced that the experimental Division had fulfilled its purpose, and would be eliminated.

But events 12,000 miles away, in Vietnam, influenced Pentagon thinking at this time. Communist insurgents in South Vietnam had effectively infiltrated southward beyond the 17th parallel, with the unmistakable objective of overwhelming the Southern Republic. It was obvious that unless the Free World came to the assistance of Vietnam, this rice-rich lush country would fall under Communist domination.

Under these circumstances the decision was made to build up United States Forces in South Vietnam, for operations to defeat the aggression from the North. On 16 June 1965 Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that the Army had been authorized an Airmobile Division as part of its 16 Division force structure, to be formed at Fort Benning, Georgia. At this point the Secretary complimented those who had worked tirelessly in developing and testing the air mobility concept.

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)

On 1 July 1965, and in formal ceremonies on 3 July, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was activated at Fort Benning with men from the 11th Air Assault Division, from the attached Air Transport Brigade, and from the 2d Infantry Division. On the DMZ in Korea the old 1st Cav-

alry Division was redesignated the 2d Infantry Division as the two sets of colors crossed the Pacific.

After 22 years of overseas service, the 1st Cavalry Division was back in the United States—but not for long. Secretary McNamara had announced that the new Airmobile Division would be combat ready within eight weeks. On 1 July the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was told to achieve a status of RECON I—readiness condition of the highest combat priority—by 28 July.

It was a tremendous problem. Many units faced reorganization under new TO&E; equipment had to be exchanged; new personnel had to be trained in heliborne tactics and techniques; 1st Brigade men had to be jump qualified and 600 newly assigned men had to qualify as paratroopers in an abbreviated, intensive course. Night and day preparations went forward—gas chamber exercises, swimming lessons, classes in jungle warfare, rappelling from helicopters, sniping, helicopter door gunnery, aerial weapons firing, artillery adjustment by forward observers in helicopters, communication procedures. In all, there was so much importance attached to efforts to provide each soldier as much additional training as possible, that civilian personnel were employed to work in the mess halls.

Concurrently, the tedious process to POR/POM qualify all men continued. Processing was handled in a large field house at Harmony Church, using the country fair system of stations that handled 850 men daily. The 11th Aviation Group had a particularly tough job—many of its pilots and helicopters were still supporting the XVIII Airborne Corps in the Dominican Republic.

Families of members of the Division had to be relocated in these few short weeks. With the assistance of citizens of Columbus, Georgia, and Phenix City, Alabama, and the Division's Family Assistance Groups, under the auspices of The Infantry Center's Army Community Service Agency, the job was done.

At his news conference on the evening of 28 July, the President explained why the United States was concerned in Vietnam and had assumed the commitment to aid in the defense of the Republic; he demonstrated also why the Free World had a stake in the outcome of the struggle. Then in solemn tones President Johnson announced:

"I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division."

This was the first time an American President had publicly announced the deployment of an Army Division to a combat zone before departure of the Division. The 1st Cavalry Division (Air-

mobile) was the first full division committed to the Vietnam effort.

Confirmation by the President of the rumors rife at Fort Benning did not provide details, but efforts to be ready were redoubled; the new M16E1 rifle was issued, studied, fired, zeroed, fired again. Towels, handkerchiefs, and underclothing were dyed green; it is said that the public washing machines in the Fort Benning area provided a green tint for weeks after the Division had left.

After these feverish weeks of preparation, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was ready, on time, to go; ready to flex its muscles; ready to show the world that it was by far the best; eager to show off airmobility and make officials wonder how they ever got along without it.

And so, at the end of these harried weeks, commanders strove to give each man a few days leave before actual departure; a few days to spend with their families before the long, hard year ahead. For the men, and for the families, leave provided a tremendous morale boost before the men were to leave their country, their loved ones, their families, for at least a year—and some of them, forever.

DEPLOYMENT

Actual movement of personnel was called Operation PAT and was scheduled in three increments: an Advance Liaison Detachment, an Advance Party, and the Main Body. The first echelon to depart was the Advance Liaison Detachment composed of 32 key officers and men. Led by Brigadier General John S. Wright, ADC-B, the detachment departed the United States by air on 2 August 1965 and arrived in the Republic of Vietnam two days later.

Of the 32 men in the Advance Liaison Detachment, 28 were pilots including, of course, General Wright. In most cases these men were executive officers of their units, and their mission was to coordinate with, and gain experience from, aviation units already in Vietnam. They were to acclimatize themselves to terrain and weather, and become familiar with flying conditions in Vietnam's central highlands.

The Advance Party was made up of about 1,040 officers and men, and left Fort Benning during the period 14-20 August. Moving with 152 tons of cargo (including nine UH-1B helicopters), the Advance Party travelled to Warner Robbins Air Force Base at Macon, Georgia, and from there were deployed by aircraft of the Military Airlift Command. The Air Force C-130's and C-124's flew via Travis AFB, California; Hickam Field, Hawaii, Clark AFB, Philippines,

arriving in Nha Trang on the eastern coast of Vietnam from 19 to 27 August. These two advance forces joined at An Khe, 36 miles inland from the coastal city of Qui Nhon, north of Nha Trang, and began to establish a temporary base camp near the An Khe air strip. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, provided security during this initial settlement phase.

The third and final phase of troop and supply movement found the bulk of the Division departing Fort Benning and deploying by troop and cargo ships of the Military Sea Transport Service. Approximately 13,500 men left Columbus, Georgia, in mid-August. Moving by train and bus, they headed for Atlantic and Gulf ports of embarkation.

Six troop carriers, four aircraft carriers, and seven cargo ships were employed in the over-water movement. The 1st Brigade loaded out on the USNS GEIGER, the 2d Brigade on the USNS BUCKNER, and the 3d Brigade on the USNS ROSE. The remainder of the Division including elements of the Support Command, the battalions of the Aviation Group, and the various combat support units, loaded on the USNS DARBY, PATCH, AND UPSUR. Troop ships departed on 16 August as the BUCKNER and DARBY pulled away from Charleston, South Carolina. The other four troop carriers departed during the next four days from Charleston, and from Savannah, Georgia.

More than 470 of the Division's rotary and fixed wing aircraft were crowded on the carriers USNS BOXER, KULA GULF, CROATON, and CARD. The BOXER itself had over 220 aircraft, to include the four flying Cranes from the attached 478th Aviation Company; over fifty CH-47 Chinooks, and all of the ASTA platoon's Mohawks. The first of these carriers—the CROATON—sailed from Mobile on 11 August; the remaining three departed in subsequent days, the CARD also from Mobile, and the BOXER and KULA GULF sailing from Mayport Naval Air Station in Jacksonville, Florida.

Although the packing began in early July and continued on a round-the-clock basis, the general cargo did not move until 7 August when the first of the seven cargo ships sailed from New Orleans.

ON THE WAY

The sea movement of this third echelon traversed the world moving both East and West. While the BOXER sailed eastward into the Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal to arrive at Qui Nhon on 9 September, the other aircraft carriers and the troop and cargo ships sailed westward through the Panama Canal, stopping

at Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines, and arriving at Qui Nhon beginning on 12 September.

Four weeks at sea provided little idle time. Additional training and preparation for jungle service filled the hours. Subjects discussed hurriedly during the last days at Fort Benning were reviewed. Physical fitness was emphasized thru daily PT in cramped space between aircraft and other equipment. Skull practice in guerrilla tactics, patrolling, jungle navigation aided mental alertness. The "lessons learned" by other units already in Vietnam were analyzed. Weapons testing and familiarization continued from the aft decks of the BUCKNER and ROSE, with home-made targets towed behind the ships. Fire Direction Center and Forward Observer teams fired "match box" Artillery missions.

Every young Cavalryman was determined to be as knowledgeable and in as good physical shape as possible; they were getting ready for combat—physically, mentally, and spiritually.

August 31 at sea was a moneyless payday—troops had been paid before departure. Two weeks before arrival in Vietnam, weekly doses of malaria suppressive tablets began—a routine that became the favorite, is not the best, method of counting off the passing months in the jungle.

While the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was crossing the Pacific, the Cavalrymen of World War II and Korea gathered in Kansas City for the 18th Annual Reunion of the 1st Cavalry Division Association. General Kinnard and key staff officers took time from their busy schedule to explain the new Division concepts to the old timers. The members of the Association who had helped establish the reputation of the 1st Cavalry Division in the Southwest Pacific, in the Philippines, and in Korea, wanted to know the new Division.

As the troop ships approached Vietnam a second echelon in the main body deployment departed Fort Benning. The 18 Caribou aircraft of the 17th Aviation Company flew from Lawson Army Airfield 3 September enroute to Hamilton Air Force Base in California. This first, and longest, leg of the trip took an average of 17 hours and was completed without incident. Shortly thereafter on 6 September the aircraft departed for Southeast Asia, with fuel, maintenance, and crew stops at Hawaii, Wake, Guam, and the Philippines. On 18 September the 18 Caribou arrived at Vung Tau and then made the short flight to An Khe—the first time an entire Caribou Company had ferried its organic aircraft across the Pacific.

On the 13th of September the DARBY dropped anchor in Qui Nhon Harbor. This was the Division's birthday, or Organization Day, and it is

unlikely that anyone concerned in the Division's activation in September 1921 foresaw the 44th birthday. General Kinnard, with customary foresight, had prepared an Organization Day message which newspapers of the ships carrying the Troopers published. He proclaimed:

"The eyes of the world are fixed on this Division. We are the embodiment of an exciting new tactical doctrine. Whatever lies ahead, we will prevail. We are THE FIRST TEAM."

Earlier, on 9 September, the BOXER had arrived with the giant Chinooks of the 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion. Preparations began several days prior to arrival with the de-cocooning process. When the BOXER dropped anchor at Qui Nhon the Chinooks were "Go." The first CH-47 left the deck on 11 September with Captain Harold E. Gonyer and CWO (W3) William A. Ralston at the controls—the first deployment of a helicopter from a carrier into the combat zone. Sixty nine hours later the last CH-47 departed, registering the Company as 100% flyable.

WELCOME TO VIETNAM

The other troop ships arrived in due course and the troops put their debarkation drills to good use. Completing their voyage in the amphibious tradition, LCM's and LCU's transported the men from the ships to the beaches, where they were greeted by the Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador of the United States to Vietnam, and a lieutenant and captain in the Horse Cavalry reserves in the 1920's and 1930's. He welcomed the new members of THE FIRST TEAM—a new generation of Cavalry Troopers entering a new kind of war.

Stopping only briefly on the beaches, the men boarded the waiting CH-47's for the short 25 minute flight from Qui Nhon to An Khe, eager to rejoin their comrades in the Advance Party who had prepared a place for them. The troop lift from the beach to the base camp was entirely an organic air movement, involving an average of 21 Chinooks daily, with the movement completed 22 September. Over 1,100 flying hours supported this mission, while general cargo and vehicles moved to the base camp on National Highway 19.

While the main body was crossing the sea, the Advance elements had been hard at work developing the base camp at An Khe, a small hamlet in the southwestern sector of Binh Dinh Province, although the name was applied generally to the entire area. An Khe is equidistant from the coastal city of Qui Nhon and the inland city of

Pleiku, the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Headquarters for the II Corps Tactical Zone.

Under the Saigon Government, Vietnam is divided into four Corps Tactical Zones, each commanded by a Vietnamese general responsible for all Vietnam forces within his Zone. From the DMZ in the north to and including Quang Ngai Province, I Corps is in control. The II CTZ lying immediately South of I Corps includes South Vietnam's Central Highlands (Map 1). It is the operational area of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and is by far the largest of the four Corps, encompassing 45% of the South Vietnam land mass. The III CTZ lies further south and includes the area generally to the west and north of Saigon. The IV CTZ is still further south and includes the Mekong River Delta. (Page 14)

THE GOLF COURSE

The 1st Cav advance elements were required to carve out the world's largest helipad, soon to be the hub of activity for the Division. Surrounded by flat terrain, except for Hong Kong mountain on the camp's western perimeter, what was to become the base camp was initially dense undergrowth, bamboo and thorn thickets, and ant hills as much as 12 feet high. Dust had to be minimized; dust in whirling rotors would quickly destroy the fine machinery of the helicopter engines. Consequently, the entire area was cleared and leveled and smoothed using only hand tools, thus preserving the turf and topsoil.

It was a strenuous task, but after a few hours practice the men became proficient in the use of axes, entrenching tools, machetes, and Vietnamese brush hooks. After the blisters healed and hardened into callouses they were even more proficient.

Dominating the area was an old, very large banyan tree which was spared and kept as a rallying point. Here announcements were made, instructions given for the work parties, progress charted and plans developed. Here, General Wright, commander of the Advance elements, challenged the men with the task in store which he described as "making the rugged area as smooth as a golf course." The name took hold and the helipad—largest in the world—was soon world-famous as "The Golf Course."

BASE BUILDUP

Even while the Division was closing, Viet Cong sniper fire and light probing attacks began. The valley and the route into the base camp were secured by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, but the 1st Cav Div (AM) was responsible

for its own immediate perimeter from the outset. The Division supported the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division in Operation GIBRALTAR, but the official date for assuming complete responsibility for the defense of An Khe was 28 September. General Kinnard had noted:

"This was 104 days from the date Secretary McNamara announced the formation of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and 90 days after General Orders activated the unit on 1 July 1965. . . . Somewhere in the annals of military organization there may have been outfits activated, organized, and moved 12,000 miles to combat, all within the space of 90 days, but none comes immediately to mind. That the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) did just that not only is a remarkable achievement, but a tribute to the men of the Division who devoted an unbelievable amount of time and effort to accomplish the task."

Now the whole Division was on hand to establish the perimeter, to complete the clearing of the helipad, and to erect buildings and tents, field fortifications and storage sheds. These efforts undertaken in oppressive climate, under adverse jungle conditions, and in the face of constant irritations, were successful only through the intensive and dedicated efforts of the Troopers.

Heat is oppressive in Vietnam in September and October, but the intensity of the sun and the danger of sunburn kept shirts on sweating backs. Ant and insect bites plagued the men and were often infected; vines snagged and tripped men at work; impenetrable hedgerows required killing labor in their removal. Scorpions, spiders, and snakes, fortunately, were less prevalent than had been imagined. Tigers stayed back in the brush, but rats infested the areas where the troops worked. Rabies and plague had to be warded off; malaria prevention had top priority. Mosquito netting was used without any question, and provided nighttime protection against any creature that might creep, crawl, slither, or fly. Men learned to inspect bedding—usually merely a blanket or sleeping bag protected by the mosquito netting—before crawling in; snakes and scorpions appreciated the soldier's belongings.

Men lived under ponchos or in shelter tents until late November. Darkness came early—about 1830 hours, and letter-writing and preparations for the night were done in candle-light—just as in old Horse Cavalry Days when electricity and even gasoline lighting were luxuries true Cavalrymen did without.

Daily sanitation measures were also geared to the elements. For months, an afternoon down-

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pour seemed to be inevitable, and men used the rains for shower baths. More than once a man was caught completely lathered and hopefully waiting for more rain which never came.

During the first weeks practically all supplies were brought in by air. There was very little

refrigeration, and the C Ration was the steady diet. The comforts and amenities of Fort Benning and the far off USA were in the past, and in the future—for now, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) would put up with the Combat Zone and its adversities.



Tactical Road March, Georgia, July 27, 1965



The AC-1 CARIBOU, largest fixed-wing transport aircraft in the Army Aviation program (now operated by USAF), is preparing to land at The Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, Alabama. The CARIBOU carries 32 combat-ready troops or three tons of cargo and features short take-off, short landing, and ease of loading through the rear ramp.



This AGGRESSOR is taking on three UH-1B helicopters during test exercises at Fort Benning in July 1965



The versatile UH-1B IROQUOIS is blowing out a brush fire sparked by muzzle blast of 105mm howitzer at Fort Benning



1965: Troops boarding IROQUOIS assault helicopters in the final phases of the test of the air mobility concept



The AC-1 CARIBOU unloading a jeep at Fort Benning



Georgia, 1965. Loading a 2.75 inch rocket into the weapons system mounted on a UH-1B helicopter in preparation for a firing demonstration during test exercise SKY SOLDIER I



The CA-54A SKYCRANE with pod which can carry 64 troops (at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, November, 1964)



Georgia—July 25, 1965. Army Sgt. Philip Maddox, 1st Sq 9th Cav, learns mountain climbing techniques of rappelling as he makes his third jump from a 35-foot tower at Fort Benning. After five drops from the tower, Troopers move to helicopters and make three more descents from a height of 60 feet. Sgt. Maddox makes his home at Lincoln, Nebraska.



Georgia—July 1965. Another shot of rappelling technique demonstrated by Sp4 Charles Ames, Fort Wayne, Indiana. Thorough training at Fort Benning made Cavalrymen skillful in this technique which proved its value in combat in Vietnam.



The CH-47 CHINOOK disgorges a laden Army "MULE"



USNS CROATON waiting at Mobile to load troops of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile) for the journey to Vietnam



"Take care of your rifle and it will take care of you." Troopers trained during the leisurely pleasure cruise across the Pacific. A blindfolded Cavalryman strips his M-16 rifle.



Qui Nhon. BRIGADIER GENERAL WRIGHT, CG of the Advance Party, greeted troops of the 1st Cavalry Division arriving after the long sea voyage



FINAL MOVE BY WATER, on the way to the beach via LSU. (September, 1965)




An Khe, 25 August 1965. Troops waiting to load aboard C130 for trip from Qui Nhon to An Khe.



Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland greet Skytroopers of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) as they arrive at Qui Nhon.

PART II

COMBAT



MAP 1

On 18 September, just four days after the main body had arrived at An Khe, elements of the 1st Cav were supporting offensive operations against the Viet Cong, in the first of 54 operations conducted by the Division before the end of 1966. Of these 54 operations, 32 were classified as "major" and involved battalion task forces or larger units. During these fifteen months the 1st Cav had aggressively pursued its mission of clearing the II Corps Area for return to control of the Saigon Government. Principally responsible for the largest of the four Corps areas, the Division operated over an area covering about 15,625 square miles, extending from the South China Sea along the axis of route 19 to the Cambodian border, and from north of Bong Son to Tuy Hoa along the coast, and from Dak Pec to Ban Me Thout along the ridgeline marking the Cambodian border. The terrain within the Tactical Area of Operations Responsibility (TAOR) varies from the rugged double-canopy forested mountains in the west and in the Kim Son and Suoi Ca valleys in the east to the fertile rice plains and the sandy beaches along the coast. (Map 3). The central highlands are affected by both the Northeast and Southwest monsoons, with the heavy rainfalls that inundate much of the coastal plain and make life more miserable everywhere.

Only because of its total airmobility could the Division operate, destroy the Vietcong, control the area, and neutralize the guerrillas in such a vast area.

Generally the Division operated with two Brigades, generally with a total of seven Battalions, outside the base area, mostly in search and destroy operations while the remaining (or Stay-Behind) Brigade conducted base camp and Route 19 security and local offensives in the TAOR.

FIRST OPERATION

As mentioned, the 1st Cav Div (AM) began its combat career on 18 September, when the 2d Battalion 12th Cavalry (2/12) was put under the operational control (OPCON) of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. This OPCON relieved the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, of the An Khe area defense responsibility to permit its commitment into the Vinh Thanh Valley, 10 miles northeast of An Khe. To assist in the initiation of Operation GIBRALTAR the 11th Aviation Group assembled all available aircraft to lift troops of the 101st into the operational area. Battery B 1st Battalion 77th Field Artillery was moved to support the

operation while other batteries of that Battalion provided direct support for the 2d Brigade in its assigned sector in the Base Camp defenses. On 20 September when the 2/12 Cav was relieved from OPCON 1st Brigade 101st, the 2d Battalion 5th Cavalry (2/5 Cav) came under its operational control for the An Khe base security, and remained so until the 28th of September when the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) formally took over its TAOR.


From that day forward there has been no question of who has been in charge. In its first operations, to secure its doorstep before leaving its home, the Division entered in force in the Vinh Thanh Valley (scene of Operation GIBRALTAR) which was then strongly dominated by the Viet Cong. Although its dimensions (1½ to 3 miles wide and 12 miles long) are relatively small, it was one of the best developed and most heavily populated areas in the Binh Khe district of Binh Dinh Province before the influx of the Viet Cong in March 1965. By methodically burning and destroying hamlets, schools, and churches, the enemy subjugated the population by terrorism. In May 1965 the Viet Cong were in complete charge, and all available males were conscripted into their ranks.

HAPPY VALLEY

Operation HAPPY VALLEY, from 3 October to 1 November, was the first concentrated Allied effort to regain control of this valley for the Vietnamese, as well as to insure the security of the Division TAOR. The operation was conducted in three successive phases—Domination, then Resettlement and Reconstruction, then Consolidation and Pacification.

The Domination phase was geared primarily to search and destroy, with large show of force operations by one- and two-company size forces. There was very little heavy contact, as the enemy preferred to hide rather than face the Cavalrymen. All troops were lightly equipped, and usually only one 81mm mortar was carried forward because of its weight and the weight of the ammunition. Similarly the 106mm recoilless rifle, being roadbound, was not usefully employed. Even without these supporting weapons, the Division quickly completed the Domination phase of the operation; although the bag of Communist killed was meager. The Viet Cong had fled the valley.

Phase II of the operation aimed at encouraging the Vietnamese population to return to the valley



MAP 3

and resettle in their hamlets. At first it was difficult to gain the confidence of the people, who were inclined to flee and hide at the sight or sound of the helicopters, but within a few days the humanitarian actions of the US force led to the return of the people to their homes, particularly in the vicinity of the Cavalry Command Post.

National police worked with the Division to reestablish the civil police structure. A new CIDG (Civil Irregular Defense Group) Camp was constructed to assist in the control and pacification. Meanwhile, daily air assaults of company and platoon sized elements continued to flush the enemy from his lairs.

Phase II eased into Phase III and the action focused then on civic action programs, which included medical treatment, distribution of clothing, and the repair of buildings and roads. The Psy-Ops effort also increased with extensive propaganda leaflet distribution. Each of these efforts was significant, and Cavalry operations beyond the base camp made indelible impressions in the campaign for the hearts and minds of the people.

A good will program culminated HAPPY VALLEY on 30 October and 1 November and was designated Operation FRIENDSHIP. It was icing on the cake, designed to aid the needy and to demonstrate the US friendship and desire to help. The Division Band played for the occasion, and was followed by speeches by Vietnamese officials as well as by Lt. Col. Frederic Ackerson, CO 1/5 Cavalry.

SUOI CA

Meanwhile, the 3d Brigade had moved further east into the enemy-saturated SUOI CA Valley, on 10 October, for Operation SHINEY BAYONET. Special intelligence reports in conjunction with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam intelligence sources indicated that bases for two battalions of the 2d Viet Cong Main Force Regiment were in the valley. The intelligence was accurate, but the two battalions were able to exfiltrate before the arrival of the helicopters. The plan of action called for the committed units—a task force consisting of the 1/7th Cav, 2/7th Cav, and elements of 1/9th Cav Sq, to act as a blocking force while units of the 22d ARVN Division drove the enemy into the vise. Contact was light because of the prior exfiltration, but when the operation ended four days later major enemy rest areas had been destroyed and the Cavalrymen received invaluable training in jungle warfare against the elusive enemy.

Throughout, the stay-behind Brigade worked to improve its living area, the base perimeter, and


the base camp in general. More and more of the men were moved out of poncho and lean-to shelters into more permanent, drier quarters. Locally procured bamboo matting was used for tent walls and helped to double the normal capacity of the GP (General Purpose) Medium and Aerofab tents. Floors were made with cut timber. Repaired but unserviceable parachutes became the overhead covering of outdoor chapels under which logs were laid for pews.

The appearance of electric generators made jungle life somewhat more tolerable. Fans, coffee pots, and refrigerators were at a premium; those who had them made friends easily. As usual, the GI adapted readily to the environment and the shortages. Language was colored by the circumstances: the GI was here to "Help Arvin," a superlative expression was "Numbah One" and a lousy performance was "Number Ten." His hootch was his living quarters, whether a tent, bunker, hut, or corner of a hole, regardless of the degree of sophistication. And, always, "Charlie" was the adversary.

Concurrently, the defense barrier was taking shape with four rows of triple concertina separated by 75 to 100 yards of defoliated jungle. Access and perimeter roads were built, but often became precarious because of heavy rain. During November and December it was not uncommon to see several trucks which had slid off the road and were up to their truck beds in mud.

One of the most unique as well as difficult construction jobs was the leveling of the top of Hong Cong mountain. A platoon of C Company 8th Engineers, was airlifted to its top to begin construction of a combined communications and observation station. A small area was cut away by hand so that the Engineer's lightweight bulldozer could be lowered in for the heavier work. After 45 days of felling trees of all dimensions, moving tons of rock, igniting over 1,000 pounds of dynamite, and warding off several VC snipers, the Sky Beavers of the 8th Engineers had leveled ten feet off the mountain top. Communications and radar equipment was then emplaced and the Division commanded the flatlands in four directions.

In retrospect, the operations conducted during September and up to the end of October 1965 were merely a prelude to the first meaningful operation by the Division—the Pleiku campaign. The arrival of the Division at An Khe had blocked the planned communist offensives, and had contributed materially to the security of the An Khe area and the welfare of the population. Operations had been largely defensive, and even the search and destroy missions nearby had as a



MAP 4

primary objective the increased security of the base. With Highway 19 fairly secure, and with no immediate Viet Cong threat to the base, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was ready for offensive operations.

PLEIKU

The Pleiku campaign extended from 23 Oct until 28 Nov and was characterized by heavy, close-in fighting, and swift decisive airmobile tactics.

On 19 Oct the enemy attacked a CIDG Camp at Plei Me, an opening bid in his attempt to take over the Central Highlands. Originally it appeared that the attack was an enemy regiment's "shake-down" immediately following its infiltration across the Cambodian border. But by 22 October, the intelligence estimate was revised upward to show two NVA Regiments in the area: the 33d at Plei Me, and the 32d in an ambush position to destroy an expected relief column from Pleiku. The planned ambush of the relief column was an integral part of the enemy's Plei Me attack.

Obviously if the attack on Plei Me were successful enough to attract the relief column, then the destruction of that column would open vulnerable Pleiku, and control of Pleiku would provide control of the Western part of the Central Highlands, and threaten An Khe.

The ARVN II Corps Commander was confronted with a difficult choice. He could refuse to go to the relief of Plei Me and lose the camp; or he could commit the reserve from Pleiku, stripping that area of defense troops. If he lost the relief column Pleiku would be easy prey to the Communists.

Aware of the ambush and of the potential consequences, ARVN II Corps applied for help from the US Forces. CG IFF-V (Commanding General, First Field Force, Vietnam) sent the following message to General Kinnard:

"Commencing first light 23 Oct First Air Cav deploys one Bn TF minimum 1 Inf Bn and 1 Arty Btry to PLEIKU mission be prepared to assist in defense of key US/ARVN installations vic PLEIKU or reinforce II Corps operations to relieve PLEI ME CIDG CAMP."

Operations of the 1st Cav Div (AM) in the Pleiku-Plei Me area were delineated in two phases. Phase I, from 23 to 27 Oct, placed Division elements in a defensive, reinforcing, and/or limited offensive role as reflected in the above message. Phase II, from 28 Oct until the end of the operation, saw the Division assume an unlimited offensive role to actively seek out and destroy the enemy units. Phase II activity was divided: the

1st Brigade conducted the operation from 28 Oct to 9 Nov; the 3d Brigade from 10 to 19 November and the 2d Brigade took over the culminating search and destroy operation from 20 to 28 November.

Task force INGRAM was airlifted from base camp, early on 23 Oct, to Camp Holloway at Pleiku, closing by 1300 hours. The force consisted of 2/12th Cav, Btry B 2/17th Artillery, a weapons section of 1/9th Cav, and a company (-) of the 8th Engr Bn. While this move was underway, the Division Commander, sensing that a decisive operation was imminent at Plei Me, obtained permission to deploy the 1st Brigade to Pleiku and terminated its operation, SCRIMMAGE, in the Binh Khe area east of An Khe along Route 19. The 1st Brigade Hq, 2/8th Cav, and two firing batteries of the 2/19th Artillery were extracted from the Vinh Thanh Valley by 1500 hours 23 Oct and closed by air at Camp Holloway by midnight to assume operational control of TF INGRAM.


While the 1st Brigade was still charged with securing Pleiku, it had two additional missions: to provide artillery support for the ARVN relief of Plei Me, and to provide a reserve/reaction force for possible commitment to Plei Me.

While some of the elements of the 1st Brigade were moving to Pleiku the armored relief column ARVN began moving down provincial road 6C toward Plei Me. The enemy had underestimated and allowed one hour for the 32d Regiment to neutralize the relief column, and at 1730 the column met a heavy ambush simultaneously at two points. 1st Cav Div Arty was called in on the ambushing enemy with deadly accuracy and was a decisive factor in repulsing the attack. On the afternoon of 24 Oct the 1st Bde placed an Artillery liaison party with the column which further strengthened the support and morale of the ARVN units.

The enemy ambush failed to fragment and destroy the relief column, but meanwhile Plei Me was still under siege.

On the evening of 25 Oct the relief column arrived at the camp at Plei Me and immediately reinforced the defensive perimeter. 1st Cav Infantrymen and Artillery had also air assaulted from Pleiku on the 24 and 25 Oct into Landing Zones (LZ's) within close support of Plei Me. It was now apparent that the original enemy plan had failed, for that plan called for the 32d Regiment to destroy completely the ARVN relief column, and then, in concert with the 33d Regiment, to fall on Plei Me and reduce it.

At 2200 hours on 25 Oct the 33d Regiment at Plei Me was ordered to withdraw to the west,



MAP 5

leaving behind a reinforced battalion to maintain pressure and cover the withdrawal.

At this point a significant decision was made. General William C. Westmoreland visited the 1st Bde Forward CP at HOMECOMING, the LZ 5½ kilometres northeast of the Plei Me CIDG Camp, and authorized the 1st Cav Div (AM) to pursue, seek out, and destroy the enemy. These orders were confirmed on 28 Oct by message from CG IFF-V:

"Elements 1st Cav Div (AM) currently deployed Vic Pleiku will coordinate with and establish an area of operations VIC Plei Me CIDG Camp and undertake operations to find, fix, and destroy VC forces which endanger that general area."

The Division's scope of operations changed from one of reinforcement and reaction, to one of unlimited offense, the initiation of Phase II. It was to have responsibility for searching out and destroying all enemy forces that threatened the entire central highlands.

IA DRANG

The battlefield area covered approximately 1,500 square miles on generally flat to rolling terrain. The area is drained by the Ia Drang, Ia Puch, and Ia Kreng rivers, and an extensive network of small streams flowing to the west and southwest across the border and into the Mekong River in Cambodia. The dominating terrain feature is the Chu Pong Massif in the southwestern corner of the AO, straddling the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier. For long periods it had been an important enemy infiltration area and one of his many strongholds, where he could mass and construct strong defenses under the heavily canopied jungle.

Intelligence suspected that a Field Front (divisional headquarters) was controlling the enemy regiments. If so, this was the first time any US unit in Vietnam had opposed a NVA divisional sized unit under a single commander.

The 1st Bde assumed the new Division mission as a continuation of operation ALL THE WAY, which began on 23 Oct with the reinforcement of Pleiku and Plei Me.

The first significant contact was made on 1 Nov, when a platoon of B 1/9th Cav Sq overran a regimental aid station 6 miles southwest of Plei Me, killing 15 enemy and capturing another 15. This rifle platoon had been air assaulted into the area in response to sightings of scattered small groups by 9th Cav Sq scout helicopters. The other two rifle platoons ("blue" platoons) from Troop B were landed to exploit the contact and began to sweep through the area. At just after 1400 hours

scout helicopters reported a battalion-size force moving from the northeast toward the friendly platoons, which were then heavily engaged until 1800 hours with this large enemy force. The fighting was at close quarters—too close for rocket support from the Aerial Rocket Artillery, or for Tactical Air support. At the time, also, the position was beyond range of available tube artillery. Reinforcements were committed as platoons from 1/12th Cav, 2/12 Cav, and 2/8th Cav, landed late in the afternoon, followed by two additional platoons from 2/12th Cav. (Map 5).

Ground fire was intense on all reinforcement, resupply, and evacuation choppers, and seven ships were hit by hostile fire. By 1700 hours B 1/8th Cav was committed to the battle, and by 1900 hours the Blue Platoons of the 9th Cav Sq, having found and fixed the enemy, turned the requirement of destroying the enemy over to the 2/12th Cav. The Blue Platoons were then extracted from the area.

This operation cost the 33d Regiment its aid station, many patients, and over \$40,000 worth of important medical supplies, as well as 99 killed and an additional 183 estimated wounded.

This operation, also, demonstrated the Cav Sq at its best: scout ships reconnoitering and locating enemy groups, followed by rifle platoons fixing him in place, followed by heliborne units finishing him. This tactical concept and theory worked to perfection when implemented by the skilled personnel of the 9th Cav Sq and its backup units, not only at Plei Me but again and again during Div operations.

On 2 Nov Division intelligence learned that the NVA Field Front could expect its third regiment, the 66th, which had already arrived in South Vietnam but still had to move into assembly areas in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang area.

AMBUSH

On the night of 3-4 Nov, the rifle platoons of the 1/9th Cav Sq again drew blood; this time with a well-executed ambush at 2100 hours. The southernmost ambush position (all of which were located just north of Chu Pong mountain) sighted a heavily laden NVA unit estimated at company strength moving along an east-west trail. Deciding to take a break just 100 meters short of the ambush site, the column loitered outside the killing zone for 90 minutes, while the ambushing men of the 9th Cav Sq lay quietly in wait. At 2100 hours the NVA unit moved noisily along the trail westward. The first element was allowed to pass, and then the trap was sprung with eight Claymores along a 100 meter kill zone. It was perfectly executed and the enemy's weapons pla-

toon with machine guns, mortars, and recoilless rifles was caught in a wall of lead as the 9th Cavalrymen fired continuously for two minutes. There was no return fire.

The ambush patrol returned immediately to the patrol base and went to work to strengthen its perimeter. By 2230 hours this base perimeter was under heavy attack by an estimated two or three companies of NVA regulars. A CIDG Company, which had accompanied the 1/9th Cav Sq in earlier operations that day, remained in its ambush position to the north for the patrol base leader decided it was better to leave them there, than to try to bring them in during a firefight when recognition would have been difficult. They wore different uniforms, and of course spoke Vietnamese and Montagnard. By midnight the perimeter was in grave danger of being overrun, but reinforcements were on the way. Co A 1/8th Cav, on stand-by alert at Duc Co USSF (US Special Forces) Camp, 12 miles of roadless jungle to the north, had been alerted for commitment. The first platoon was on the ground and in combat within forty minutes after midnight. (Map 6). The entire company had closed by 0240. While this type of relief and reinforcement is now routine, it was a unique experience in November 1965, and the efficiency of its execution attests to the skill, daring, and esprit of the Cavalrymen. The operation was unique in that it was the first time a perimeter under heavy fire had been reinforced by night by heliborne troops air assaulted into an LZ which none of the assaulting forces had previously seen. It was also the first time that ARA had been employed at night and in such close support—50 meters—of the friendly troops.

By dawn the enemy attack had lost momentum, and contact diminished to occasional sniping from surrounding trees. The tangible results were 98 NVA killed by body count, 10 captured, and over 100,000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, two 82mm mortars, and three 75mm recoilless rifles destroyed in place, as well as 20,000 rounds of 7.62 and large quantities of mortar and recoilless rifle ammunition evacuated. The implications of an ambush deep within what was expected to be secure territory must have stunned the NVA high command.

Within two days, on 6 November, Companies B and C, 2/8th Cav, became heavily engaged with another NVA battalion 6½ miles to the northeast of the Chu Pong Massif. Once again there was close-in fighting which diminished as darkness fell and reinforcements were brought in. The enemy suffered another 77 dead, and many wounded were carried and dragged away from the battlefield.

SILVER BAYONET

On 9 November, after the completion of the 1st Brigade's search throughout the operational area, the 3d Brigade took control in Operation SILVER BAYONET I, with the 1/7th Cav, 2/5th Cav, and 1/12th Cav and replaced the 1st Brigade and its battalions. At this time, the enemy regiments were attempting to regain secure positions to rest and reorganize after the failure at Plei Me, the failure of the relief column ambush, and the subsequent stunning defeats of the NVA forces. On 11 November the enemy took stock and found the 32d Regiment was still a cohesive fighting force despite casualties sustained during the ambush of the ARVN relief column during its advance to Plei Me. The 33d Regiment had 890 killed out of its original 2200 men, with another 100 missing. The regiment had lost thirteen of its eighteen anti-aircraft machine guns, and five of nine 82mm mortars. Its depleted ranks required reorganization and a melding of units to form a composite fighting force. The 66th Regiment had taken no casualties other than the 98 killed during the battle of 3-4 November, and as a result provided the major cutting edge of the Field Front.


The 32nd was located north of the Ia Drang, the 33rd maintained its positions just north of the Chu Pong, and the battalions of the 66th were strung along the northern bank of the Ia Drang.

While the 3rd Brigade was replacing the 1st, the NVA Field Front had also made plans to attack Plei Me again on 16 Nov with these three regiments. This decision was made as an attempt to regain its earlier advantages in the east. It also decided to support the attack with a 120mm mortar battalion and a battalion of 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft machine guns, both of which units were on infiltration routes headed into RVN. Another turning point in the War had been reached, for this was to have been the first time a full NVA division was to attack a target in South Vietnam.

What followed was a period of heavy combat, as the mobility of the 1st Cavalry once again enabled us to seize the initiative from the enemy and deal him an overwhelming defeat.

GARRY OWEN

On 14 Nov Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore, the CO 1/7 Cav before moving up to take over the "Garry Owen" Brigade, received the mission to air assault near the Chu Pong mountains to conduct search and destroy operations to upset enemy formations in the area. Bravo Company was on the ground at LZ X-Ray, 1 mile north of the massif, by mid-



MAP 6

morning and within two hours the remainder of the battalion had closed unopposed. (Map 6). A prisoner was captured and admitted that he was a member of the NVA and further stated that there were three battalions on the ridge above the LZ. While C Company secured the LZ, Bravo Company had meanwhile moved north and west. At 1330 Bravo Company reported it was under heavy attack by at least two companies and that its forward platoon was in danger of being overrun. This platoon remained an isolated island of resistance until it was retrieved the following day. Alpha Company on Bravo's left flank likewise became engaged with a company size force that was attacking Bravo Company. The LZ itself was hit by mortar fire forcing C Company off to the east where it soon came under a two company attack. Elements of D Company were moved to reinforce and combined with tactical air, aerial and tube artillery within 100 meters of friendly positions, were able to crush the attacks. (Diagram A).

Meanwhile 2/Lt. Walter J. Marm Jr., 1st platoon leader in A/1/7 had taken charge in his area of responsibility. Finding that his platoon was pinned down by deadly accurate machine gun fire, Lt. Marm took matters in his own hands, moved from his position of relative security and single-handedly assaulted the well-entrenched, bunkered positions. After personally killing several enemy with grenades and small arms fire, Lt. Marm was seriously wounded as an enemy round smashed through his jaw. For his heroism that day, Lt. Marm was awarded an interim Silver Star and a year later the division's first Congressional Medal of Honor for gallantry in Vietnam.

By 1545 sufficient troops had landed to consider another attempt to reach the cut-off platoon since the first had been stopped by upwards of 300 enemy. A combination of terrain and the numerical superiority of the enemy once again stopped the companies short of their goal. By 1900 B/2/7 Cav. had landed at the LZ and was initially placed in reserve as a battalion reaction force. Later one platoon from B/2/7 reinforced C/1/7 and its recon platoon was pulled back to join the reaction force. The decision was then made to place the isolated platoon in a defensive position and to establish a battalion perimeter before dark. (Diagram C).

The enemy made three separate attacks on the isolated platoon during the night, each of 50 man strength. The main perimeter was also under repeated probes, but each was repulsed by intensive artillery protecting fires that ringed the two positions. The 105 howitzers of A and B Batteries of the 1/21 Artillery at Falcon, a nearby LZ,

pumped more than 4,000 rounds of high explosives in close support of X-Ray. Throughout the night an C-47 Air Force ship remained on station providing continuous illumination. Air strikes and artillery resulted in numerous secondary explosions.





The division had achieved complete surprise with the air-assault at the foot of the Chu Pong mountains, which forced the enemy to abandon his plan to attack Plei Me in order to defend his own base area. This threat at the Chu Pong presented the first attempt to penetrate the massif since 1954. Since 1954 it had been a secure rear area in which the enemy stored supplies, conducted training, manufactured and repaired arms and equipment, and provided an operational base for combat units. Reacting swiftly to the Cavalry landings, the Field Front ordered the 66th Regiment to attack the LZ with its 7th and 9th Battalions and a composite battalion organized from the remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 33rd Regiment. There has been no explanation why the 32nd Regiment remained in its positions 8 miles to the northeast of X-Ray.


On 15 Nov the Field Front sought to redeem its failure on the 14th by adding to the attack the 8th Battalion of the 66th Regiment and the H-15 Main Force VC Battalion.

VIOLENCE

The morning of the 15th erupted in violence as the enemy continued the fight with multi-company attacks, probing the LZ's perimeter for weak spots. Most severely hit were two platoons of C/1/7 on the southern portion of the LZ when the enemy closed for hand-to-hand combat. (Diagram D). The eastern portion was similarly hit forty-five minutes later at 7:15 a.m. and within another forty minutes A Company on the west came under attack. Elements of B/2/7 which had assaulted into X-Ray the prior evening were committed as reserve to reinforce C/1/7's area. After two hours of fierce fighting, the attack abated making it possible to land A/2/7 Cav to beef up the perimeter. By 1000 hours the enemy attack was over as he withdrew into the Chu Pong.

The men of the Black Knight battalion, the 2/5 Cav, also moved overland from LZ Victor to X-Ray, a distance of two miles, and had closed by 1245 hours. It was assigned the mission of sweeping to the northwest to spring loose the isolated platoon of B/1/7. The attacking echelon included A and C Companies of the 2/5 Cav and B/1/7 Cav. They reached the platoon without serious resistance, and all the forces returned to the LZ perimeter by 1600 that afternoon.





MAP 7

Meanwhile the companies which remained at LZ X-Ray had screened 300 meters to their front and found NVA dead, body fragments, and weapons and equipment around portions of the perimeter. There was massive evidence of the high number of casualties taken during the fight. Bloody trails and bandages told of NVA who had been dragged and carried from the battle area. Enemy bodies were found stacked behind ant hills. We also found that wounded NVA had to be approached with caution, for they became fanatical in their resistance to capture, and the division took a few casualties before we learned to appreciate this fact.

All the forces at X-Ray were under OPCON of Lt. Col. Moore, CO 1/7 Cav and each went into assigned areas for a nighttime perimeter.

THE B-52's

15 Nov, while the battle was raging at X-Ray, marked the introduction of a new weapon against these NVA units in the Central Highlands and one which struck terror in the hearts of even the most hardened North Vietnamese regulars. Shortly after noon, a large area in the Chu Pong erupted with hundreds of thunderous explosions that moved across the ground like a giant carpet being unrolled. The B-52 bombers had struck and for the next five days the big bombers systematically worked over large areas of the Massif.

At 0400 on the morning of 16 Nov, the enemy began a series of probes around the perimeter, gradually increasing in intensity. By 0640 the several attacks had been beaten back, and the order was given for a "mad minute" at 0655 during which all weapons on the perimeter opened up. They systematically sprayed trees, bushes, and ant hills to their front. The shock of this firing caused a group of 40-60 NVA, who had been creeping toward the perimeter, to launch their attack prematurely. The attack from 150 meters forward of the perimeter was beaten back without difficulty.

Sweeps around X-Ray that morning revealed more enemy dead and confirmed that still more enemy dead and wounded had been carried off. At 0530 before the mad minute the 2/7 Cav landed at the LZ. After the fight the 1/7 withdrew by air from X-Ray to Holloway for rest and refitting. The 2/7 Cav and the 2/5 Cav then made plans to leave X-Ray on 17 Nov as it was in an area scheduled to be hit by a B-52 strike. The fight at X-Ray had been another costly one to the NVA which suffered 834 killed and an additional 1,000 estimated killed. Over 100 individual and crew served weapons were destroyed in place while many others were evacuated.

These two days of intense combat have been rated as the biggest battle in Vietnam for 1965.

The cavalymen at X-Ray received outstanding fire support as tube artillery fired over 6,000 rounds and ARA expended more than 2,000 rockets in the two-day period of heavy fighting. The Air Force maintained its aircraft on strike runs on an average of one every 15 minutes for more than 40 hours. There is little doubt that the outcome would have been different without this overwhelming weight of metal.

1/7 UNIT CITATION

Because of the unit heroism and brave determination of the men of the 1/7 Cav. during these two days, Lt. Gen. (then Maj. Gen.) Vinh Loc, CG II CTZ, recognized the American effort on the behalf of the Vietnamese people and subsequently awarded the "Garry Owen" battalion the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm.

After his defeat at X-Ray, the enemy decided he had had enough of the infantry positions and decided to turn his attention to what he thought would be less well-protected positions—the artillery at LZ Columbus and LZ Falcon, 1½ and 5½ miles respectively to the northeast of X-Ray.

As the friendly battalions left X-Ray for overland movement on 17 Nov and headed toward the northeast, the 8th Bn, 66th Regiment and the H-15 VC Bn began their move in that direction to attack these artillery positions.

The 2/7 Cav and A/1/7 Cav followed the 2/5 Cav toward Columbus for one and a half miles before splitting off to the northwest to recon a proposed LZ, named Albany. (Map 7). About 300 meters short of the objective two POW's were taken, and the column continued. As the lead element entered Albany, heavy fire was received from the right and left front as well as from its right flank. There was close hand-to-hand fighting in the positions of C and D companies and in a few cases the enemy penetrated through the ranks of the column.

The fight was an infantry battle at close quarters for several hours until perimeters could be marked and identified in order that air and artillery fire power could be brought to bear. The first strikes were made by ARA which were followed by a napalm run which helped to break up a company attack forming on the western portion of the perimeter.

By 1620 the firing had diminished sufficiently to permit B/2/7 Cav to air assault into the perimeter. By 2200 that night B/1/5 Cav had marched overland from Columbus giving the perimeter needed reinforcements. There were no major threats for the rest of the night.

When the battle area cleared the next morning, the enemy had once again been defeated. In this case it was the 8th Bn, 66th Regiment which had halted in hasty positions on its way to the artillery positions and was eating lunch when outposts brought word of the approach of a large US unit. In some cases enemy machine guns were fired from exposed positions and many NVA then entered the fight wearing their heavy forage packs. To say the enemy was completely unprepared would not be a understatement. This state of unreadiness meant the enemy lost 403 killed by body count as well as substantial weapons and equipment. It would be safe to say that this 8th Battalion was no longer an effective fighting unit.

THE BLACK KNIGHTS

On 20 Nov the 3d Brigade terminated SILVER BAYONET I and was replaced by the men of the Blackhorse Brigade with the initiation of SILVER BAYONET II. Included in the 2d Brigade task force were four cavalry battalions—the 1/5, 2/5, 2/12 and 1/8 and elements of four artillery battalions—1/77, 1/21, 2/17, and 2/20. The remainder of the operation was spent attempting to regain contact with large bodies of the enemy and was characterized by constant harassment of small groups attempting to avoid contact. All told, the enemy lost 1,519 killed by body count with another 2,000 estimated killed. There were 57 captured. His material losses were comparable, with 897 individual weapons captured and more than 400 others destroyed; 126 crew served weapons captured, as well as a great deal of communication equipment and grenades.

There is no doubt that the ARVN relief force would have been defeated en route to Plei Me, and the camp itself overrun, without the intervention of the 1st Cav. What made the intervention even more unique was the manner in which THE FIRST TEAM conducted the initial support operation and eventually the pursuit. The enemy was no stranger to the helicopter and the advantages it offers its allies. What he failed to grasp was the use of the helicopter in a role other than as mover of supplies, other than as an airborne 2½ ton truck. For the first time he found his withdrawal routes blocked, his columns attacked, artillery fire adjusted on routes of exfiltration—all because of the third dimension which the 1st Cavalry added to the war. So baffled was the enemy during the pursuit of the 33rd Regiment from Plei Me by constant harassment and rapid compromise of "secure" way stations that a captured document revealed the NVA

cadre concluded there were traitors within the regiment providing target information to the Americans.

LESSONS

The PLEIKU Campaign was the division's baptism of fire in the Vietnam War; it marked THE FIRST TEAM's participation in each of the three Major Conflicts our nation has been involved in since the division's formation in 1921. It meant that the 1st Cavalry was one of the two US Army Divisions entitled to two stars on the Combat Infantryman's Badge. It also meant some new "firsts" in FIRST TEAM history. It was the first time a large American unit operated continuously over difficult terrain, devoid of roads, relying extensively on heliborne tactics. It was the first time American units met and defeated consistently large NVA units fighting as battalions and regiments under Field Front control. Also particularly noteworthy were the repeated moves of the 105mm howitzers by means of the Chinook helicopter to provide constant fire support to fast moving airmobile infantry, the reconnaissance by fire techniques developed by the Air Cavalry Squadron, the coming of age of the aerial artillery tactics, and the perfection of massive logistical efforts. There was an unprecedented use of airmobility and fire power as over 400 helicopters consumed 85,000 gallons of fuel daily.

In another respect these 37 days of combat had proven something of even greater importance. They had shown beyond a doubt that the air assault concept was valid under actual battlefield conditions. The campaign had been the acid test of combat for the airmobile division and there can be no question that it fully carried its weight. The accolades paid to the division reflect this splendid success. General Westmoreland declared it "the most significant defeat inflicted upon the enemy in this war." Other congratulatory messages followed: General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, sent a message to General Kinnard which recited in part:

"On behalf of all members of the United States Army, I salute the intrepid officers and men of the 1st Cav Div (AM) for their superb action in the battle of the Ia Drang Valley. . . . The Army and the nation take pride in your display of courage, determination and fighting skill."

Secretary of Defense McNamara, usually conservative with compliments, declared, "There was no other outfit in the world that could have accomplished what this Division did."

The defeat of the Field Front, or 630 NVA Division, in the Pleiku Campaign, blocked his first attempt to move into the Central Highlands in strength. We will see later that the enemy had placed considerable emphasis on gaining a foothold in the western portion of the II CTZ.

THE ENEMY

This first major engagement with the enemy taught the Cavalrymen a great deal about the training and discipline of the NVA regulars. It also proved the elusiveness of the supporting Viet Cong guerrillas. We had learned a lot about the enemy. We know that there were two nominally distinct enemy military organizations—the NVA and the Viet Cong forces. More convincingly though we knew each was controlled by the Hanoi based Communist Party led by Ho Chi Minh.

These NVA units infiltrated into South Vietnam through the demilitarized zone at the 17th parallel and along the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos and Cambodia, a system of roads and foot trails meandering southward before turning east toward the sparsely populated frontiers of South Vietnam.

In addition to these NVA units other Communist fighting forces in South Vietnam include the VC's Main Force, District Force, and Village Defense Force Organizations.

Significantly and most dangerous is the VC pretense of a truly South Vietnamese "people's army." This facade rapidly crumbled beginning in 1965 with the increased introduction on a growing scale of North Vietnamese forces and equipment and stepped up operations by regular North Vietnamese divisions. The Main Force units are the VC Shock Troops and are composed of well trained and equipped men who are capable of fighting conventional battles of limited durations, although they are reluctant to do so. The District Forces and Village Defense Forces are usually paramilitary forces and are generally made up of local civilians who are part-time soldiers or guerrillas and whose military duties do not take them far from home. They are often seen as farmers and merchants by day—terrorists—guerrillas at night. Among them the less well-trained and equipped serve as guides, guards, messengers, bearers, and informants for the regular military units.

The enemy, whether he be NVA or local guerrilla, is collectively referred to as "Victor Charlie," V.C., "Old Charlie" or just "Charlie." The small guerrilla army which existed in 1960 had matured into a formidable force by 1966. Correspondingly, the demands on local civilians have increased to support these larger units. The military and

political support organizations have grown so rapidly they now collect four times as much taxes as does the constituted government of South Vietnam. The logistical requirements for food and weapons have also greatly increased. As a result "Charlie" is supported in the field by an incredible logistical organization beginning with the Local V.C. tax collector and extending many miles to North Vietnam over trails and roads worn smooth by the feet of thousands of porters.

Literally translated, the phrase Viet Cong means Vietnamese Communist and those who are members of the V.C. army employ all the communist tricks of deceit and violence. Viet Cong also applies to the military or to the civilian components of the "Front," of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, more popularly known as the NFL.

"The war in Vietnam is a different kind of war" said President Johnson on July 28, 1965. "There are no marching armies of solemn declaration. Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government. But we must not let this mark the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the south, to defeat American power and to extend the Asiatic domination of Communism."

While NVA units are usually found wearing khakis and carrying packs, the local guerrilla or old charlie is clad in Calico Noir, the traditional black P.J.'s of the Vietnamese peasant. The arms for main force and district force units may range from 75mm recoilless rifles and 82mm mortars to Communist and French manufactured machine and submachine guns. The individual soldier may be armed, however, with nothing more than a few potato masher grenades. He is ingenious, a master at camouflage, and an expert in living and moving underground. His elaborate tunnel complexes stretch for miles and are used for both cover and for concealment from ground and air surveillance. He knows the insidious effectiveness of booby traps, poisonous punji stakes, spike boards, Malaysian gates, and trip-wired cross bows. Each has taken its toll in American casualties. His adept use of terrorism has controlled great numbers of Vietnamese, for he thinks nothing of torturing or killing village and Province Chiefs, teachers and other influential citizenry. As a result many Vietnamese support the Front only because of fear. Because of the militia and the secret agents of the Communist organization, more than a third

of the people of South Vietnam were paying taxes to the Front by the end of 1966 even while they continued to pay taxes to the legitimate government of South Vietnam.

He fights well but often more for fear of capture than from ideological conviction. His cadre keep him isolated from contacts which would tend to counter their propaganda and indoctrination. Main Force battalions have carried out well-planned attacks and ambushes with NVA counterparts. Utilizing an explicit tactical doctrine summarized in four words, "Four fast, one slow," the V.C. carefully plan every move. His credo is "Fast advance, fast assault, fast clearance of the battlefield and fast withdrawal" based on "slow preparation."

As described, his usual tactic is to hit and run. He will exfiltrate an area when he feels his security is endangered, only to return when his enemy has withdrawn. As will be seen he is a master at this exfiltration especially under the cover of darkness. When he is trapped, however, he will fight and fight viciously for his life. He will not initiate engagement though unless forced to or unless he feels he has the upper hand—which is usually a numerically superior force or he is in well-prepared, camouflaged defensive positions. If he does undertake an offensive attack, it may or may not be preceded by mortar and recoilless rifle fire to "unsettle" the enemy.

As an individual, he is strong but small (usually not over 100 pounds), raised in the jungles and accustomed to the severest rigors of life. He stores food, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies in caches throughout his base areas. He needs little more than two pounds of rice a day to keep him going.

His actions under fire have led some to suspect use of narcotics before battle, as reflected in this report:

"... they started charging me with 10 to 15 man waves, on a regular skirmish line, hollering and screaming. I hit some of them two or three times with bullets and they would keep coming at me, stop, turn around and then I could see big blood splotches on their backs as they took two or three steps toward the rear and then fell over. When they were charging me they were yelling, and even after I hit them they were laughing."

This is what the Cavalrymen learned of his adversary. There is no doubt the enemy is a professional, at least in his type of warfare. Much of what the troopers were told at Fort Benning they now knew was true from personal experience.

DECEMBER

Following the PLEIKU Campaign, division attention was again directed to the east of An Khe, first to provide security for the establishment of the Republic of Korea Capitol Division's base camp at Binh Khe and then into an area we have come to know well—the Soui Ca Valley. G-2 Intelligence indicated that as many as 1500 hard core VC and local guerrilla forces were in the valley. The 3rd Brigade was tasked with finding and destroying them.

Operation CLEAN HOUSE was conducted in three phases from the 17th of December until the end of that month. After moving into assembly areas on the 17th, the 1/7 Cav began its search on the 18th along with the 1/8 Cav in an Operation called SCALPING MUSTANG. The 2/7 began its search the following day. These battalions were supported by elements of the ROK Capitol Division which were in blocking positions near the mouth of the valley. Although there were 137 enemy killed during the three phases, the losses were suffered mostly in short fierce engagements with the enemy attempting to break contact whenever possible to exfiltrate the area.

On December 29 a unique system was used. Intelligence indicated that "Charlie" was departing the valley through a particularly forbidding piece of heavily wooded terrain. To counteract this possibility and to reconnoiter the area quickly, 300 riot control agent (CS) grenades were dropped by Huey helicopters on the suspected area from a locally built grenade dispenser. An area of 300 meters by 350 meters was effectively denied by the agent. No VC were seen moving, and thus with relatively little effort, it was determined there were no enemy occupying the area.

Psy-ops efforts continued throughout CLEAN HOUSE, and 306,000 leaflets were dropped on the objective area to explain the presence of US troops, appeal for surrender and to get the people not to aid the VC. In order to deflate the value of VC "payment certificates" given to indigenous civilians for work performed, Psy-Ops dropped 30,000 reproductions of the VC 1,000 Dong notes. We attempted to defeat the enemy and undermine his resources in every way possible. Several captured documents added to our rapidly building files on enemy formations in the area.

MATADOR

After CLEAN HOUSE the division returned to more effectively secure its base camp and highway 19 between An Khe and Pleiku. Operation MATADOR was conducted in two phases, the first of which was to open this portion of the highway

followed by phase II with search and destroy operations along the Cambodian border. MATADOR I took place between 31 December 65 - 13 January 1966 with the commitment of the "All the Way," 1st Brigade. Highway security today is merely a routine mission, but a year ago it was considered a major operation. The enemy had controlled the road system and territory between the major cities for many years. It was along "The Street without Joy," as Highway 19 has been called, that the French Group Mobile 100 suffered 2,000 killed out of 3,600 men in an armored convoy in 1953 in the mountain pass separating An Khe and Pleiku. During the eight days between January 4 and 12th the 2/12 Cav escorted 37 convoys into Pleiku with a total of 2913 vehicles. Each trip was made without incident. As the convoys carried much needed supplies into the central highland, they broke the hold the VC had established on the logistical flow through the area. The entire portion of the road was protected by various artillery positions along its length. Phase II began on 13 January and lasted for four days while 2/5 Cav and 1/5 Cav conducted spoiling attacks along the Cambodian border to demonstrate that significant enemy fortifications were not in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. The 2nd Brigade which had entered the operation set up its command post at the Polei Djereng US Special Forces Camp while the units operated from company sized bases along the border. The heavily forested area required the use of the trooper ladder from Chinooks for the first time to introduce engineer troops through the thick canopy. LZ would then be cleared with chain saws in order to accommodate one or two choppers so that heavier heliborne engineer equipment could be lifted in. Although contact was limited to occasional encounters with small groups of local forces, MATADOR I and II served several useful purposes. In the first place it convinced the CIDG forces in the vicinity that there were no large enemy forces along that portion of the border. With their morale bolstered, it encouraged their offensive operations. It also provided mutual experience for US and CIDG forces in working together. Moreover, the division gained further detailed knowledge of the trails in western Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, while it destroyed VC way stations, training areas, and generally disrupted the enemy's logistical support facilities.

BONG SON

It was only eight days later, on January 25, that the division launched its longest and largest operation to that date. Operations MASHER/WHITE WING, also known as the BONG SON

Campaign, lasted for 41 consecutive days as the division moved into the northeast and eastern portions of Binh Dinh Province. (Map 8). Although the division had operated east of An Khe before, this was the first time we had penetrated so far into the eastern sections of the enemy's domain.


Reliable intelligence had built up over several months that eastern and northeastern Binh Dinh Province contained another NVA Field Front, the Sao Vang (Yellow Star) Division, then known as the 610th, but recently renumbered the 3d NVA Division. As the operation developed it became apparent that there were three regiments in the area—two NVA and one VC, all part of the Yellow Star Division. These units were primarily concentrated in the central-coastal plain north of Bong Son, situated on the Lai Giang River, and in the mountains to the north, west, and southeast of Bong Son. The plains area to the north was known to contain main supply routes as well as providing good recruiting areas. To the northwest is the An Lao Valley, an enemy held stronghold for 15 years, except for a brief period in 1954 when peace was restored between the Viet Minh and the French. To the southwest were the Kim Son and Soui Ca Valleys also rich rice producing areas and under VC domination.

The mission assigned the division once again gave maximum freedom of action to General Kinard: attack and destroy enemy elements in the area of operations, reduce VC influence in the coastal areas, and return the fertile lands and the local people to GVN control.

MASHER/WHITE WING was conducted in five phases in which each one of the division's brigades participated in one or more. We were not alone, however, THE FIRST TEAM worked in conjunction with other Free World Forces. Additional support came from the III Marine Amphibious Force, the 22nd ARVN Division, and the ROK Capitol Division, each working toward the ultimate goal—Pacification. Mainly the 22nd Division secured National Route 1 which ran from Bong Son to Qui Nhon, while their airborne brigade attacked east of NR 1. The Capitol ROK Division provided highway 19 security between An Khe and Qui Nhon.

Although phase I began as a 3rd Brigade operation, the situation soon developed that required division wide participation. This initial phase lasted for only 3 days and was geared at deceiving the enemy as well as increasing the security on N.R. 1. The 1/9 Cav operated with excessive activity along the southern portions of the Chop Chai Hill Mass, southeast of Bong Son for deception purposes.

The first contact was established however, on



MAP 8

28 January, the beginning of Phase II, when the 3rd Brigade conducted air assaults and overland attacks north of Bong Son. The ARVN Airborne brigade was to the east and along the coast while elements of the 3rd Brigade attacked to the west of Route 1. Because of these attacks two enemy battalions, the 7th and 9th of the 22 NVA Regiment were found, fixed and destroyed. The division attempted to cut off enemy retreat by landing in blocking positions to the west and north of the areas of contact along expected routes of withdrawal. Fighting was heavy and by 1500 hours on the 28th, 28 aircraft had been hit by ground fire and four CH-47 Chinooks were inoperable. Heavy fighting continued for the next two days until the 30th when the enemy broke contact and withdrew to the adjoining high ground to the north and west. Phase II terminated on the 3rd of February at which time the enemy had already suffered dearly—566 killed by body count and 215 captured.

NEW FIRSTS

It was during Phase II that two unique firsts were established for both Army Aviation and for Army Artillery history. One was the operational displacement of the 155mm towed howitzer by CH-54A "Flying Crane" helicopters of the attached 478th Aviation Company. By means of a special sling fabricated by members of the Division Support Command, we were able to reposition the 155mm howitzer permitting it to occupy firing positions that would otherwise have been inaccessible. Unheard of until recently is the high ground artillery emplacement which has been used with considerable success by the division's artillery. The howitzer, which weighs about 13,000 pounds, gives the division a 3000 meter range bonus over the 105mm howitzer and greatly increases the amount of steel that can be placed on a target. The second historical "first" was the successful firing of the combination SS-11 missile/2.75 inch rocket weapon on February 2, 1966. This weapon system which is now standard in the 2/20 aerial rocket artillery battalion was devised, manufactured, and promoted by one individual, Warrant Officer Robert W. Maxwell of B Battery 2/20 Artillery. It is properly known as the Maxwell system. Therefore, the helicopters of the 2/20 had either one or the other of these two systems, but not both and to change systems for attack on different targets took precious time. Mr. Maxwell decided to eliminate this problem, and his invention substantially increased the effectiveness of his battalion. The Maxwell system provides the point-target capability of the SS-11 missile and the area fire superiority of the

2.75 inch rockets. This flexible and responsive system has added greatly to the ARA helicopter capability.

PHASE III

Phase III found the 2nd Brigade moving into the operational area with three additional infantry battalions—the 1/5 Cav, 2/5 Cav, and 2/12 Cav. The division had escalated to two brigades and six infantry battalions in preparation for its entry into the An Lao Valley. The plan called for the US Marine Corps to block enemy escape routes to the north of the An Lao as part of its Operation DOUBLE EAGLE. The 22 ARVN Division was to block to the south. The brigades of THE FIRST TEAM were to establish blocking positions east of the valley on the dominant terrain, assault three battalions west of the Valley, and then attack east into and through the Valley. D-Day was 4 February; however, bad weather required a two-day delay during which time the enemy was able to escape. This was the only time in six months of fighting that inclement weather had caused a delay in 1st Cavalry airmobile operations. As a result, the attack into the An Lao was disappointing and met with only slight resistance.

During the third phase, the division's Psy Ops personnel were busy broadcasting and dropping leaflets to inform the people of the An Lao that the division would not remain there, and if they chose to leave the valley the opportunity was presented. Approximately 4,500 of a total population of 8000 elected to leave, and of those 4,500, over 3,300 were flown to freedom in division Chinooks.

KIM SON VALLEY

The fourth phase of the operation was initiated to exploit intelligence reports of an enemy buildup in the Kim Son Valley, dubbed the "Eagle's Claws" or "Crow's Foot" because of the seven valley configuration on the map. In this phase the division perfected a new technique for finding and fixing the enemy. The 3rd Brigade air assaulted elements of three battalions onto the high ground and on exfiltration routes of these various valleys, establishing ambush positions. Simultaneously, the remainder of the brigade assaulted into the center of the valley along the valley floor and began sweeping outward toward these ambushes. These "beater" forces flushed the enemy into the kill zones of the ambush positions; the tactics worked as well as it was planned. For more than three days ambushes were sprung which resulted in two heavy contacts.

On February 17th, B Company 2/5 Cav air assaulted into an LZ and by 9:15 a.m. had found

and fixed a VC company armed with heavy weapons and a large number of automatic weapons. Two additional companies of the battalion were quickly committed to exploit the contact. A third placed under OPCON of LTC Edward C. Meyer, CO, 2/5 Cav assaulted to the southeast of this contact and immediately engaged another heavily armed unit. Intensive TAC AIR and tube and aerial artillery fires were delivered on the area throughout the day. And by 6:00 p.m. "Charlie" had had enough. A sweep through the enemy's defensive position revealed 127 of his bodies. A large number of mortars and recoilless rifles were left behind. It was concluded that the 2/5 had fought and decimated the anti-aircraft battalion of the Yellow Star Division as well as the signal company of the 2nd VC Main Force Regiment.

IRON TRIANGLE

The capture of a battalion commander in the 22 NVA Regiment led to the second significant action on the eastern edge of the Crow's Foot area and about 12 miles south of Bong Son, where an elaborate defensive position called the IRON TRIANGLE, was discovered on 19 February. The captured battalion commander directed elements of the 2nd Brigade to a meeting place where the prisoner had met his regimental commander two days earlier. As these elements began to move into the area, a fierce fire fight developed with what was estimated to be a regimental headquarters and supporting troops. When units of the 22 Regiment attempted to reinforce the regimental headquarters, they became caught in the cross fire of two companies of the 1st Bn, 12 Cav. For the next three days, the Iron Triangle was hit by wave upon wave of B-52 bombers and large concentrations of artillery. Finally by February 21st, the division had devised and implemented its own one-two combination. The area was saturated with CS (a riot control agent) to drive the enemy from his fortifications and was followed by a B-52 strike. Enemy resistance ceased, and the final enemy body count was 313.

Meanwhile, the 1st Brigade had replaced the 3rd Brigade in the Kim Son Valley on February 16 to allow the 3rd Brigade to return for base camp security and the TAOR mission. As elements of the 1st Brigade moved along the high ground on the eastern and southern portions of the Son Long Valley, the southwestern finger of the Kim Son, they encountered the headquarters company and the heavy weapons company of the 18 NVA Regiment. After a heavily contested engagement the airborne troopers of the 1st

Brigade captured ten of the twelve 12.7mm AA machine guns and nearly all of the recoilless rifles of the regiment.

The fifth phase of the campaign from 1-6 March was aimed at destroying the enemy forces in the Cay Giep Mountains. This is a forest covered mountain stronghold where air assaults were made by bombing holes through the canopy before Skytroopers could live up to their name and enter combat by means of rappelling from Hueys and descending on the trooper ladder from Chinooks. Once on the dominant high ground they swept down the hills, into the 22 ARVN Division which blocked together with two battalions of the 2nd Brigade along the low ground south of the mountains. Simultaneously, the ARVN junk fleet established a screen to the east. Contact was light, but the division did succeed in driving a large enemy force into the ARVN which resulted in 50 enemy killed and another 30 captured.

On March 6, MASHER/WHITE WING ended with 1st Cavalry forces back in the area south of Bong Son where the initial mission had begun 41 days earlier. The division had operated in 360 degrees around Bong Son in which enemy contact was maintained during each day of the forty-one days.

The BONG SON Campaign dissipated any residual doubts of an airmobile division's capability to conduct sustained operations, for at least four infantry battalions were effectively supported over the 37 miles from base camp throughout the operation. Also of particular interest was the first time elements of the division successfully completed an air assault into a riot control permeated area with all personnel, including pilots, masked.

BONG SON was a crucial operation for the division, for it offered additional proof, if skeptics remained, that the victory in the PLEIKU Campaign was no fluke. Undoubtedly the new 1st Air Cavalry had what was necessary to find, fix, and finish Charlie wherever and whenever the opportunity presented itself.

The statistics of the operation are impressive: 1,342 enemy killed by body count and a total of 2,150 killed by all participating Free World Forces. A hard blow was struck at the three enemy regiments which had long threatened Bong Son and the stretch of National Route 1 to Qui Nhon. Intelligence sources indicated five of the nine enemy battalions engaged were ineffective. Three field hospitals had been captured. Another encouraging sign was revealed from the fact that 140,000 Vietnamese civilians volunteered to leave their hamlets in the An Lao and Son Long Valleys to return to QVN control.

BASE SECURITY

One can now appreciate that the overall scheme of the way the Air Cavalry operates in Vietnam is not too dissimilar from that of the old cavalry days during the Indian Wars. In the Indian days, the troopers operated from a centrally-located, well-fortified base area, a base area which would be secure. It was here that they would refit and maintain their equipment, plan their operations and return for rest. That pattern is remarkably clear today, for in a war like Vietnam's where there are no front lines and resultingly no rear areas, it is also necessary to have a secure area to which the troops can return; hence, a base camp. The modern operational areas are, of course, farther apart and each of greater dimension than those of old due to nothing else than the means of mobility involved. In the case of THE FIRST TEAM, the most secure area of all is its large base camp, with a nine and a half mile circumference, which encompasses an area one third as large as Manhattan Island. While subdued and camouflaged patches black and OD for black and gold, OD name tags, ranks and insignia were sewn on the field uniforms, continued improvement was visible in base camp. The barrier defense system underwent complete planning, as it was envisioned by next fall to have a string of powerful lights completely ringing the barrier and floodlighting avenues of approach out for a distance of several hundred meters. The TAOR and highway 19 were also relatively secure as the stay-behind battalions, supported by a reinforced artillery battalion, made their presence felt. While there had been no major contacts in the TAOR, the mission demands every bit as much preparation and effort as does an air assault in the operational area.

The town of An Khe itself had grown rapidly as eager businessmen and local merchants capitalized on the services they had to offer. The laundry business probably grew the fastest and the Vietnamese were introduced to something new called starch. There were good laundries in which one could be fairly sure he would get back the same clothes he handed in and in a reasonable state of cleanliness. And then there were the bad ones. It didn't take long to make a decision. Other way-side shops along route 19 offered the usual trinkets, scarves, folding chairs, cabinets in addition to many other items on which one could spend money. A G.I. could not avoid the small girls running up with small cones of peanuts to sell, "Hello, G.I."—"you buy?" Then the little boys would crowd and compete for the shoe shine. More often than not either one or

the other and perhaps both would be purchased. One couldn't help but feel compassion in seeing the dirt and sores all over their bodies. But then merely having money would not help the situation.

It is only accurate to say that base camp and the TAOR are relatively secure, for the troops in each are constantly alert to the possibility of enemy mortar attacks. Such was the case at 20 minutes after midnight during the night of 19-20 February when elements of the 407th VC Battalion initiated a well planned attack on base camp to include an assault of Hong Cong mountain as the main thrust, an infiltration of the barrier on the opposite side of camp as a diversion, and a mortar attack. The V.C. company which attacked Hong Cong used one platoon in the actual assault of the communications facility with two platoons positioned in ambush posture to attack any ground relief forces which might be committed. All reinforcements for the facility, however, were effected by helicopter and the enemy ambush sites were successfully avoided. Although the attack on the communications-signal facility did not succeed in destroying any of the vans or transmission's facilities, friendly losses did include the death of a few men, the destruction of four generators, and the loss of one M-60 machine gun. Elsewhere, the diversionary attack accomplished very little, for of the few enemy who were able to penetrate the barrier each was immediately killed. The mortar attack delivered 106 x 82mm mortars which landed in the vicinity of division headquarters, the division's helipad, and the 1st Bn, 7th Cavalry with little damage. Artillery and ARA fired more than 1,700 rounds in a counter mortar program but without estimate of damage to the attacking enemy.

CAMP RADCLIFF

The next day, Monday, February 21st, was also an important one in base camp history. For that day Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge flew from Saigon to officially dedicate Camp Radcliff. The commemoration of base camp honored Major Donald G. Radcliff, one of the division's first fatal casualties of the Vietnam war.

Major Radcliff was a member of the advance liaison party and departed Fort Benning on August second for his orientation flying in this country. On the 18th of August General Kinnard sent a personal message to Lieutenant Colonel John B. Stockton, CO, 1 Squadron, 9th Cavalry in care of the USNS DARBY:

"Regret to inform you Major Donald Radcliff KIA 17 August 1965."

Maj. Radcliff, executive officer of the 1/9 Cav, lost his life at the controls of a gunship after he volunteered to fly a combat mission in the relief of a US Special Forces Camp. For his heroism that day he was awarded, posthumously, the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Purple Heart. His courage was in the highest tradition of the United States Army and it was only fitting that his name should be inextricably woven into the history of THE FIRST TEAM in Vietnam.

At the solemn dedication ceremony that February 21st, General Kinnard humbly explained, "In bestowing his name upon this camp we carve into history our recognition and appreciation for his sacrifice."

JIM BOWIE

The next significant operation began on March 13th and was of a search and destroy nature executed by the 1st and 3rd Brigades in the Vinh Than and An Tuc Districts to the north and east of Camp Radcliff. It was planned as a follow-up to the BONG SON Campaign, as intelligence reports indicated a VC headquarters and its service facilities were in the Kon Truc area. Units from Bong Son may have entered the area to rest and refit. Since the Kon Truc base area was also adjacent to the TAOR, operations there would also enhance our security. D-Day for Operation JIM BOWIE was originally scheduled for March 10th, but low ceilings and heavy rains once again forced a three day postponement. The two brigade assault was still made on the 13th at less than desirable conditions with a broken ceiling of 1,200 feet instead of the preferred 4,000 feet absolute. There was only light resistance with limited and sporadic contact, as captured documents and prisoner interrogation revealed that the enemy unit had made an orderly departure on 8 March. On March 21st, the 1st Brigade was returned to Camp Radcliff where it proceeded to the Pleiku-Plei Me area again to commence Operation LINCOLN on March 25th. The 3rd Brigade continued JIM BOWIE with ground sweeps and heliborne assaults from the Kon Truc area, through the old U.S. Special Forces Camp at Kannack, back to division base at An Khe, terminating the effort on March 28th. Although this operation saw relatively little contact, there were many way stations, training areas, and supply caches destroyed. There was wide-spread disappointment over the fact, however, that no engagements were made with units of the 407th VC Battalion which were believed to have withdrawn into that area after the attack on Camp Radcliff on February 20th.

Of interest is the fact that this operation was

logistically supported directly from base camp, 36 miles away. The skytroopers also gained valuable experience in perfecting assault techniques into extremely dense and mountainous jungle terrain, for the terrain around Kon Truc was perhaps some of the most difficult yet encountered by the division. Characteristic are steep hills rising 3,215 feet on the eastern side of the DAK KRON Bung River and 2,000 feet on the western bank. Numerous streams flow through deep ravines. Heavy vegetation covers the area.

Another innovation in the use of artillery was perfected during JIM BOWIE, the piggy-back sling which allows simultaneous displacement by Chinook helicopters of a 105mm howitzer, its firing section, and 30 rounds of ammunition. With the artillery crew in the aircraft, the 105mm ammunition is carried in a sling load beneath the howitzer itself, thereby saving a great deal of precious time in turn-around by allowing the crew to have a quick reacting package for immediate operation once displaced. In the field of tactics, the use of a "no-fire box" around a unit in dense jungle when the unit was unable to pinpoint its ground location, proved to be an effective means of fire support coordination. The box served as a fire support coordination line and limited fire inside the box to the artillery battalion with the mission of primary fire support for the unit. Other fires could only be delivered inside the box at the request of the unit and under control by its direct support artillery.

The air assault technique is, of course, much in evidence throughout all the operations. To place our operations in proper perspective, Major John J. Madigan of the division's G-3 training and operations office explained the alternative to the helicopter:

"In the first place, our movements to combat would be to a great extent roadbound, with all that such moves entail in South Vietnam—clearing the road, which slows the column, which in turn makes it more susceptible to ambush. By remaining on the road we would be subject to diversionary attack and the relief column ambush technique which cost the ARVN so heavily in the period just prior to the intervention of allied troops. Second, the VC and NVA drive to dominate the western portion of II CTZ and its subsequent penetration to the sea to link up with forces in Binh Dinh Province, could not have been countered by a road-bound force. The conventional force in this war must of necessity telegraph its punch, simply by being Channelized by road net. Once headed in a

certain direction the force must remain headed in that direction, reverse itself and return whence it started, or leave the road and attempt to move cross country at the generally accepted rate of 400-500 meters per hour. By our telegraphing the punch the enemy has in the past had all the time he needed to decide whether to stand and fight on terrain of his own choosing, or to avoid a fight, side-step the punch and counter punch as he saw fit. In essence, the enemy had found himself with many of the advantages which traditionally are supposed to accrue to the defense on interior lines. This is particularly true when considering the planning required before Free World Forces could mass enough troops to take the offensive. With the appearance of the cavalry, we have a division capable of seizing the initiative from the enemy, of placing him on the defensive with no advance warning, of swooping into previously invulnerable secret bases in multi-battalion strength, prepared to stay until the enemy is killed or abandons his sanctuary. In short, we have carried the fight to the enemy and forced him, prepared or unprepared to settle the issue. Finally, by smashing the enemy whenever his concentration of forces justifies committing our battalions, the Cav. has given the lie to those prophets of doom who say the VC is all but invincible. The ARVN have taken heart from this, and in the II CTZ have turned in some spectacular results against the enemy in battalion size operations."

LINCOLN

On the 25th of March, the 1st Brigade with three battalions had returned to the scene of the PLEIKU Campaign to begin Operation LINCOLN, also a search and destroy operation. LINCOLN was initiated to avert an enemy offensive, believed in progress, or pending in the immediate future. Although no specific enemy units were forecasted as a result of prior reconnaissance in force operations, the Division G-2 still carried in the area the 32d, 33d, and 66th NVA Regiments, which were encountered in November 1965, as well as an additional transportation company. These units were supported by the usual signal, medical, and engineer troops.

On the morning of the 25th, the 1/8 Cav air assaulted directly from An Khe to an LZ near Duc Co. This 78 mile air assault was one of the largest combat assaults of an entire battalion undertaken by THE FIRST TEAM. The 1/12 Cav, the 2/8 Cav, and the supporting artillery and

logistical units proceeded into the operational area by combat convoy made up of over 450 vehicles as well as 24 C-130 sorties. The division's aviation group and the helicopters of the 1/9 Cavalry supported LINCOLN from the "Turkey Farm," near II Corps Headquarters at Pleiku, and so named because of its appearance from the air with the many choppers irregularly spaced on the ground.

Meanwhile, the division's 3d Brigade continued Operation JIM BOWIE, northwest of the division's base, but planned for commitment into the LINCOLN Area. The 2nd Brigade maintained base, TAOR, and highway 19 security. The 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducted Operation GARFIELD, south of the LINCOLN AO, but prepared for commitment into LINCOLN on order of I Field Force Vietnam.

For the five days before March 30th, the 1st Brigade conducted small unit reconnaissance missions north and east of the Chu Pong Massif, while the 1/9 Cav screened along the Cambodian border in zone, north and south of the Chu Pong. Only light and sporadic contact was established.

The tempo of action increased sharply on the 30th, however, when the aircraft of the 1/9 Cav sighted three enemy in an open area south of the Chu Pong and observed thirty more hiding in prepared positions. Weapons ships of the 1/9 made gun runs and TAC AIR took them under fire with napalm. The 1st Brigade was notified of a possible significant target. To develop the situation, in true 1/9 fashion, the infantry platoon, A Troop, 1/9 Cav assaulted into the area. The platoon captured a prisoner who incredulously stated, "There are 1,000 troops in the area." Sure enough, shortly thereafter, this platoon became heavily engaged with a much larger force. An attempt was made to extract the platoon, but two lift ships of the 1/9 were downed by heavy fire. Fifteen men were killed in these crashes including the recently captured prisoner.

Reinforcements were on the way as A/1/12 Cav was enroute from Pleiku to assist the beleaguered platoon. Having closed into the area about 5:00 that afternoon, Alpha Company also became heavily engaged. ARA, close air support, and continuous illumination from SMOKEY BEAR, an Air Force flare ship, were provided throughout the night. Also at 11:00 PM a CV-2 Caribou made a low-level ammunition and ration drop to the units. This marked the 1st Cavalry's first attempt in making such a resupply at night. It was completely successful. A few minutes after 1:00 AM on the 31st, A Company of the Jumping Mustangs 1/8 Cav and B/2/19 Artillery, executed a night air assault into LZ CAT to provide tube

artillery support for the blue platoon and A/1/12. This was another first for the division—the first night combat assault by a rifle company and an artillery battery successfully planned and executed into an LZ not previously reconnoitered. The enemy broke contact prior to sunrise, on the 31st. He left behind 197 bodies and there were over 200 more estimated killed.

At 10:00 AM on the 31st, the decision was made to advance the operation's time schedule. This was done by the division's assuming operational control of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and by moving the 1st Cav's 3d Brigade into the operational area at Plei Me. These deployments marked the initiation of Phase II of the operation, which lasted until the 4th of April without significant contact.

Phase III began on April 4th as all units reacted to division OPORD 6611, issued on March 29th, by assaulting into the Chu Pong itself. The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division attacked from the north, the 1st Brigade from the south and the 3d Brigade from the east. For the next four days, until the termination of LINCOLN, the entire Chu Pong was traversed with light to heavy contact. No new bunker or cave systems were discovered. LZ's X-Ray and Albany, sites of heavy contact during the November 1965 PLEIKU Campaign, showed no signs of occupation or use by the enemy since the division's departure. Further proof that the enemy had not thoroughly combed the area is the fact that when an Air Force plane which had been shot down during the PLEIKU campaign was located by the Division's 3d Brigade, the six .50 caliber machine guns and over 1800 ammunition rounds had not been removed.

In total the enemy lost 480 killed, with roughly 200 of this number credited to the division's artillery. The light-weight M-102 howitzer was first used by the 1/21st Artillery and proved to be a valuable asset for the Airmobile Division with its lightweight and 6400 mil traverse. Also the Division's 8th Engineer Battalion built a 3500 foot C-130 airstrip in 96 hours and covered it with the new T-17 membrane in another 18 hours. A total of 2300 man hours and 787 equipment hours were required. In related engineer activity, two airstrips were built using the sectionalized bulldozer, which was delivered piecemeal by helicopter, assembled on the ground at the site location, and put to use.

NATION BUILDING

Although the division was heavily burdened with searching for and destroying the enemy from the South China Sea to the Cambodian border, it was waging an equally important war—the war of

helping the Vietnamese people to help themselves. It has been called "nation building" and is a campaign "to win the hearts and minds of the people" over to their legally constituted government. As the Division's G-5 office, headed by LTC Harry J. Phelps, has overall supervisory responsibility for the Civic Action affairs, the large portion of the implementation of the projects are left to the Civil Affairs Officers appointed by the respective subordinate units. These efforts have magnified since the initial attempts during Operation Friendship in the last days of October.

This is the battle without bullets. It is the battle to fight disease, ignorance, and poverty. Each of the various Civil Affairs Teams uses its own method—although the goal is always the same. Medical assistance is rendered to hundreds of persons a day—sometimes thousands. Clothing, food and soap are distributed. When time permits, division members show local civilians how to dig and use wells, how to build schools and hospitals, and generally to improve their economic and social development. There are many things to be done.

In the hamlet of An Son, Major Wilmot Hall, the 1st Brigade Civil Affairs Officer rose to his feet before a meeting with the hamlet and began to speak, carefully and slowly and in short sentences so there would be no errors in the interpretation to those present.

"We come from the United States of America. We are soldiers, but we want to do other things than just shoot the Viet Cong. We want to help your people and all the people of Vietnam. We want to help you to help yourselves so that everyone will enjoy a better life. But first, we must know what you need."

The hamlet chief, the spokesman present, produced a list of needs so basic that it staggered the officer for a moment because of its simplicity.

"We need a place for women to have babies," the Chief said.

Major Hall replied seriously. "A doctor will visit your hamlet once a week to treat the sick and examine the women who are heavy with child. An engineer officer who knows how to build a hospital will draw up a plan for your own medical center. But can you give us a person from the hamlet whom we can teach how to nurse those of your people who are ill?"

The Chief nodded.

Rather than dispense the largesse for which the U.S. Army is known the world over, Major Hall held up his hand for silence and attention. "We will help you help yourselves," he continued. "Our soldiers will not always be available to help

with the work in the hamlets and villages. They will show you how to build with the material we will provide. But you must do much of the work yourself."

The Chief nodded. However, he had additional requests such as the needs for wells and pumps, culverts so that their dirt roads would not be washed out with each monsoon rain, small bridges so that they could cross raging waters during the rainy seasons, and finally, they wanted the knowledge to bring an end to disease which for scores of years had been running rampant.

Meanwhile, other Cavalrymen independently took up the civic action cause of their own volition. Captain Warren E. Mullan, a platoon leader in the 2/20 ARA Battalion was asked by a Vietnamese school teacher if he would take time to teach a few words of English to a class of youngsters. The father of four children could not refuse. The first visit was followed by additional and longer visits until Captain Mullen began spending several hours a week in An Khe—as a school teacher. His explanation: "I just love kids."

MOSBY

Operations MOSBY I, 11-17 April, and MOSBY II, 21 April-03 May, were search and destroy and reconnaissance in force operations north and northeast of LINCOLN, respectively. Little or no contact was established by the committed units, but the division gained valuable intelligence of infiltration routes, rest stations, as well as uncovering a few sizeable caches.

The next operations, while not significant in terms of raw numbers, are included to demonstrate the unique capabilities of the division. The first of these, Operation BEE BEE, 26-28 April, was a show of force executed near Bong Son in conjunction with elements of the 40th Regiment, 22d ARVN Division. An air assault by C/2/7 Cav into an LZ in that vicinity had apparently flushed into the open a company-sized unit of the 22 NVA (Quyét Tam) Regiment. They were caught in the open by the gun ships of C Troop, 1/9 Cav and ARA ships of C Btry 2/20 Arty (ARA) in what is popularly known as the "Turkey Shoot" for the Cavalry helicopters. The aircraft killed 58 enemy without touching ground and without a single American loss. BROWNING, on 29 April, was a daylight raid with the mission of locating a VC rice husking machine reported to be operating in the Vinh Thanh Valley within the division TAOR. Two infantry companies, with ARA support, air assaulted into the area where the machine had been reported. There was light contact with the enemy, and the machine was found in a building which had been set afire by ARA.

Their mission completed, the infantry companies were withdrawn from the area by 12:00 noon and returned by helicopter to Camp Radcliff. BROWNING is typical of the type operation which we have repeatedly conducted on short notice to exploit intelligence.

LEWIS AND CLARK


Operation LEWIS AND CLARK, 3-16 May, found the 2/12 Cav air assault near Plateau Gi, 48 miles northwest of base camp, and return in leaps and bounds to An Khe. Only six enemy were killed, but the battalion discovered an ordnance station, an aid station, a training area with a bayonet assault course, and the location of an enemy battalion headquarters. Of importance, we were insured no major enemy forces were in the north and northwest of the Division's TAOR.

DAVY CROCKETT

While LEWIS AND CLARK was underway, the Division moved the 3rd Brigade into a second operational area, once again to the territory covered by MASHER/WHITE WING in northeastern Binh Dinh Province. DAVY CROCKETT, conducted simultaneously with LEWIS AND CLARK from the 4 to the 16th of May, was divided into two phases each of which claimed major enemy contact.

During the month of May the central highlands near Pleiku extending to the coastal areas around Bong Son undergoes a seasonal weather transition. The northeast monsoon weakens and the southwest monsoon winds strengthen, resulting in a decrease in precipitation, accompanied by rising temperatures. During both phases of DAVY CROCKETT the temperatures ranged from 94 to 110 degrees heat with little rainfall and high humidity. Each man was told to carry salt tablets keeping heat exhaustion cases to a minimum. In general, the weather was very favorable for air assault techniques.

Prior to the 3rd Brigade's entry into phase I around Bong Son and the confluence of the An Lao and Kim Son Rivers, reliable intelligence located two battalions of the 22 NVA Regiment, the objective of the 3rd Brigade's mission. On the 4th of May the 1/7 and the 2/7 assaulted into the northern part of the operational area and were in blocking positions when D Troop, 1/9 Cav, and ARVN APC Troops launched an overland attack to the north to drive the enemy into the trap. The attack northward was characterized by light sporadic contact until early in the afternoon of the 5th when the 1/9 Cav received heavy automatic weapons fire. (Map 9). In reaction,



MAP 9

the 2/7 and 1/7 moved to the area of contact to encircle what was estimated as an enemy battalion. Tube and aerial artillery maintained continuous fires, expending 806 rounds of all caliber within forty minutes, to fix the enemy while the maneuver elements encircled. Although high losses were known to have been inflicted on the enemy, the major part of the battalion was able to elude the encirclement through a gap left open in the south. The well-coordinated attack the next morning fell short of expectations as the enemy was no longer there. Shortly thereafter, at 9:55 AM an element of the 1/9 Cav went to secure a helicopter downed by enemy ground fire near the hamlet Thanh Son (2) which was south of the previous evening's encirclement. The 1/9 Cav received heavy fire from the hamlet and concluded that it was there to which the enemy battalion retreated and had held up.

The 1/7 Cav was ordered to attack south from its present position. D Troop 1/9 with the attached ARVN APC Troop attacked to the east. 2/7, in classic example of airmobility, was assembled, given its mission, and air assaulted into new positions south of the hamlet all within the space of less than an hour. Forty minutes after the battalion had been found, the enemy discovered the aggressive 1st Cavalry soldiers had once again surrounded him. The threat of the closing noose forced the enemy to dig in and that was the last mistake he was permitted to make. . . . Ordnance from twelve sorties of F-4C fighter-bombers pounded the area combined with relentless artillery fire. At one point an enemy company, caught between two 3d Brigade companies which were separated by only 300 yards, was bombed with 750 lb. bombs, in what Colonel Harold G. Moore, then 3d Brigade CO, described as "the most accurate display of tactical air precision bombing I have ever seen." The enemy positions had not been breached by nightfall but the division maintained the encirclement, and contact continued throughout the night as small groups attempted to exfiltrate. The enemy lost over 140 killed on the 5 and 6, and a captured prisoner subsequently revealed that the entire 9th Battalion, of the 22 NVA Regiment had been engaged and destroyed as a fighting unit.

The second phase of DAVY CROCKETT took place in the Crow's Foot between 11-16 May. The only significant contact was made on the 11th when aircraft of the 1/9 spotted what was thought to be an enemy battalion moving south-southwest in the valley. Once again air strikes and artillery were called in to hold the enemy while elements of the 1/9, 1/7, and 1/5 maneuvered into blocking positions on routes of withdrawal. Later the esti-

mate was dropped from one battalion to 40 NVA troops operating with 25 local guerrillas. Nevertheless this contact netted thirty-eight enemy dead from the sixty-five man force.

The second phase of DAVY CROCKETT saw extensive use of the Hunter-Killer airmobile technique as developed by Colonel Moore. This technique is just one of the many ways the air assault capability can be used effectively and ingeniously. To avoid tiring inordinate numbers of infantry in looking for "Charlie," the concept calls for a small lightly equipped force to scout an operational area with the mission of searching and hunting down the enemy. Once located, and this is often the most difficult part of this war, a larger combat-prepared "killer" team, on stand-by alert at a nearby LZ, can be rushed into the area to close with and destroy the force. When the terrain and weather permit, the hunter-killer concept employs the inherent advantages of the Air Cavalry; it relieves the infantry from the constant demanding jungle patrolling, and reduces unnecessary flying hours on our aircraft.

"AIR ASSAULT"

This is only one particular airmobile technique, but throughout there has been the repeated term "air assault," around which the continued success of THE FIRST TEAM revolves. But what exactly is an air assault and what are the components of such a maneuver? Once again, Major Madigan of G-3 Training and Operations explains it this way:

"First, of course, comes intelligence information pinpointing an enemy unit. Map study of the area will isolate a few likely LZ's; or perhaps we have been in the area previously and already know where we want to land. In any case a careful reconnaissance is made without attracting attention to the spot selected for the assault; the commander may have two or three long looks from a helicopter casually flying at various altitudes past the LZ. Plans are made for the assault as responsibility for initial security of the LZ is assigned, and equipment is issued and checked. Liaison is established with the helicopter company commander, who has probably been through a number of these assaults in support of one or another of our battalions. Fire support is laid on and perhaps TAC AIR will have a few planes in the area. Certainly ARA will be with the aerial column, to provide final preparatory fires on the LZ and then to remain in orbit on call with half their armament. As the troopers load the choppers, a complex system of communication is activated, linking artillery observers with their units, Commanders, pilots and other

contributors to the operation, to insure a rapid flow of information. As the troop carrying helicopters near the LZ, artillery fires, which have been hammering at the clearing and the trees surrounding it are lifted. ARA swoops in to deliver rocket fire on the enemy on any likely positions and is followed by escorting armed Hueys which spray the area with machine gun fire. The gunships go in on the deck to entice the enemy into firing at them and revealing his position. The troop ships arrive, sometimes landing, more often hovering a foot or two in the air and sometimes as high as ten feet, as the infantry hit the ground and head full speed for the edge of the LZ. The forward artillery observer, by now on the ground with his Company Commander, is in contact with his battalion either through the artillery liaison officer or an orbiting chopper, or directly to the battalion from his own radio. He is prepared to bring fire right up to the perimeter. ARA remains on station as succeeding waves of helicopters hit the LZ. Once the LZ has been secured, artillery must be moved in and the Sky Troopers are prepared to continue their mission on foot. By now they may be 15-25 kilometers from the battalion CP they left not over 30 minutes earlier. They may have crossed a mountain and a couple of rivers enroute to their objective with not even a second thought. Small wonder the shock actions of the air assault, as executed by this division, have proven to be more than the enemy can counter."

GENERAL KINNARD LEAVES

It was on the 5th of May, just after the initiation of LEWIS AND CLARK and DAVY CROCKETT, that the Airmobile Division experienced its first change of command. General Kinnard, who pioneered the air assault concept with the experimental division at Fort Benning and who brilliantly led the Air Cavalry in its first months of war, relinquished command to Major General John Norton, also a knowledgeable expert on airmobile tactics.

General Kinnard was to return to the Pentagon for his new assignment as US Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development. But there was the old Cav tradition for a colorful farewell ceremony to be given a departing Commanding General. And a most important ceremony it was going to be, for never before has one man been able to fashion an operational reality from a vision and a dream and then continue to command it in combat. Not even in the hey-day of the birth and development of the airborne divisions in World War II did one individual accom-

plish a similar task. The men who envisioned the dreams of airborne tactics were not the division commanders in combat.

With all the pomp and circumstance afforded a man of General Kinnard's caliber, the division went all out to deliver a proper send off to the soft-spoken CG. The sunny weather helped capture the panorama of color of the massed battle-streamered flags and guidons whose military traditions reflected an encyclopedia of American History.

In true air assault fashion, the ceremony began with a simulated combat assault by ARA rocket ships which, after flying low overhead, released a thundering volley of rockets which exploded outside the Camp Radcliff perimeter. The reconnaissance twin-engined Mohawks made a fly-by to pay their respects, after which followed the aircraft from the 1/9 Cav, trailed by the gun and "slick" ships of the 229th "Stacked Deck" Assault Helicopter Battalion. A trio of CH-47 Chinooks brought up the rear, with a piggy-back sling load of 105mm howitzer and ammunition pallets slung below.

There was the usual "trooping the line" of massed colors and the deserved praise by Lt. General S. R. Larsen, CG I Field Force Vietnam. As the day drew to a close, guidons bearers representing all the units in the division, took their positions along the path leading from the general's quarters on the hill, past the twin Quonset huts of the Command Headquarters, to the CG's waiting chopper on Skytrooper pad. After final farewells, General Kinnard once again trooped the line of colors, this time shaking the head of each and every one of the division's sergeant majors.

The band played "Auld Lang Syne," for an era was ending and on the morrow a new one would begin. The roar of the Mohawks signalled the final fly-by with all aircraft units of the division represented. Three bubble-nosed OH-13's trailed in the order of succession and hovered as they turned and displayed individual placards which read in sequence: ALL THE WAY; ★★ ★★ (four stars); HWOK. And so departed Major General Harry W. O. Kinnard, formerly of THE FIRST TEAM.

GENERAL NORTON COMMANDS

The following morning, General Norton, the Cav's new CG trooped the line of colors and a new era for the division began. General Norton was no stranger to the Cav, nor to the airmobile concept. In 1959-60, he served in Korea as a Battle Group Commander with THE FIRST TEAM, and in the early '60's, as an Army Aviation Officer to the Continental Army Command,

he served on the Howze Board, which gave birth to the Air Mobile concept.

When Operation CRAZY HORSE kicked off on May 16th, General Norton was at the helm of what would be a very rewarding and successful year for the 1st Cavalry. Ironically, 1966 was the Year of the Horse in the annual Vietnamese New Year, or TET, tradition of naming each year in succession after one of twelve animals. It was surely not going to be an ordinary "Year of the Horse," for the 1st Cavalry was there to insure it would be a year of hope and new found freedom for the Vietnamese.

CRAZY HORSE

The mission during CRAZY HORSE was to search and destroy in the rugged hill mass between the Suoi Ca and the Vinh Thanh Valleys south of the Crow's Foot area. While not an obstacle to airmobile movements, the density of the jungle represented many problems in the construction and selection of LZ's. The area was also effectively split into a northern and southern portion by a natural corridor between the two valleys. The "Oregon Trail," as this corridor is called, was used consistently by the enemy as an avenue of approach into and egress out of the Vinh Thanh Valley. Intelligence indicated the enemy was in the area, and a captured document revealed the possibility of an attack on the Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp in the northern end of the valley on May 19th, Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The period around the 19th was also to be one of no moon.

The 1st Brigade prepared for commitment against what we had determined to be the 2nd VC Regiment. Its mission was to continue the attack in zone to destroy the 2nd VC Regiment, and pursue the enemy regardless of his direction of movement. Maximum effort was to be made to capture prisoners for intelligence purposes.

The possibility of the overrunning of the Vinh Thanh Valley Special Forces Camp brought about an Harassment and Interdictory (H&I) artillery program and massed TOT fire missions on a scale not achieved since MASHER/WHITE WING. An indication that the artillery H&I fires did significantly hurt the enemy was revealed by a soldier subsequently captured during an attack on the co-location of the 1st Brigade's forward CP and the 2/19 Artillery. Under interrogation, the prisoner volunteered that the attack had been staged primarily in revenge for casualties suffered by the artillery H&I Program.

Our initial contact was made on 16 May when B/2/8 Cav touched down at LZ Hereford and became engaged with what the Commanding

Officer estimated to be a VC battalion. A & C Companies, 1/12 Cav, assaulted to reinforce, landing late in the afternoon. Contact broke at 10:45 that night. During the subsequent four days there was light to heavy contact throughout the operational areas, as the Cavalry units hopped and skipped from LZ to LZ. Early in the afternoon on the 21st of May the mortar platoon of C/1/12, which remained at LZ Hereford while the company's rifle platoon swept down ridges to the west was attacked and overrun by a company size force of enemy. Killed that day with the weapons platoon was Sam Castan, a Senior Editor of Look Magazine who was on an assignment with the division.

The operation went into its second phase on May 24 which lasted until the termination of CRAZY HORSE on 5 June. The concept during this phase was to surround the area with Cavalry and ARVN units to prevent exfiltration while all available TAC AIR and artillery blasted the center to destroy or drive out to the blocking forces the remaining enemy elements. Following three days of this intensive fire power the area would be swept again to destroy totally the last remaining enemy forces.

During the last days of the operation, heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy both from fire support and by the infantry units. During this time ROK forces maintained contact with an enemy battalion for 4 days, inflicting serious casualties. In total figures, CRAZY HORSE cost the enemy 507 killed by body count with an additional 380 dead. He lost 97 individual weapons and 16 crew served weapons. The division evacuated or destroyed 45 tons of rice and 10 tons of salt. Captured documents provided valuable information for the first time on the VC infrastructure of Binh Dinh Province. Too much credit cannot be given to the logistical support side of CRAZY HORSE. The Forward Support Elements carefully insured there was always enough artillery ammunition on hand. Because there were no roads in the operational area, the air line of communications (ALOC) performed superbly in unit resupply.

Meanwhile, by early June, improvements were visibly affecting the comforts of life in base camp. The semi-permanent 20'x80' buildings, with concrete floors and 2"x4" frames with tin roofs, had sprung up throughout the unit areas. Most of the men, however, still lived in tents with dirt floors but they could now see hope for things to come. More and more men had electricity in their hooches, as generators became more readily available. Roads in base camp were wider, and were periodically sprayed with an oil-based substance

to keep the dust down in the drier seasons. A swimming area with floats and wonderful place to relax was completed in a portion of the Song Ba River which flowed through Camp Radcliff. Yes, life had become more comfortable than during those days of late September.

ROTATION

It was also during the next three months of June, July, and August that the "old" FIRST TEAM would be rotating back to the States—the new replacements would soon arrive for their year with the Cav. Most of the "short timers" were on a count down, as each day they struck another day from their FIGMO Calendar (FORGET it, I Got My Orders!). This calendar is a massive cardboard cut-out of a voluptuous "round eye" whose anatomy is ingeniously subdivided into 365 days. This points to the fact that there are three things every GI knows in Vietnam: his rotational date, the number of days left before that date, and that another week has passed when he takes the weekly Chloroquine-Primaquine malaria prophylaxis tablet. The usual question during the waning months of one's tour was often repeated, "Has your turtle arrived yet?" Once one's replacements has arrived, the comment follows, "Oh, I see you've got your turtle! Now you can stack arms!" A "turtle" is no more than one's replacement, as seen from the rotating man's eye—it seems like it will take forever before he will arrive!

DECKHOUSE—NATHAN HALE

On the 18th of June a company of CIDG forces was overrun by an estimated battalion of NVA in an area southeast of Camp Radcliff at the Dong Tre Special Forces Camp, in Phu Yen Province, south of Binh Dinh. The 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division began Operation DECKHOUSE I, a day later on the 19th to close with and destroy the attackers of the CIDG force. When these elements of the 101st became heavily engaged on three sides with the 18th B NVA Regiment, the IFFORCEV reserve-reaction force, Task Force Colt, with B & C/1/8 Cav and B/2/17 Artillery were committed on June 20 from Kontum to reinforce. Thus began the 1st Cavalry's Operation NATHAN HALE in the vicinity of Tuy Hoa. That same day the 3rd Brigade Headquarters assumed control of the 2/327 still in contact and the 1/8 Cav after it deployed into the operational area. On June 22 at 5:43 AM B/1/8 Cav and C/2/327 Inf came under a heavy two pronged enemy ground attack at position Eagle. There was also sustained enemy mortar fire which fortunately overshot the

target and was largely ineffective. The enemy breached the friendly lines and took cover in the defensive foxholes only to be routed in violent hand-to-hand fighting by the reserve platoon of B/1/8. The enemy broke contact later that morning leaving behind 134 of its dead. For the outstanding display of unit courage and gallantry that morning, B/1/8 Cav has been recommended for the highest award for unit bravery—The Presidential Unit Citation.

On June 24th, elements of the 2/7 Cav encountered what was estimated to be a company at Plateau Cay Song 6 miles southeast of Dong Tre Special Forces Camp. Later that afternoon the estimate was revised upward to an enemy battalion. Elements of the 2/7 took blocking positions to the south while the 1/8 assaulted to the north. The cordon could not be completely sealed before nightfall, and the enemy managed once again to escape by fragmenting his forces and slipping through the jungle to predesignated rendezvous areas.

On the 26th, 1st Cavalry Division Headquarters assumed control of the operation until its termination on July 1st. The remainder of NATHAN HALE was characterized by extensive hunter-killer operations with very few enemy found and only sporadic contact made. The final tally on 1 July showed enemy losses at 459 with an additional 291 estimated killed.

The influx of new personnel became noticeable during the operation. These replacements from commanders, to aircraft pilots, to communications personnel arrived and began to learn the tactics and techniques essential to timely and successful airmobile operations. NATHAN HALE was a success in not only accomplishing the assigned mission but as a training vehicle for these recently arrived men.

HENRY CLAY

Operation HENRY CLAY began the next day, on July 2nd and lasted for twenty-eight days. It was merely a continuation of NATHAN HALE to the west and toward the Cambodian border. Contact was sporadic and very light with only 33 enemy killed. The division took advantage of the opportunity to integrate replacements at all levels, while it compiled additional data on terrain throughout the area of operations.

PAUL REVERE II

The stage was now set for another major effort in the west—PAUL REVERE II. The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division had had a continuing mission, beginning in May 1966, to interdict infiltration and supply routes in the Pleiku and Kontum

Provinces. As the 1st Cavalry was moving west during HENRY CLAY intelligence sources indicated a significant enemy build up in this area during the period 10-26 July. Reports reflected the possibility of a repeat of the circumstances during the early stages of the PLEIKU CAMPAIGN; that is, a diversionary attack on a fortified area, with the enemy in position to ambush relief forces on a highway or at likely LZ's. In particular, II Corps intelligence estimated that the 32nd, 33rd, and 66th NVA Regiments were still in the area and planned to attack CIDG camps at Duc Co, Plei Me, and also the city of Pleiku. Using strategy on a grand scale, the Communist invaders hoped that these attacks would draw major U. S. Forces away from Tuy Hoa and the eastern coast, thereby enabling the Viet Cong to secure the rice harvest in that area at that time of year.

By August 2, sufficient forces had been committed for PAUL REVERE II so that General Norton was given control of the AO. The operation followed the now-familiar pattern of extensive search and maneuver interspersed with brief periods of intense contact. As already seen the division had covered the AO extensively during the PLEIKU CAMPAIGN in Oct-Nov 1965, MATADOR 11-17 January, and in LINCOLN 25 March-8 April. We had a good idea of what to expect in both the enemy and the terrain. It was the weather, however, that was unexpected and unusually severe. General Norton described it as some of the worst weather he had ever seen for airmobile operations. Only a few hours a day were available for lift and resupply and even during these periods flying was hazardous.

From 2 to 7 August efforts centered on finding the enemy. We knew he was in the area, but most of the sightings and contacts were of individuals and small groups. On August 8th, however, A/1/7 Cav came under heavy fire at LZ Juliet and withstood mass assaults by a reinforced battalion for several hours. An attempt to encircle the company was beaten back by heavy artillery and TAC Air Support. The company was reinforced by two companies of the 1/12 Cav which were diverted, in a classic example of flexibility, while in the air to conduct another assault several miles away. When the helicopters with the reinforcements appeared on the LZ, the enemy broke leaving 106 dead. He was pursued until contact was lost after dark.


On the night of 9-10 August, the 9th Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st ROK Cavalry Regiment was working an area near the border, reinforced by a platoon from 1/16 Armor, 3d Brigade, 25th

Infantry Division. An enemy battalion attempted to overrun the company base, but was halted short of the objective with the armor platoon firing cannister. The one sided nature of the battle is evident from the fact that the Koreans suffered only seven killed and fifteen wounded, while the enemy lost 197 by body count with an untold number of killed and wounded dragged away.

The final major contact of the operation found the division once again at the Chu Pong massif, this time at Hill 534, on the southern portion of the hill mass. On August 14, A/1/5 Cav encountered forces at least in battalion and possibly regimental strength as it pursued a group of VC on foot. While attempting to link up with Alpha Company 1/5, Bravo 2/5 also became engaged with a large enemy force likewise in prepared, bunkered positions. As the size of the fortification became known additional companies were committed until two battalions were positioned around the enemy. The fierce close-in fighting continued throughout the night and well into the morning of the 15th. By morning, a total of 138 NVA dead were counted on the slope of Hill 534.

By 24 August, 1st Cavalry elements had begun movement of OASIS, the forward Division CP area, in preparation for return to Camp Radcliff. Within the next two days all units had closed into An Khe, and PAUL REVERE II had terminated.

Operation PAUL REVERE II was conducted in extremely dangerous weather, and great credit must be given to the division's aviators who braved very difficult flying conditions to accomplish their mission. PAUL REVERE II witnessed the heaviest commitment of the 8th Engineer Battalion in any single operation to that date. All of the battalion's resources and skills were fully required during this month-long operation to offset the effects of the prevailing rains of southwest monsoon. They did a superior job in keeping the roads in the area open as well as maintaining the respective airfields in operational condition. These two tasks alone required twenty-four hour attention. Artillery, as usual, played a major part in the operation, as over 100,000 rounds of various calibers were fired in support of the infantry. One innovation was the Air Force aerial re-supply of 6,100 artillery rounds for the 105mm and 155mm howitzers and the 175mm gun. Particular credit must be given to the ability of the aircrews to find and hit the LZ. Because of the terrain involved and the inherent lack of vehicles in the airmobile division, a wide dispersion in any airdrop would mean retrieving the cargo load and its packing



MAP 10

material, and in most cases by hand, round by round. The accuracy of the drops kept these extra efforts to a minimum.

The enemy lost 861 dead to the allied forces during PAUL REVERE II. There were 83 NVA captured and 43 VC captured. There is little doubt that the enemy was seeking a victory just before the Vietnamese national elections on September 11th. His defeat and withdrawal from the area not only deprived him of that victory, but further degraded his image in the Pleiku Province.

As PAUL REVERE II was drawing to a close, a task force with the 2/7 Cav was placed under the operational control of IFFORCEV on Operation BYRD and was sent to the southernmost part of the II CTZ to support the Vietnamese Revolutionary Development Program in Phan Thiet, Binh Thuan Province. This task force remained on this mission through the close of 1966.

ORGANIZATION DAY

On September 3rd, the division celebrated ten days early (because of tactical considerations) its 45th anniversary since the 1st Cavalry was activated in 1921. Brigadier General William A. Becker, Assistant Division Commander-A, was commander of the several thousand troops massed on the Golf Course air strip parking ramp. His staff was the Division's General Staff Officers: LTC Ardie E. McClure Jr, ACofS G-1; LTC William B. Ray, ACofS G-2; LTC James H. Mapp, ACofS G-3; LTC Robert A. Tolar, ACofS G-4; and LTC Harry J. Phelps, ACofS G-5. Behind them were massed the Division colors with the colors and guidons representative of each unit in the Division. These new Cavalrymen, many of them with the Division less than a month, had already become combat tested in PAUL REVERE II; they now listened to the glories of the past, to the traditions and honors that have come to the Cavalry, to its battle record: the purge of the Indian crises, the island hopping heroics through the Pacific, and the gallantry in the Pusan Perimeter before the northern thrust across the 38th parallel. They also heard recounted the historical birth of the airborne division only a little over a year ago and the hard-fought battles that ensued in Vietnam. They could feel exceptionally proud of this heritage which was handed to them, but even more so from the fact that they were contributing to it, making a new, a most important chapter in the history of THE FIRST TEAM.

After the reading of the division history, General Norton spoke of his pride in THE FIRST TEAM and the need to carry on in this traditional manner; LT General Larsen, CG IFFORCEV, emphasized the importance of the

1st Cavalry in the II Corps area and how in less than a year its many operations had completely taken the initiative away from the enemy. The ceremony terminated solemnly with a roll call of those cavalrymen who were killed in PAUL REVERE II which was followed by a minute of silent prayer.


At 9:50 that evening the enemy launched another mortar attack against Camp Radcliff, only this time there was no ground attack. The casualties were light to both personnel and to the helicopters which were parked on the Golf Course.

THAYER

Ten days later, the 13th of September, the day of the Division's actual organizational day, THAYER I commenced in what banner headlines in the Division's weekly, The Cavalair, proclaimed as the largest air assault undertaken to date. THAYER I initiated the first phase of the Binh Dinh Province Pacification Campaign, a grand strategy to clean up, once and for all, all regular VC and NVA units in the area as well as uprooting the long established VC infrastructure. Although this Campaign was still continuing after the first of the year, 1967, there were three separate, but closely allied division operations prior to 31 Dec 1966—THAYER I, IRVING, and THAYER II. In sequence, each one covered substantially the same territory, northeastern and central-coastal Binh Dinh Province, and had the same mission—complete pacification of the Province. This campaign marked this division's first opportunity to move into an area in force and remain there in force until the job was done.

To accomplish this mission, it was not enough merely to find the enemy. (Map 10). The division had to seek out and find the base areas of the 2nd VC and 18th NVA Regiments. By locating these vital stockpiles of food, arms and ammunition, equipment, and medical supplies he had worked so hard to build up, we would definitely complicate his capability to continue as an effective fighting force.

THAYER I began with five infantry battalions air assaulting into a circular configuration around the Crow's Foot area, landing on 14 high ground LZ's, after which they searched the ridge lines down toward the Kim Son Valley floor. (Map 11). Meanwhile, two ARVN airborne battalions deployed into the THAYER I AO and positioned themselves in the north of the valley to prevent enemy exfiltration as the noose grew tighter. Ground contact was sporadic, but there was no question about locating rear supply areas, for on September 16th elements of the 1st Brigade




CENTRAL-COASTAL AND NORTHEASTERN BINH DINH PROVINCE

MAP 11

MAP: VIETNAM
1:250,000
ND 49-5

SOUTH CHINA
SEA



CENTRAL-COASTAL AND NORTHEASTERN BINH DINH PROVINCE

MAP 11

MAP: VIETNAM
1:250,000
ND 49-5

SOUTH CHINA
SEA

located an anti-personnel mine and grenade factory. 3000 mines and 1377 grenades were in various stages of completion. That same day, the 1st Brigade came across a major regimental sized hospital with specialized surgical equipment and accommodations for 50 patients. A weapons cache on 17 September revealed 75 rifles, to include 16 M-16's and 200 lbs. of TNT. These were just a few of many. The number of these caches and their contents fully indicated that the Division was astride an important regimental trains area. By thoroughly dominating the valley, the Division prevented the enemy from using these bases he needed to remain combat effective. He had one of two choices: to stand and fight or to exfiltrate. He decided to run and headed eastward toward the coastal regions.

On the 19th of September, elements of the 2/8th Cav became heavily engaged with two enemy combat support companies in the highway 506 Valley situated to the east of the the KIM SON Valley. Taken in light of other intelligence, this contact was significant for it pointed to the fact that some of the enemy forces had left the valleys and were in fact moving east. Consequently, on September 20th, the 2nd Bde was given the mission of conducting a reconnaissance in force operation in area PANTHER with the 1/5 Cav. This battalion's assault to the NUI HON GIANG hill mass, east of the 506 Valley, was unopposed. That same day elements of the 2/5 Cav also deployed to the low ground further east of this hill mass to block routes of egress. The Division now operated in two areas of the THAYER I AO: the 1st Bde continued search operations in the KIM SON Valley while the 2nd Bde operated in the PANTHER AO. On the 21st, a day later, two companies of the 1/5 Cav air assaulted toward the northeast into area TIGER in response to reports that the Regimental Headquarters as well as the 9th Bn, 18th NVA Regiment were in that area. It is believed these units were attempting to exfiltrate to join other elements of the 3rd NVA Div located to the north in the AN LAO Valley. Sporadic contact was made on the 21st and 22nd of September which apparently forced these enemy units farther north. Significant contact with these forces was not established during the remainder of the operation.

ELUSIVE VC

On 22 September, elements of the 22nd ARVN Division joined the 1st Cavalry's search and destroy mission in THAYER I. Fortuitously, the 2nd Bn, 41st Regiment and the Regimental CP of the ARVN Div entered the AO in the Crescent area, a position near the location of two sought-

after enemy battalions--the 7th and 8th Bns, 18th NVA Regiment. This further confirmed that the enemy had moved east. Confused and unsure of which way to go, the two battalions decided to attack ARVN and achieve a victory on their way out. Consequently, at 3:40 AM in the morning on the 23rd, the ARVN position was attacked, but the enemy had underestimated ARVN's resources. The ARVN soldiers gave a tremendous account of themselves and, with artillery and air support from the 1st Cavalry, counter-attacked at 6:00 AM, forcing the NVA battalions off the battlefield, leaving behind 137 of their dead. They departed the battle area in an easterly direction, and, although there were strong elements of the 2nd VC Regiment in area TIGER, it is probable that the nearby presence of the 1/5 Cav and 2/5 Cav presented too great a threat to any enemy link up. Based on intelligence from captives of the ARVN contact, the Division reacted by committing elements of three battalions by air assault into a cordon operation in area PANTHER. During the following days, the division continued to search in area PANTHER and TIGER but to no avail, as local sweeps failed to locate the enemy units. As subsequently pieced together, the battalions moved north of Lake DAM TRA O and headed south along the coast, arriving at a location northeast of the Nui Mieu Mountains on 27 September. They then began to move in a southwesterly direction intending to cross National Route 1 on 30 September at a point just north of the PHU LY Bridge. The plan was to return to their base areas in the SOU CA and KIM SON Valleys. A captured soldier revealed the plan, and as reaction a company of the 1/5 Cav was dispatched from HAMMOND to move along the highway in force, thereby giving the impression of a larger number of troops. The company also established blocking positions west of National Route 1. This rapid reaction discouraged the enemy from attempting to force a crossing; instead, he returned east and was reported on the flatlands south of the NUI MIEU Mountains on 30 September. This retreat provided what proved to be the Division's first major contact on D-Day of Operation IRVING.

IRVING

Meanwhile other 1st Cavalry units moved east from the valleys and maneuvered into position to trap the enemy in a coastal pocket. There evolved a screen around the proposed IRVING AO, to prevent enemy exfiltration back to the western valleys. Therefore, as THAYER I drew to a close, it was concluded that the bulk of the enemy forces in the AO had been forced out of their base areas

in the rugged mountains and were located in the coastal plains to the east. Routes of egress west were blocked, and contact on the plains confirmed that sizeable enemy forces were there in a natural pocket, bounded generally by the NUI BA hill mass on the south, and the coast line on the east, the NUI MIEU hill mass on the north, and National Route 1 on the west. As most of the contact took place within this pocket, it is understandable why IRVING has been called a battlefield within a much larger battlefield.

The enemy, uprooted from his mountain sanctuary and supplies during THAYER I found himself forced with the choice of fighting at a disadvantage during IRVING, or exfiltrating from the area in small groups. Exfiltration was made difficult because of the already mentioned screen established in the later stages of THAYER I.

One can now appreciate that what was to be the great success of IRVING began when THAYER I was launched, for it was during September that the Division was building the subsequent battlefield. Favorable conditions had been established, although it was impossible to predict results. Tactically, IRVING was a logical continuation of THAYER I, but the name was changed to distinguish it as part of a Free World Force effort from THAYER I, a 1st Air Cavalry Operation.

In IRVING, the two enemy units primarily encountered were once again the 18th NVA Regiment and the 2nd VC Regiment. Prior operations—MASHER/WHITE WING, January through March 1966, and CRAZY HORSE, May and June 1966—saw the division engage and defeat elements of these Regiments. In addition, there were numerous local VC forces as well as two other main force VC battalions located within the area of operation.

In planning for IRVING, the Division concentrated on Psy-Ops programs, population control, and Civic Action projects. Each was essential for the successful accomplishment of the mission. Although BINH DINH Province itself is about the size of Connecticut with a total population of 860,000, the IRVING AO encompassed only the Province's central-coastal sector. However, there was a population of 300,000 in the operational area, 85% of which was concentrated along the coastal region and engaged in rice farming and salt production.

As the Free World Forces were required to operate in this heavily populated area, it was imperative that an effective population control program be planned and executed. It was through these precautions that non-combatant casualties were kept to a minimum.

Population control was put into effect as part of the Psy-Ops program, and, unlike previous operations, control measures were required throughout the operation and varied only in degree. In all, Psy-Ops dropped 12,261,000 leaflets and expended 154.5 broadcast hours during IRVING, most of which was directed toward this control. Furthermore, both means were used to establish curfews and to instruct the villagers to remain in place until more specific instructions were given. "Stay put. If movement is necessary move only in our direction when the battle must be carried to a hamlet, file out of the hamlet in the specified direction."

Civic Action was also carefully planned. By holding refugee flow below anticipated levels, all combat units were able to concentrate on fighting the enemy without serious concern for inflicting casualties on non-combatants. In spite of this effort, there were still 19,000 refugees, most of whom were from the PHU MY District. Their movement was controlled by refugee forward collection points, established in each Brigade area. A central collection station under Division control was located in the vicinity of PHU MY District Headquarters. Care, feeding, and medical treatment were administered at every echelon.

THE ALLIES

Actually, the 1st Cavalry's Operation IRVING, 2-24 October, was one of three separate, but closely coordinated operations of three allied nations. The stated mission was to continue the Pacification Campaign in the Province and to uproot the long established VC infrastructure along its coastal region. The 22nd ARVN Division and the Capitol ROK Division participated in operations DAI BANG (EAGLE) 800 and MANG HO 6, respectively, and it was the tri-national cooperation throughout the operations which was most significant.

On D-Day, 2 October, the US Forces, encompassing the north and west, had planned to pare down an effective portion of the fairly large AO by landing forward. Five Air Cavalry Battalions were to assault in objectives 506A, 506B, 506C, and 507. (Map 11a). This forward strategy would enable the Division to put massive force on the enemy's heartline within a few hours. Simultaneously, the ARVN and ROK deployments would push northward in the southern portion of the AO so that all three schemes of maneuver would reinforce and complement one another. The 22nd ARVN Division was to launch an overland attack to the northeast with two infantry battalions and two airborne battalions. Their APC's would work between the ROK's on the southeast and the

US on the west over suitable terrain and in an area that was familiar to them. The Capitol ROK Division was to push northward through the PHU CAT Mountains, clearing mountain sanctuaries and coastal hideouts in its advance.

On the South China Sea, the ARVN junk fleet and the US Navy in swift boats conducted patrols. Naval support was important, for without the ability to seal escape routes to the sea, the enemy could have avoided encirclement.

Operation IRVING opened with elements of the division air assaulting across PL WHIP into assigned areas beginning at 7:00 AM on the 2nd. On D-Day the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry was assigned its usual reconnaissance mission, dispatching one White Team (Scout ships) and one Red Team (Gunships) in the vicinity of HOA HOI. While surveying the area, the White Team spotted seven NVA soldiers in the hamlet, received fire from them, and requested the gunships' support. The aircraft then called for A Troop's infantry unit to develop the situation. This Blue Team, on stand-by alert at HAMMOND, was promptly notified and was on the ground at HOA HOI within 15 minutes of the initial sighting. Although the enemy force was originally estimated as a platoon, the Blue Team became heavily engaged with an obviously larger force.

Advised of the situation, Colonel Archie R. Hyle, CO 1st Brigade, decided to commit the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry. While airborne to another location, LTC James T. Root, CO 1/12 Cav, received the change of mission, requiring him to divert his companies from the planned assault into objective 506B. Relying extensively on heliborne assault, the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry had maneuvered five rifle companies within a few hours to completely surround the hamlet. In a classic example of airmobility, the enemy was sealed within the perimeter, effectively cut off from any escape. While establishing this cordon and, before artillery was called in, the battalion made a maximum effort to remove all non-combatants from the battle area. A temporary lull in offensive action was called in order that these civilians, mostly women and children, could safely depart. A broadcast ship had arrived on station and issued specific instructions for the villagers. As a result, they gathered in four district areas outside the perimeter for control and screening during the fight.

The contact lasted throughout the day and into the night. Artillery fired numerous missions and TAC Air strikes pounded the area. During the hours of darkness a C-47 (USAF), armed with 7.62 miniguns and aircraft flares, remained overhead to support the troops in contact. There was

continuous illumination as well as 685 supporting rounds from the Division's 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery.

Two sweep-throughs followed the next morning. Another 40 enemy were routed from their protective bunkers. By noon on October 3rd, the enemy had lost over 250 killed or wounded while the US losses remained relatively light. This particular engagement confirmed the presence of the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 18th NVA Regiment, the two battalions that had planned to exfiltrate the IRVING AO into the SOUI CA on September 29th.

Meanwhile, also, on D-Day, the two battalions of the 3rd Brigade, 1/7 and 5/7, assaulted all companies into objective 507. Once on the ground all forces established blocking positions and then began to conduct search and destroy movement toward the sea.

Population control on D-Day included over 2,000,000 leaflets and 14 hours of aerial broadcasting resulting in fewer refugees and civilian casualties than anticipated. Elsewhere, a B-52 strike covered a portion of the NUI MIEU Mountains in objective 506A, after which a follow-up reconnaissance on the 3rd revealed documents and seven enemy dead, confirming the presence of elements of the 2nd VC Regiment at the time of the strike.

All forces advanced on schedule gradually decreasing the circumference of the pocket. The sweep to the sea continued in-coordinated overland movement and air assaults to destroy the enemy in and around the coastal flats.

On the 4th of October the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry air assaulted into the HUNG LAC Peninsula to clear that area of enemy. B Company landed north to sweep south and C Company landed south to sweep north to link up with B Company. Enemy were forced out of caves and underground hideouts. The Division Cavalry Squadron continued its air and ground reconnaissance throughout the operational area. The naval blockade was effective in sealing escape routes and in preventing enemy departure in sampans.

On D-Day plus three (5 October) the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry air assaulted back into the SOUI CA Valley to exploit another B-52 strike and to prevent enemy surprise from the west, or rear, of the operation.

While other Cavalry units continued search and destroy missions in assigned areas, the ARVN 22nd Division completed its attack to the northwest and began a systematic sweep of their assigned AO concentrating two battalions in both the northeast and the southwest. The Capitol

ROK Infantry Division swept through the PHU CAT Mountains and sealed off the northern sector in support of the ARVN operation. It flushed the enemy from natural caves as well as from rice paddies on the coastal plains.

The search continued in three areas: The SOUI CA, the HUNG LAC Peninsula, and the NUI MIEU Mountains. From the beginning the Free World Forces concentrated on searching for, finding, and uprooting the VC. To accomplish this, all able bodied males between the ages of 14-60 were taken into custody for processing. Some 3,857 suspects were interrogated and just less than 20% of these suspects were identified as hard core VC. The search continued to find the enemy in small, fragmented groups.

On October 9th, the 2nd Battalion, 20th Artillery (Aerial Rocket Artillery) fired two SS-11 missiles at bunkers on the HUNG LAC Peninsula. The missiles proved extremely effective in destroying the bunkers and led to the capture of 55 VC without a fight. Also on that day, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry was released from Division control to become OPCON to 3rd Brigade and thereby assumed the searching mission of the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry in the SOUI CA Valley.

On 10 October, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry reported that a fourteen year old Vietnamese boy had walked into its positions at LZ PLAYBOY in the NUI MIEU Mountains. The boy claimed to have been a prisoner of the VC until 5:00 that morning. The boy believed he was the only survivor as that morning the VC threw hand grenades and fired into a pit in which he and eighteen other prisoners were held. After the enemy's departure, he had managed to escape.

Believing his story, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry proceeded to systematically search the area in which the boy thought the POW camp was located. Four more survivors were encountered during the search and each verified the young boy's story.

With the help of these survivors, the main camp was located on October 11th to the northwest of LZ PLAYBOY. An old man with badly burned feet was found and evacuated; he had been left behind by the VC because he could not walk. At 2:30 that afternoon, a short distance away from the main camp, the bodies of 12 Vietnamese were found. Their hands were tied behind their backs before they were killed.

These atrocities were specifically condemned in a division Psy-Ops leaflet. This leaflet was reported by two returnees to have encouraged their return to the government. The real meaning of this discovery can perhaps be appreciated by read-

ing the following letter to US Forces by Vo Phouc, one of these captives. (The translation is as close to the original as possible.)

Republic of Vietnam

To the Commanding Officers of the US Army
Dear Gentlemen:

I am Vo Phouc from Hung Lac Hamlet, By Thanh Village, Phu My District, Binh Dinh Province. I am representing 157 people of good will and National cadres who were captured by the Viet Cong and kept in the rock cave at Chanh Giao Mountain, My An, some of whom had been held 2 to 3 years; I was held for 20 months. On 9 October 1966, we were freed by the US Army to return to the National Government. Thanks to you who freed us and restored us to life, gratitude like the sky and ocean we feel for you, we will never forget that great feat which can never be repaid by us.

Now we return to our families and the National cadres are very happy and I send my regards to you gentlemen and please send our regards to the American government and people who are trying to help us, trying to kill the savage communist despotism.

One more time, we sincerely thank you, American Army, people and government who are helping the Vietnamese people eject the savage Communist despotism and are building a strong Vietnamese nation.

Respectfully yours,

Vo Phouc /s/
VO PHOUC /t/
14 Oct 1966

Contact began to diminish on the coast as the units completed searching to the sea and doubled back to catch the enemy as he came out of hiding. Meanwhile, a new picture began to develop in the west. Several substantial ammunition caches were located in the SOUI CA Valley. On 12 October intelligence reports indicated that at least two battalions of the 2nd VC Regiment were regrouping in the KIM SON Valley and that the regimental headquarters had moved there with one of the battalions from the CAY GIÉP Mountains. Plans were made to exploit the intelligence with air-ground reconnaissance and long range patrols in the KIM SON and SOUI CA Valleys.

Then on October 13, forces were repositioned as once again we entered the KIM SON Valley with two battalions. The 2/8 Cav remained along the sea coast. Operations continued in and around the SOUI CA where the 1/5 Cav had undoubtedly

located the VC Hoi Son secret base areas. For seven consecutive days A and B Companies of the 1/5 Cav uncovered large enemy weapons, food, and medical caches. Found on the 15th were four cameras, one of which was owned by the Look Senior Editor, Sam Castan, and taken from him when he was killed during CRAZY HORSE. On the 18th, a major cache of ammunition, supplies, and material was located by A/1/5 Cav which reported that this particular cache was found on platforms on a hill with apparently no attempt to camouflage, giving an indication of the sense of security the enemy felt in his rear area.

A recap of some of the more important items we located in these caches will show the devastating effect on the Hoi Son base area. The thirty-three major finds in the SOUI CA and its surrounding high ground revealed 133 weapons, both individual and crew served, 330,500 rounds of small and heavy caliber ammunition, 4 complete mortars and 43x57 RR rounds. The hospital complex uncovered on the 13th held in part, 1,400 bottles of morphine. Other supply caches contained 5,000 reams of typing paper, 60 bolts of cloth, and numerous telephones and radios.

For the remaining days of IRVING attempt was made to establish contact with sporadic success. C/1/5 Cav engaged a company from the 2nd VC Regiment on the 15th resulting in 39 enemy dead. Otherwise contact was light in the waning days of the operation.

In 22 days THE FIRST TEAM had combined efforts with other Free World Forces so that the enemy had no alternative to fighting—surrender. The statistics were overwhelming, for in total figures for the three allied operations the enemy lost 2,063 killed, 1,930 captured, and there were 141 returnees to the GVN. In particular, Operation IRVING was unique in that THE FIRST TEAM captured, interrogated, and processed more enemy than in any previous operation. Also for the first time since the division began operations in Vietnam the number of enemy captured exceeded the number killed. In round figures the 1st Cavalry alone accounted for 681 enemy dead and 741 captured. Not only did the enemy suffer heavy personnel losses, but his vital logistical and support losses in the SOUI CA and KIM SON Valleys—the life sustaining caches of food, ammunition, clothing and medical supplies were uprooted and either evacuated or destroyed. His political machine—the VC infrastructure—and his ability to control the population by terror had dissolved. A significant step toward eliminating VC influence in this fertile area had been taken and we insured that an effective revolutionary project would follow the military victory.

THAYER II

THAYER II commenced on October 25, with the termination of IRVING, and continued the successes realized during these first two phases of the Binh Dinh Pacification Campaign. However, as the six battalions in the KIM SON and SOUI CA Valleys and one battalion, the 2/8 Cav in the NUI MIEU continued to look for and destroy elements of the 2nd VC and 18th NVA Regiments, the 2/5 Cav, the IFFORCEV reserve-reaction force, was alerted at Camp Radcliff and committed to Pleiku on the 29th of October for Operation PAUL REVERE IV.

Toward the end of October, agent reports, contacts and sightings by the 4th Infantry Division, recently based at Pleiku, indicated a large scale buildup along the border, particularly in the Plei Djereng-Duc Co area.

PAUL REVERE IV

On 31 October, the frag order Travis was issued requiring the 2nd Brigade and its CP to move into the PAUL REVERE IV AO where it would operate until December 27th. With the 2nd Brigade CP deployed the 1/5 Cav, the 2/12 Cav, B/1/9 Cav and 1/77 Artillery. Extensive search and destroy operations followed in the Chu Pong-Ia Drang area and along the border. With the exception of heavy contact made by C/1/5 Cav on the 21st of November, the 2nd Brigade units made only minimal contacts. On the 21st C/1/5 had the mission to continue its search southward along the Cambodian border from its position six miles from Duc Co. About 9:45 AM its second platoon became engaged with a sizeable enemy force. Approximately 15 minutes later, as the 3rd platoon was coming to the 2nd platoon's aid, it likewise became engaged in a separate action 300 meters away and found itself surrounded on all sides. The men of the 3rd platoon fought for their lives but there was just no chance as the enemy filled the air with a heavy volume of machine gun fire and hand grenades. Artillery was called in on top of the 3rd platoon's position which still did not prevent the platoon from being overrun. The NVA closed in on the platoon and killed all but one wounded before fleeing the area. The 2nd and 3rd platoons of C/1/5 Cav suffered badly, but the enemy paid dearly with his 147 killed. These two platoons from Charlie Company had engaged a battalion of the 101 C Regiment of the 10th NVA Division, a previously unencountered unit for the Cavalry. There is no question that Charlie will think twice about striking the next time. One would think he should have learned this lesson a long time ago.

Light sporadic contact with small groups continued for the remainder of the operation. The 1/5 Cav departed the AO on 6 December and the 2/5 Cav was withdrawn on the 22nd. PAUL REVERE IV terminated on the 27th when the 2nd Brigade Headquarters, the supporting elements and the 2/12 Cav closed into Base Camp and prepared for commitment into the THAYER II AO.

THAYER II

During the period of PAUL REVERE IV, THE FIRST TEAM maintained sustained operations in four distinct and widely separated areas of the II CTZ. (Map 12). A brigade and three battalions were in PAUL REVERE IV, two brigades and four battalions were on THAYER II in Binh Dinh, a battalion was at Camp Radcliff, and a battalion task force at Phan Thiet on Operation BYRD. One can only wonder at the massive logistical support that was required for the daily necessities of food, ammunition, equipment, and petroleum to keep the "birds" flying. Effectively operating in these diverse areas once again points up the versatility of the Air Cavalry and the capability to react to the enemy whenever and wherever he may appear.

Meanwhile at high noon on November 11th, the Division Artillery acknowledged the firing of its one-millionth round in the Republic of Vietnam as one gun from a selected battery in each artillery battalion, organic and attached to the 1st Cavalry, fired a TOT. These rounds were fired from the respective tactical positions in the various areas of operation and could be heard from the South China Sea to the Cambodian border.

In the THAYER II AO the division forces ranged from a brigade with two maneuver battalions to three brigades with eight maneuver battalions once PAUL REVERE IV terminated. Emphasis continued on searching the KIM SON and SOUI CA Valleys, looking for the enemy which had fragmented after IRVING and attempted to avoid all contact unless he thought he had a decided advantage. The operation was characterized by long periods of light and scattered contact punctuated by sharp engagements with enemy units up to battalion size.

On November 1st, elements of the 1/9 Cav and B/5/7 established contact with the 93rd Battalion of the 2nd VC Regiment in the area between National Route 1 and the DAM TRA O Lake, south of the GAY GIEP Mountains. The fight lasted over nine hours, and for his heroism in leading his company that day by repeatedly jeopardizing his own life, Captain John L. Hitti,


CO B/5/7 was nominated for the Distinguished Service Cross. There were forty-three enemy dead when contact broke at 6:00 PM that evening.

On 1 December the infantry platoon from C Troop 1/9 Cav entered the hamlet of PHU HUU (2) in search of the KIM SON Valley floor. Two squads became pinned down by a large volume of machine gun and small arms fire. Captain Hitti's company was once again nearby to answer the call for help, and his 2nd platoon arrived at the hamlet in an hour and a half after a double-time overland movement. The 5/7's platoon penetrated the hamlet and the well prepared defensive position after close-in, fierce fighting for the remainder of the daylight and on into dark. It was reinforced by a sister platoon that evening while other cavalry units positioned themselves in blocking positions to prevent exfiltration. Contact broke that night, but a sweep through the next morning revealed sixty-seven enemy dead and four wounded. Unknowingly these two platoons had successfully fought an enemy battalion when it was in well-concealed, well-planned, mutually-supporting bunker positions.

ROVER

Determined to clear thoroughly the KIM SON Valley, the division began Operation ROVER on December 9th, which was a five day refugee evacuation effort to clear the valley of civilians. By doing so the valley was then designated a "free fire" zone which authorized massive artillery and TAC Air ordnance bombardment at will without regard for the Rules of Engagement. On D-Day, pamphlets and loudspeakers were used to inform the indigenous populace that they had five days to evacuate and specified the routes to follow to arrive at collection and screening points. Over 1,100 of the local peasants took heed and were resettled in secure areas.

The highway 506 Valley, just east of the KIM SON Valley was the location for heavy contact on December 17th. C/1/8 on a ridge to the west of the 506 Valley spotted and pursued an enemy squad southeast into the valley. Subsequently numerous aircraft were fired on throughout this general vicinity. The infantry platoon from A Troop 1/9 Cav air assaulted to exploit the contact and encountered heavy resistance on the valley floor. The 1/12 Cav was called upon to attempt to encircle what was determined to be at least an enemy battalion in well-dug in defensive positions. By dusk a total of five infantry companies and two platoons from the 1/9 were committed, but darkness prevented a shoulder to shoulder cordon around the battalion. In spite of continuous illumination from an Air Force flare ship,



MAP 12

the enemy eluded during the night to the east and southeast. However, a final sweep of the battle area on December 19th revealed a body count of ninety-five enemy dead. Once again the Cav had brought the fight to the enemy and forced him to show his hand.

LZ BIRD

The two day Christmas truce ended violently when early in the morning of December 27, nineteen hours after the truce termination, the three battalions of the 22nd NVA Regiment attacked C/1/12 and two artillery batteries at LZ Bird in the KIM SON Valley. The battalions had moved southward from their usual bases in the AN LAO Valley taking advantage of the two days of truce to get into position for the mortar and infantry attack. As his mortar fires landed among the howitzers of B/2/19 Arty (105mm) and C/6/16 Arty (155mm) the infantry assaulted the defensive perimeter and were able, because of sheer numbers alone, to reach several of the firing positions in each one of the artillery batteries. Both the cavalry and the two artillery batteries fought desperately to hold the positions they still controlled. There was violent close-in firing and hand-to-hand combat. This determined stand, combined with the direct fire of the division's first two "bee hive" 105mm rounds from B/2/19 Artillery and extremely accurate ARA fire drove the enemy from the position. The next morning 44 enemy were counted among the "gun" pits. Pursuit during the ensuing days brought the enemy total losses for its attack on Bird to over 200 killed.

A few days later the division captured Senior Captain Phuoc of the 22nd NVA Regiment. With him was the map depicting the enemy's version of the positions on LZ Bird, from which the attack had been planned. Senior Captain Phuoc was the operations officer of the Regiment and had planned and executed the attack. Subsequent interrogations have revealed vital information on enemy tactics and techniques.

1966 closed during the second two day truce period around the U. S. New Year. On December 31st, THAYER II was in its sixty-eighth day, the longest operation undertaken by the division in Vietnam. On that day, the 3rd NVA Division had lost a total of 980 killed in THAYER II, representing each of its three regiments. 1967 would see the continuation of THAYER II as it exceeded 100 days and accounted for a division record for killed in one operation—1,757 dead by body count. It was a very promising note on which to end the first eighteen months since the birth of the Air Cavalry on July 1, 1965. There was

nothing slow in its upbringing as it was forced into immediate full growth and maturity from the very beginning.

RECOGNITION

This unusual success certainly did not go unheralded, or without recognition. The achievements of the division and pictures of Sky Troopers repeatedly adorned daily newspapers and weekly magazines throughout the United States. Columbia, South Carolina took it unto itself to adopt the 1st Air Cavalry as its own and offered assistance in building materials and "hard-to-get" items for civic action projects. The city was most willing to help this division which gave so much of itself for the cause of freedom. The General Assembly of the State of Georgia resolved in February, 1966 to erect a suitable monument in Columbus, Georgia, in honor of all Cavalrymen, living and dead, as an expression of gratitude by the people of Georgia for its supreme sacrifice in Vietnam. In October, 1966 the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was selected from a field of nominees as the "Outstanding Aviation Unit" for the period April, 1965 to March 1966 by the Army Aviation Association of America. THE FIRST TEAM was cited for its innovation in the use of Army aircraft above and beyond the usual mission.

Since arrival in Vietnam in September of 1965, the 1st Air Cavalry has conducted 12 operations involving single or multi-company task forces; 32 operations at battalion or brigade task force strength, and three operations it called campaigns because of the duration and the forces committed. These are the PLEIKU CAMPAIGN in October-November 1965, the BONG SON CAMPAIGN, January-March 1966; and the BINH DINH PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN.

These operations have been costly to the NVA and VC enemy—over 7,400 killed by body count with an additional 5,960 estimated killed, for a total of over 13,360—3,206 captured, 2,476 individual weapons and 349 crew operated weapons captured or destroyed, 1,295 tons of rice, and 512 tons of salt captured or destroyed. When at all possible the division operated with ARVN and CIDG units to assist them in winning their war for self-determination. Command emphasis continually stressed the importance of the Civic Action projects and the Revolutionary Development programs.

YEAR OF THE HORSE

1966 certainly was the year of the Horse as the only way one could interpret the success of the 1st Cavalry. Each member of THE FIRST TEAM

was inspired to an awareness of the importance of our mission to the people of Vietnam and of our unique capability to accomplish that mission. This mission is the continuous orientation on the enemy, and the knowledge that we possess that means to exploit decisively any contact by the Sky Troopers or supporting forces. It is the execution of the vertical envelopment and the pursuit, when our organic helicopters enable the commander to carry the fight to the enemy and deny him the sanctuary he needs when he breaks contact. There is a flexibility, an ability to react to rapidly changing situations. The division

embodies an ever prevailing esprit de corps. Corporal, Captain, Colonel, or Commanding General—each is constantly learning from the other, as we demonstrate the Airmobile Division is uniquely equipped to defeat the enemy at any point on the counterinsurgency scale, from the local VC defense platoon to the well-armed NVA Regiment. The 1st Cavalry Division—THE FIRST TEAM—is proud of past achievements. Continuous refinement of airmobile tactics and techniques will produce still more decisive victories in the days ahead.



CH-54 SKYCRANE lifting out a CH-47 CHINOOK



A Sergeant of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) directs the landing of a resupply helicopter in a dry rice field near the Cambodian border. Nov. 1965.



Preparing to board assault helicopters. October 1965.



An Khe—by Christmas of 1965 the Base Camp had developed to the degree shown in aerial photo.



Panoramic View of the "Golf Course"—the world's largest helipad—and the surrounding area. Photograph was taken from Hong Cong Mountain, facing East, after the base camp in the foreground had been developed.



CH-54 SKYCRANE emplacing 8" howitzer



Bin Dinh Valley during Operation MASHER. Troopers alert for the enemy after receiving VC sniper fire



Operation MASHER north of Phu Cat, January 1966. Howitzer crew (B Btry 2/21 Arty) preparing ammo for fire support



January 1966. After securing LZ, troopers move into perimeter positions. (Operation MASHER, north of PHU CAT)



Search and Destroy. A rice paddy north of Phu Cat 25 Jan 1966 (Operation MASHER)



On patrol in "Happy Valley"



Choppers don't go unscathed. A HUEY ARA rocket ship with bullet and shrapnel holes after Camp Radcliff was mortared, Sept. 3, 1966.



Captured Viet Cong weapons displayed at the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Museum, at An Khe. (June 1966)



This HUEY is carrying men of A 1/9th Cavalry to LZ Two Bits. Oct 1966.



THE ARMY "MULE" transporting ice to the 15th Medical Hospital. (October, 1966)



SEARCH AND DESTROY: Gone today, here tomorrow (maybe)
Viet Cong are elusive



CH-54 SKYCRANE delivering POL in bladders at LZ TWO BITS,near BONG SON



Vietnamese children in school at Old An Khe



DR. JOHN FUSELIER, 15 Med, helps children at SONG AN elementary school try on clothing sent by citizens of Elton, Louisiana



Retreat Ceremony at Camp Radcliff, An Khe, 23 Nov 66



OPERATION PERSHING, along the South China Sea. Sky Troopers on the ground and helicopters in the air work together to mop up Vietcong remnants.



PIGGY-BACK. One Chinook carries away a 105mm howitzer and ammo load; another Chinook will be along to pick up the remaining load.



This CH-47 lifts a 105mm howitzer into position to begin an artillery raid.



Sky Troopers of 1/9 Cavalry stand on the skids, waiting to drop into landing zone in Operation PERSHING



Elements of B 2/12 cross rice paddy on clearing mission



The Division Commander visited a squad of ROK troops.



The CH-47 CHINOOK can put men into position via rope ladders.
The first 50 descents are the hard ones.



One of the bloodiest encounters occurred at LZ BIRD in Kim Son Valley during THAYER II. These are enemy dead on 27 Dec 1966.



THAYER II, Kim Son Valley, LZ BIRD: Enemy dead, 27 Dec 1966



SEARCH AND DESTROY—a frustrating business; more often than not the Viet Cong exfiltrate before contact is made



LZ TROUT: Sky Troopers of 2/12 Cavalry under fire from estimated two battalions of mixed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong



Young schoolgirl of the Hoai An District presents flowers to Maj. Wilmot Hall, 1st Bde, as thanks for expulsion of Viet Cong from the Bong Son area in Operation THAYER

PART III

ORGANIZATION OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)

The following discussion of the organization of the AIRMOBILE Division provides some background for a meaningful comparison with other United States Army Divisions.

The base of the Airmobile Division is similar to that of a standard ROAD Division, with the addition of an Aviation Group. The structure of the Division originally envisioned five Infantry and three Airborne Battalions as maneuver elements. Based on Vietnam experience the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) requested the assignment of an additional infantry battalion.

Each battalion is organized for total mobility as the administrative, mess, and logistics have been removed from company responsibility and placed at battalion or brigade level. The rifle company has only two vehicles—two mechanical mules. The Battalion Headquarters are also light with $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{3}{8}$ ton trucks.

More specifically, each Brigade has three battalions assigned to it for these administrative purposes. The 1st Brigade supports the 1/8 Cav, 2/8 Cav, and 1/12 Cav. The 2d Brigade hosts the 1/5 Cav, 2/5 Cav, and 2/12 Cav. The 3d Brigade is responsible for the 1/7 Cav, 2/7 Cav, and 5/7 Cav. Once committed to a tactical situation, however, a Brigade Commander may find himself with two to five battalions, depending on the situation.

Also organic is the 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry, the US Army's only Air Cavalry Squadron. Its three Air Cavalry troops contain scout teams (OH-13's) and gunships (UH1Bs) to find and fix the enemy. Each Air Cavalry troop also has an infantry platoon, called a Blue Team, to engage with and finish the small enemy units. Moreover, the one ground troop, in addition to the Air Cavalry troops, provides greater Infantry fighting depth. Its $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{3}{8}$ ton vehicles are substituted for the heavier track vehicles found in Cavalry units in other Divisions. Although a surveillance and maneuver element, the 1/9 Cavalry is primarily air oriented and is not usually placed entirely under the control of a Brigade; commonly, it is employed separately, or one of its air troops is attached to one of the Brigades. The Cavalry Squadron is one of the Division's principal intelligence gathering agencies. It has

been employed in just about every type of offensive operation, to include flank security. It has also operated separately in an independent AO. Authorized a total of 88 aircraft, the Squadron had 30 OH-13's, 38 UH1B's, and 20 UH1D's.

The Division Artillery has three 105mm Direct Support Howitzer Battalions: the 2/19 Arty, the 1/21 Arty, and the 1/77 Arty. Each is equipped with the lightweight M 102, 105mm howitzer, and is unique in that there are no prime movers assigned for howitzers. Rather, they depend on the CH-47 Chinook of the 11th Aviation Group. There are $\frac{3}{4}$ ton ammunition trucks assigned to each battalion to provide ground mobility, if necessary. Where other Divisions have a medium Artillery battalion, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Artillery has an aerial rocket Artillery Battalion (2/20th ARA), the only one of its kind in the world. Thirty-six of its 39 UH1B's are armed with a pair of 24 tube 2.75" rocket launchers. The remaining three are command and control ships. These aerial rockets are an extension of the arm of tube Artillery and offer considerable responsiveness by being able to move rapidly beyond the normal range of the 105mm tubes to place direct fire on any type of target. In addition to 2.75" rockets, this ARA battalion has the capability of firing SS-11 missiles for effective penetration against bunkers and fortified shelters. The Division Artillery also sports the only Artillery battery in the world (E Battery 82nd Field Artillery) without organic artillery weapons — this battery provides aerial reconnaissance, aerial adjustment of Artillery fires, and command liaison.

The bulk of the Division's aircraft are found with the 11th Aviation Group, consisting of two assault helicopter battalions (AHB) and one assault support helicopter battalion (ASHB). The two AHB (227th and 229th) team up with maneuver Infantry units for air assault operations. Each of these battalions has a weapons company of 12 armed UH1B's to accompany the air columns and to provide suppressive ground fire on the LZ just before troop deployment. Frequently the lift companies are tasked to assault one Infantry battalion and turn around for another. Also, each has three lift companies with 20 UH1D's, each ship designed to lift a squad.

The heavy lift battalion, the ASHB, has all 48 of the Division's CH47 Chinooks, divided 16 per company. These twin-rotored helicopters are prime movers for the tubes and ammunition of the 105mm howitzer battalions. Additionally, and also of high importance, is the Chinook's commitment in handling the lion's share of logistical resupply and some troop movement. The 11th General Support Aviation Company provides command and liaison choppers for the Division Headquarters and for all those units without organic aircraft (Support Command, Signal Battalion, Engineer Battalion, MP Company, and Pathfinder Company.) The Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon (ASTA) platoon of the GS Aviation Company has three SLAR (side-looking radar) and three IR (infrared) Mohawks (OV-1) providing six additional prime intelligence sources.

The Support Command provides administrative, maintenance, and medical support to the Division and attached units. Its importance cannot be overstated, for without its supply and maintenance of equipment the Division could not operate. It is organized in much the same manner as the support command in the ROAD Division, with the addition of a large aircraft maintenance section. The ground maintenance section is naturally smaller than in the standard Division.

The 8th Engineer Battalion has an HHC and three line companies, each of which is similar to the standard airborne Engineer company. All the heavier equipment is maintained in the HHC and used to reinforce the line companies when necessary. Unique to this battalion is the airmobility of all of its heavier equipment; even the light-

weight sectionalized bulldozer has been airlifted to build airstrips in some of the roughest terrain in the world.

The 13th Signal Battalion provides the Division's internal and long range communication capability. One of its two companies provides commo for Division Headquarters, while the other provides the link between Headquarters and the major commands.

There are certain attached units that add greatly to the Division's Airmobility. The 478th Aviation Company (heavy helicopter) provides invaluable assistance with its four flying crane helicopters—the only flying cranes in Vietnam. These carry the medical pod (a mobile operating room) right into the field of battle. Its effect in diminishing the number of deaths from battle wounds has been tremendous. The cranes are also able to transport the heavy 155mm howitzer Artillery pieces to otherwise inaccessible terrain. This capability has revolutionized the placement of Artillery, and the fire support which can be brought to bear.

This, then, is the organization of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)—lean, light, and possessing great striking power. The organization is new and the concept is new, but the Cavalry trooper has remained unchanged; he is still the rugged, determined, professionally qualified soldier who has always served with the 1st Cavalry Division. a horse trooper in the Indian days, a sky trooper today. His dedicated service and fighting spirit are in the best traditions of the old Cavalry. That is why the 1st Cav remains THE FIRST TEAM, in reputation and in fact.

In Memoriam

The following pages list the names of the men of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) who were killed in action in Vietnam, from September 1965 to February 1967.

Let us never forget their sacrifice; let us rather honor their memory by total and unstinted support of their successors in Vietnam serving in THE FIRST TEAM.

SGT	ACHICA EDDIE	RA56202852	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV	PFC	BECKER LESTER E	US55781338	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	ACKERMAN JOHN R	RA16780247	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV	SSG	BECKNORTH HARLEY D	RA53113800	BTRY A 1ST BN 21ST ARTY
SSG	ADAIR THURMAN	RA06287944	C 6-16 ARTY	SP4	BEERES GEORGE K	RA51459250	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC	ADAMS EMMIT C	US52625935	CO A 1351G BN	SGT	BELL JERRY W	RA55743580	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
ZLT	ADAMSON DONALD B	O-5326183	CO B 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC	BELTON RAY	US53444406	A 1-5
PFC	AGUILAR ARMANDO	US54382037	A 2-5	PFC	BEMBRY SHYDER P	RA14905675	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	AIKEN DAVID R	IS52639536	BTRY B 3D BN 18TH ARTY	SP4	BENEDETTI DENNIS E	US55829267	B 5-7
PFC	ALBANESE LEWIS	US56390719	B 5-7	PFC	BENJAMIN ROBERT L	US56402790	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SGT	ALBERTS FRANCIS J	RA13580318	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV	PFL	BENKE RONALD J III	RA13867895	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC	ALBIETZ RAYMOND P	US51974453	A 1-8	PFC	BENNETT BENFORD	US53398158	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG	ALEXANDER LAURIE L	RA22960345	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV	SP4	BENNETT CLIFTON E	RA56381302	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	ALFEROFF IVAN	RA12723597	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SGT	BENNETT MELVIN L	RA14677702	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4	ALGARIN-RIVERA RAF	US50174516	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC	BENTFELDO JOHN J	US51823459	B 1-5
SGT	ALKIRE THEODORE A	RA13780151	C 1-5	PFC	BENTON HENRY	US53405217	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SSG	ALLEN JAMES O	RA16526278	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV	PFC	BERG HAROLD E JR	US55877521	B 1-5
PFC	ALLEN JAMES L	RA18712963	HMC 2D BN 8TH CAV	SP4	BERLANGA RAFAEL A	US51520989	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	ALLEN LUECO JR	US52679129	C 2-12	PFC	BERNARDEZ JESUS R	US56363715	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC	ALLMAN HENRY H	US55863053	CO B 2ND BN 7TH CAV	SSG	BERNARD-ROBLES ANT	RA50128893	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	ALSTON ADELL A	RA13812224	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV	SGT	BERNARD RAMON	RA50153515	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	ALTERWISHER ARTHUR	US51587260	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV	SGT	BESS SAMUEL	RA14560525	CO A 1ST BN 8TH CAV
SGT	ALVAREZ-BUZO ELIAS	RA10409253	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV	SSG	BEVERHOUDT CLARENC	RA50111752	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	AMERIME KENT L	RA17709433	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV	SGT	BICKLEY WILSON C	RA53295246	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT	AMODIAS OSVALDO	RA14674663	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC	BIRENBAUM BERNARD	US51531538	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	ANDERS CHARLIE	RA13794449	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4	BISE ROGER A	RA13780077	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SSG	ANDERSON LEE D	RA17597047	CO A 2ND BN 8TH CAV	SGT	BISHOP RICHARD L	RA19541549	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
SGT	ANDERSON RONNIE C	RA15674436	CO A 1 BN 9 CAV	PFC	BLACK DENNIS W	RA16791402	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT	ANDERSON VICTOR E	RA197714250	CO D 2ND BN 12TH CAV	ZLT	BLAKE TIMOTHY M	O-5533367	BTRY C 1ST BN 21ST ARTY
SGT	ANDERSON WILLIAM E	RA28970162	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV	CPT	BLANTON BURTON A	O-5930916	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4	ARBUTHNOT JAMES M	RA17693539	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	SP4	BOICOURT ROBERT C	RA16787291	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
PSG	ARD HENRY	RA14273806	CO C 5TH BN 7TH CAV	SP4	BOLDEN ROLLIE L	US56365930	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	ARGENZIO NESTOR L	RA12691776	CO B 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SP5	BONHANO FREDERICK	RA14823005	C 2-12
SP4	ARNOLD RICHARD E	RA26970973	133D ASLT SPT HEL CO	PFC	BOOTH JOHN R	RA13843412	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4	ARNOLD WILLARD D	RA14921103	A 1-5	PFC	BOREN JIMMY F	RA15702708	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT	ARREY FRANK JR	RA19254970	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV	SP4	BOSS ROBERT L	RA11425304	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	ARRINGTON JOSEPH P	US56908282	B 2-12	PFC	BOSWELL JOHNNIE L	US53390152	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	ASHER SAMUEL D	US52654109	B 2-19 ARTY	SP5	BOUKNIGHT CALVIN	RA13812095	HMC 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	ASHLINE PAUL S	RA11454426	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC	BOWEN HARVEY L JR	US53405783	CO D 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC	ASHTON NORMAND J J	RA11446316	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV	ZLT	BOYCE JOHN F	O-5710867	BTRY B 2D BN 20TH ARTY
PFC	AUGUSTINAS WALTER	US51557180	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV	PFC	BOYLESSE JOSE J	US55828745	A 2-8
ZLT	AULL EARL D	O-5321480	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC	BRADFORD CHARLES M	US52653843	CO A 5TH BN 7TH CAV
PFC	BABAGE EWING C	RA14677004	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SSG	BRADLEY RICHARD B	RA42086362	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	BAILEY DAVID D	RA16808860	CO D 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC	BRAME CLARENCE R	US53385903	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
BAIR CHARLES J	RA15500059	133D ASLT SPT HEL	PFC	BRANDES THOMAS G	US55753271	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	
PFC	BAKER ALTON E	US53368275	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	SP4	BRANFORS ERIC A	RA19782898	B 1-8
PFC	BALL JIMMY R	US53426638	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC	BRELAND CECIL D	US53396776	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	BANKOWSKI JOHN F	RA16825903	B 2-12	PFC	BRENNAN JOHN F	US52589942	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT	BARKS LAVINE J	RA54222642	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC	BRIDGES LESTER	US51974360	C 1-8
PSG	BARBER LONNIE	RA55001908	B 1-8	1LT	BRITTEN LAWRENCE A	O-0098613	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SGT	BARGA SAMMY A	RA15605112	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV	PFC	BRODA RICHARD D	US52586228	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV
SP4	BARKER OSCAR JR	RA14709494	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC	BROOKS JAMES F JR	US52649122	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SGT	BARKSDALE JAMES W	RA24633018	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV	SSG	BROOKS JIMMIE L	RA14552287	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC	BARNER LARRY K	RA13858346	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC	BROPHY DENNIS J	US51545478	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	BARNES RICHARD F	US51512484	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV	PFC	BROUARD MALCOLM K	US55845710	A 5-7
PFC	BARNETT ALAN L	RA19817915	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV	PFC	BROWN DAVID P	US55804867	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
SSG	BARRETT THOMAS J J	RA54061318	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	PFC	BROWN EDDIE JR	RA14770002	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
ZLT	BARRETT WILLIAM K	O-5321736	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SP4	BROWN FRED JR	RA18692144	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC	BARRIOS BERNARD	RA12728987	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC	BROWN JAMES A JR	US51584077	CO A 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC	BARTON JIMMIE W	US55779309	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC	BROWN RALPH W	US52582632	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
MSG	BASS CHARLES W	RA17241239	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC	BROWN WILLIAM T	RA14920671	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	BAUMANN OTTO W JR	RA12749458	D 1-8	SP4	BRUNLEY BOB G	RA19704930	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC	BAYLOR ARTHUR J	US52610807	HMC 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SGT	BRUNAT MICHAEL F	RA19772638	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
WO1	BAYRON BENEICTO P	M-3152512	TRP C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC	BRYAN HECTOR W	RA13844680	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	BEARDEN RICHARD D	US53382258	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4	BRYAN LIONEL J JR	RA12672207	382D TC DET 478 FC

PFC	BRYANT BOBBY R	RA17694556	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC	CLARK TIMOTHY E	RA18665911	A 1-8
SGT	BRYANT CEARSA	RA59360279	A 1-9	PFC	CLAUSEN LAWRENCE C	RA14927078	C 1-12
SGT	BULLAERT FRANCOIS	RA21288579	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV	SP4	CLEGG LESTER H	RA13741427	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC	BULGER JOHN D	US51573953	B 1-7	SP5	CLEMONS JACK E	RA14522637	HMC 1ST BDE
PFC	BURCH KENNETH E R	US53380282	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SGT	CLEVELAND JAMES	RA19799199	C 5-7
PFC	BURKS LEROY JR	RA18727974	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC	CLUNE BRIAN J	US51585892	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	BURLIE THOMAS E	US52592590	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC	COBURN WILLIAM H	RA13827876	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC	BURRETT WILLIAM A	RA52477480	CO C 2D BN 12TH CAV	SSG	COCHRANE BLANCHARD	RA12428055	CO C 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4	BURNETTE FREDDIE L	RA14942234	C 1-12	PFC	COFFARD ANTHONY C	US51569705	B 2-19 ARTY
PFC	BURITE BARRY T	US52609858	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	SGT	COFFEY RICHARD A	RA28274757	CO D 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	BURNLEY DILLARD R	US52602924	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SSG	COHEN SIDNEY	RA21717390	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	BURRELL ROBERT G	RA12739649	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4	COLEMAN JOEL D	RA13835900	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	BURROUGHS JUDGE JR	RA59345007	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SGT	COLLER WILFORD P	RA12601951	CO C 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC	BURTON JOHNNY E	US52683627	B 5-7	PFC	COLLIER CHARLES H	RA25948185	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	BURTON WILLIAM J	US53408402	D 2-8	PFC	COLLIER NOAH C JR	RA14933492	CO A 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC	BURTON WILLIAM R J	US51526217	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4	COLLINS CHARLES A	US53384514	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
ZLT	BUSH GILBERT B	O-5418780	BTRY A 2D BN 17TH ARTY	SGT	COLLINS ELZIE J JR	RA15607767	BTRY B 1ST BN 77TH ARTY
PFC	BUSKEY ORRIE J	RA12675941	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV	PFC	CONCEPCION FRANCIS	US50011130	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT	BUTCHER REUBEN	RA12693633	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV	SP4	COMDY LADD R	US56758227	BTRY C 2D BN 20 ARTY
PFC	BUTLER HENRY	US54365644	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV	PFC	COMLEY BILLY G	US52883544	A 1-8
PFC	BUTLER ROBERT E	RA12744747	B 5-7	PFC	CORN RONALD R	US54357661	B 2-19 ARTY
SP4	BYRLO NATHANIEL	US53376285	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SGT	COOK WILLIAM D	RA19727020	D 1-12
SP4	CABRERA JOHN W	RA29034786	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC	COOPER NAPOLEN K	RA14942997	D 1-8
PVT	CADEMEAD RANDALL	RA16766281	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV	PFC	COOPER OSCAR E	US52587230	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC	CAGUINAL PEPITO	RA19874485	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SP4	COPELAND RALPH A	RA19597414	CO A 5TH AVN BN
SP4	CAIL JOHN E JR	RA14344629	CO C 2D BN 12TH CAV	PFC	CORBIN DONALD L	RA12731409	HMC 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	CAIN ROBERT JR	US53409224	A 5-7	1LT	CORNETT DONALD C	OF-0100551	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	CAMPBELL JACK	A16965779	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV	PFC	COTTON MOSES M	RA14850127	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC	CANADY ROY B	US51580327	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV	SP4	COWAN JOHN R	RA12679640	CO B 15TH TC BN
PFC	CANALES DAVID J	RA19622233	CO A 1ST BN 8TH CAV	PFC	COWELL ROBERT B	US56423190	C 2-5
PSG	CANLAS SEBASTIAN P	RA10005313	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV	WO1	COX ALLAN L	M-3152989	CO B 229TH AVN
PFC	CANNADAY MICHAEL D	US52646963	C 1-5	SGT	COX CHARLES C	RA14776910	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC	CANNATA GEORGE A J	RA12736338	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SP4	COX CHARLES E	RA24561558	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
CPL	CANTRELL LEELEIE H	RA14597747	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV	1LT	COX CHESTER G	O-5322501	O 1-12
SSG	CARABALLO-GARCIA M	RA50161329	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV	SGT	COX MACE C	RA14815593	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC	CARLEY RAYMOND M	RA15827624	CO D 1ST BN 8TH CAV	PFC	CRAFTON JAMES J JR	RA13816408	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	CARLUQUIST BRIAN F	RA29567001	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SGT	CRAIN JOSEPH D JR	RA14883511	A 2-5
PFC	CARLTON DANNY E	RA14835950	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	SGT	CRAMER HENRY L	RA19480648	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	CARNEVALE DAVID J	US56391444	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	PFC	CRANE DONALD E	US52582283	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
CPT	CARNEY THOMAS E	O-2299467	CO D 2D BN 5TH CAV	SP4	CRAWFORD GALE V	RA14818903	CO C 227 AVN BN
PFC	CAROTHERS RICHARD	US53421155	C 1-12	SGT	CREBO BERNARD A	RA36652125	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	CARPENTER CLIFFORD	US52635776	BTRY C 2D BN 20TH ARTY	PFC	CRIBB FLOYD J	US53398998	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	CARPENTER SAMUEL D	RA19701869	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV	SP4	CRIPPS GEORGE W	RA13834406	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	CARPENTER TERRY W	RA19721496	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV	SP4	CROCKER DAVID S	RA19781996	HMC 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC	CARR LEN E	US51556069	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV	SGT	CROCKETT DELMER	RA18683376	B 5-7
PFC	CARR ROBERT H JR	RA12737555	HMC 1ST BN 5TH CAV	SP4	CROW DAVID L	RA54338551	CO C 2D BN 12TH CAV
SSG	CARTER ERNEST L	RA18342712	CO C 5TH BN 7TH CAV	SSG	CROY WILLIAM M	RA15205797	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC	CARTWRIGHT RALPH W	US53364922	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	ZLT	CRUM ROBERT H JR	O-5326386	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV
SP4	CASILLLO LOUIS	US55833992	HMC 1-5	PVT	CRUAR MICHAEL G	RA19826827	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC	CAVEZOS REYNALDO R	RA19814651	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV	SP4	CUMBERPATCH JAMES	RA13819927	HQ 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	CAVAY EDWARD C JR	US61001871	B 2-7	PFC	CUMMINGS JOHN R JR	RA18746654	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC	CHADWICK FRANK W J	US51535940	C 5-7	SP4	CUNNINGHAM JACOB H	RA14923686	D 1-8
SSG	CHAMBLEY THEODORE	RA42244577	CO B 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC	CUNNINGHAM LOUIS J	RA17706856	HMC 11TH AVN BDP
SP4	CHASE LEO C JR	US53376279	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	PFC	CURRY GEORGE D	US51594112	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	CHAVEZ EDUARDO	US56687471	C 1-5	SP4	CURRY GLENN V	RA16764114	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	CHAVEZ RUBEN G	US54352880	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SSG	CURRY WILBUR JR	RA12350005	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	CHEIVES CALVIN L	RA13768911	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SP4	CURTIS GARY A	US53414837	C 2-5
SP4	CHISHOLM HOWARD	RA12754215	A 1-12	SSG	DAILY SAM W	RA54206074	CO A 5TH BN 7TH CAV
SGT	CHITTUM RONALD H	RA13618440	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SGT	DALE CHARLES R	RA13929016	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC	CHURCHILL WENDELL	US45383022	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV	1LT	DALEY WALTER R	O-5326549	A 2-12
PFC	CIROUX RONALD	RA11441982	C 1-8	ZLT	DALTON EDWARD J JR	O-5535460	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4	CLARDY JASPER D	RA13789556	CO C 2D BN 12TH CAV	PFC	DALTON JOHN M	RA16832512	C 1-5
PFC	CLARK RICHARD C	US55782169					

PFC DANIELS CARL S	RA18722407	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC DAVEPORT RICHARD	US51534745	CO C 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC DAVIS ALFRED L	RA19876845	C 1-12
PFC DAVIS BYREN R	RA25747466	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC DAVIS CHARLES O	US53385910	TRP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP5 DAVIS CHARLES R	RA15443812	HMT 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC DAVIS ELWOOD W JR	US52543547	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC DAVIS GAIL L	US55776656	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 DAVIS ROBERT A	US52590936	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC DAVIS ROBERT L	US52617494	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC DAVIS WILLIE E	US54360207	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4 DAVISON WILLIAM A	US52604358	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC DAY STEPHEN W	RA55706337	B 5-7
CPT DE AMARAL CHARLES	O-0078278	TRP C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC DE ANGELIS DOMINIC	RA12693052	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 DE LA PAZ HILARIO	US54346088	CO D 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC DE LA TORRE LUIS	RA19847657	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC DE VOE MICHAEL E	RA18723440	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV
CPL DEATON JACK J	RA22984872	D 1-12
SP4 DELAND PETER F	US51579913	A 2-7
PFC DELGADO RUBEN	RA16794582	CO C 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC DENT MICHAEL E	RA18750099	C 1-12
SSG DERHEIM KENNETH L	RA20762131	HMB 2D BN 19TH ARTY
2LT DEROSIER MICHAEL D	O-5326872	CO D 2ND BN 8TH CAV
1LT DETRIEUX JAMES B W	O-0095498	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV
SSG DEVEREAUX REESE	RA16592461	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC DIAL ROBERT L	US53398465	CO A 227 AVN BN
PFC DICKS MARVIN M	RA16851543	HMB 1-77 ARTY
PFC DIEU GARY A	US56411882	C 2-12
SGT DILLARD THOMAS M	RA53074585	HMC BAND
SP4 DINGER JAMES R	RA16762445	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC DINEPA ROBERT J	US51535591	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC DOAK TOMMY A	US52570309	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC DOMIAN EDWARD T JR	US52630254	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP5 DONALDSON ROBERT D	RA13697528	HMC 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4 DONNELLY JAMES V	RA13816747	CO C 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC DORSEY CARLITO L	RA19862398	C 1-5
SP4 DOUGHTY ROBERT T	RA19821087	HMC 2-8
PFC DOWDELL HARVIN	US53431438	CO D 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC DOWDY WILLIAM	US53395362	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 DOWNEY CLAY E	RA15723606	B 2-5
PFC DRAGOTI JAMES R	US51552673	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC DRAKE GLENN F	RA13858281	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC DRAZER THOMAS S	US55820957	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC DRISKELL LARRY R	US55855403	TRP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4 DRUMMOND AUSTIN L	RA14842148	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC DUFAULT JAMES R	US51570065	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 DUNCAN DONALD R	US52653847	A 5-7
SP4 DUNCAN THOMAS D	RA14821643	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
WO1 DUNDAS MICHAEL C	W-3152993	BTRY B 2D BN 20TH ARTY
SGT DURN WAYLAND JR	RA14308860	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT DURRY PARIS D	RA15474854	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC DUSSEAU JERRY J	RA16784558	C 8 ENGR BN
PFC DUTH ROY A	US54362624	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 DYE DANNY D	RA19814481	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SGT DYSON CHARLES E JR	RA52390262	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PSG EARNEST WILLIE L	RA14484216	O 1-12
SSG EDWARDS CHARLES M	RA18556526	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC EL MONDAN D	US55796724	HMC 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SGT ELDER WILLARD F	RA14801648	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC ELLER CHARLES L	RA14870409	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG ELLIOTT BILLY R	RA54051066	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PVT ELMAN DAVID H	RA12727944	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV

PFC ELMORE HUGH W	RA13844502	CO C 1ST BN 8TH CAV
SP4 EMBERTSON ROBERT L	RA19769155	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP5 ENGLISH CARVER J J	RA15634831	HMC 8TH ENGR BN
SP4 ENGLISH MARK L	US55838617	B 1-8
WO1 ENGMAN DARWIN H	W-3152324	TRP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC ERICKSON THOMAS B	US55849871	A 5-7
PFC ERNST RALPH H	US55765622	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4 ERSON DENNIS K	RA15743354	A 1-12
SGT ERVIN JAMES W	RA19291333	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 ERVIN DANNY M	RA14857045	HMC 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC ERVIN MURBERT A	US54379587	C 1-12
PSG ESCHBACH CHARLES L	RA35201336	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG ESPINOZA ELLIS	RA16498871	A 1-12
CW2 ESTES DONALD C	W-3151994	CO C 229 AVN BN
SGT EVANS GERALD B	RA16955846	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 EVANS JOHN T	RA18749441	B 1-5
PFC EWING TIMOTHY D	RA19839668	D 1-12
PFC FAIRCHILD DAVID A	US56336170	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC PALATO JOSEPH A	US51601631	D 1-8
SP4 FARRIS NORMAN C	RA51572234	CO C 1 BN 5 CAV
PFC FELTON WALTER	US52632471	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC FEMNEY DOUGLAS	RA18863220	D 1-8
SP4 FERGUSON RONALD D	RA19768032	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 FERNANDEZ XAVIER	US56396478	B 5-7
SP4 FERREBEE RUSSELL E	RA13876782	A 5-7
PSG FERRELL WILLIAM A	RA44122065	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC FERRY DANIEL S	US52671212	CO C 15TH TC BN
SSG FIELDS ABRAHAM L	RA13166245	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
MSG FILLIATOR RICHARD	RA35885210	HM 5 CO S BN
1LT FINCH LAMONT W	O-5326563	B 1-8
SP4 FINNEY STEPHEN	US52662118	D 1-8
SSG FINNICUM JOHN O	RA15447790	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4 FISCHER GREGORY J	RA19878668	C 1-12
SP4 FISHER DAVID L	RA17697433	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
PSG FISHER JAMES L	RA18335602	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC FITZPATRICK JOHN D	US55858107	A 5-7
PVT FLAGG JAMES E	US54361396	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC FLENING WILLIAM G	US53384500	CO C 15TH TC BN
SGT FLORES BENNY S N	RA50008035	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PSG FLORES MARUEL S	RA19429867	C 5-7
PSG FLOYD MELVIN F	RA18597527	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SSG FLOYD PAUL E JR	RA12933449	CO D 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC FONGER LYNDSEY J	RA19795241	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV
SP4 FORD RAYMOND S	RA15445367	CO D 2D BN 11TH CAV
SGT FORRESTER CARL J	RA52564232	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 FORRESTER JORDEN D	RA18678409	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 FORT MELVIN F	RA53340995	BTRY B 1ST BN 21ST ARTY
PFC FOSTER BILLIE R	RA18614770	BTRY C 2D BN 17TH ARTY
PFC FOSTER ROBERT L	US28183513	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC FOX CARL J	US53401770	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC FOX LEON V	US53397380	C 6-16 ARTY
SP4 FOXE GEORGE	US53364865	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC FRANCE MACK L JR	RA14856767	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC FRASURE HURSHIEL	US52604159	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC FREDERICK CHARLES	US52624565	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
1SG FRENCH ALBERT L	RA19238955	HMC 2D BDE
SP4 FRYAR GLASCO J	RA14846746	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC FURN GARY F	RA10121984	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
2LT FUQUA JOHN E	OF-0104079	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SSG FUTRELL GARY T	RA16647914	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4 GAGNE LOUIS P JR	RA51461756	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SGT GAINES CHARLES A	RA53337075	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
CW3 GAJAN ALTON L	W-2203888	478TH AVN CO

SGT GAMBLE WILLIAM H	RA13745783	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SP4 HARNON JERRY W	RA18699042	CO A 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC GANDY CLAUDELL	US53424609	CO D 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SGT HARPER WILLIAM C	RA55272569	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
SGT GARCIA ANTONIO	RA16809518	D 1-12	PFC HARRILL RONALD W	RA14944771	C 1-8
SP4 GARCIA WILLIAM	RA19842102	HMC 5TH BN 7TH CAV	SGT HARRIS CARL E	RA14424787	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC GARRETT LLOYD E	US53418431	B 2-12	PFC HARRIS HARLIN JR	US53400070	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP5 GAVARIA GEORGE L	RA16810875	C 1-9	PFC HARRIS HAROLD L	RA14877819	C 1-5
PFC GEIS WILLIAM C	US55797638	TRP C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	SP4 HARRIS JERRY B	US53378643	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
SGT GEISEN JOHN B JR	RA12699507	CO A 1ST BN 8TH CAV	SP4 HARRIS JIMMY	RA15702770	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT GELL JACK E	RA12567367	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV	PFC HARRIS PATRICK J	RA16832210	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4 GENSENER DAVID D	RA18625056	CO B 2D BN 11TH CAV	PFC HARRIS RODNEY C	RA14828795	CO D 1ST BN 12TH CAV
2LT GEOREGAN JOHN L	O-5222616	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SP4 HARRISON DONALD L	RA52968055	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC GEORGE RICHARD E	RA19835083	CO D 1ST BN 8TH CAV	PFC HARRISON PAUL J	RA19776351	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC GIBSON DALE H	US55884599	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC HARSANYI JIMMIE R	US52627732	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
1LT GILMORE KENNETH D	O-5406551	BTRY A 1ST BN 21ST ARTY	PFC HART RAYMOND L	US55827768	A 2-12
SFC GILREATH LUTHER V	RA14323394	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	PFC HATCHER CARLOS R	RA14857968	CO D 1ST BN 8TH CAV
SP4 GLOWIAK FRANK A	US52640241	CO B 5TH BN 7TH CAV	SGT HATTABAUGH PAUL R	RA16784270	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC GODDOLD WILLIE F	US53376289	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	PFC HAWKINS RALIS	US53432327	C 1-5
PFC GODFREY JOHN L	RA16822652	CO C 1 BN 5 CAV	1SG HAMSEY KENNETH	RA18276147	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC GOLDBERG HOWARD S	US51601452	C 1-12	1LT HAYES ALBERT J	O-5328036	D 1-8
SP4 GOLDING JERRY B	US53423694	B 1-8	SGT HAYES NELSON L	RA55692604	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4 GOMEZ JESSIE Y	RA28057406	C 1-8	SSG HAYNES MARTIS L	RA25966246	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT GONDO ROBERT	RA19690591	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SP4 HAYWORTH DENNIS T	RA14856812	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC GOODEN GERALD L	US55872360	B 2-8	PFC HAZEN PAUL G	US55825523	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC GOODING LLOYD L	US54377179	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV	SP4 HEINER EDGAR P	US54368622	CO B 13TH TC BN
SGT GORTON GARY B	RA51447475	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV	1LT HENNESSY DANIEL	O-5326579	B 1-8
PFC GOULD WILLIAM I	US51605507	B 5-7	SGT HENRY LEONARD I	RA13621957	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SSG GRADY JAMES W	RA22928032	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	SP5 HENRY SCOTT D	RA15650948	CO C 8TH ENGR BN
PFC GRAHAM ARMAND R	US51586951	C 1-12	SP4 HENRY WILLIAM J	RA14344521	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 GRAHAM EARL C	RA14787503	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SP4 HERIAUD FREDERICK	US55796666	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
2LT GRANT THOMAS R	OF-0102717	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4 HERMAN CLYDE R	RA13789949	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4 GRAY THOMAS A	US51579476	B 5-7	PFC HERNANDEZ REYNALDO	US56369235	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 GRAYSON JERRELL L	US55765568	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV	SGT HERRANDO ROGER D	RA16824834	A 2-19 ARTY
PFC GRAZIANO ANDREW A	US51556055	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV	PFC HERRERA JIMMIE A	US55892496	A 2-20 ARTY
SSG GREATHOUSE JULIUS	RA18585517	C 1-12	2LT HERRICK HENRY T	O-5325098	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 GREEN CANEY	RA14715824	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV	SGT HERRINGTON CHARLES	RA18942086	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT GREEN FREDDIE	RA14777674	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV	PFC HERSHMAN KENNETH	RA13663294	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC GREEN ROY C	US56689265	A 1-9	2LT HESS LARRY L	O-5325099	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC GREEN WILLIE JR	US54369585	TRP C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	SP5 NETZER JOSEPH E JR	RA13745528	478 AVN CO
PFC GREENE CHARLES R	RA12735137	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SP4 NICKCY JOHNNY	RA53360952	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC GRENE PAUL E	RA15735351	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV	PFC NICKS CHARLES L	RA17850848	C 1-5
PFC GRIFFITH JOHN H	US51554480	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	SP4 NIENER JERRY A	US53373121	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT GROVE RICHARD C	RA14820824	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SP4 NIGGINS JERRY W	US53274621	A 1-8
SGT GUNDERSON GUNDER P	RA17344841	CO D 1ST BN 8TH CAV	PFC HIGMAN JOHN E	RA19781042	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SFC GUNTER MELVIN W	RA33007117	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV	CPL HILL EDDIE L JR	RA53325112	CO D 2D BN 8TH CAV
SSG GUYER WILLIAM H	RA23498063	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SGT HILL RAYMOND L	RA53286227	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 HAGEY CLARENCE E	RA52562018	CO B 2D BN 11TH CAV	PFC HILL ROBERT H	US53375002	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SSG HAIL BROWNIE	RA19257994	C 1-12	PFC HILLIARD JOSEPH R	RA18684259	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC HAIRSTON JOHNNY M	US52642300	CO D 2 BN 5 CAV	PFC HINES JAMES R	US53782095	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 HAIRSTON MELVIN L	RA13791793	CO B2D BN 8TH CAV	SGT HINES LOUIS C	RA14517282	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV
SSG HAMBRICK HAROLD M	RA19389713	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	CPT HINGSTON WILLIAM E	O-0098760	A 2-20 ARTY
SP4 HAMES BOBBY J	US53377473	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SP4 HIRST ROBERT L	US52582059	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC HANILL WRIGHT B	RA19817544	CO D 2D BN 8TH CAV	WO1 HISEY TYRONE W	W-3152491	TRP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SFC HAMMOND RUSSELL E	RA23922769	CO A 8TH ENGR BN	PFC HIXSON RANDALL L	US53415566	C 1-12
PFC HAMPTON DAVID C	US54364135	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV	PFC HOAR JOHN M	US51568859	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC HAMPTON DELL G	US53396929	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC HOBBS RONALD W	RA16761456	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC HAMPTON OTIS J	RA12641433	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC HOBERT WILLIAM J	US54411959	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC HANCOCK WILLIAM E	US52676083	C 1-5	1LT HOGARTH RICHARD D	O-52525217	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT HANS NEIL R	RA13577467	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC HOLDEN JAMES E	US52596347	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT HARDEE DANIEL D	RA14190095	TRP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC HOLLANDSWORTH EDDI	US54381873	D 1-12
SP4 HARDESTY ROBERT J	RA16823189	A 229 AVN BN	PFC HOLLIS JAMES S	US56424991	B 2-8
CPT HARE WILLIAM R	O-4035592	153 ASLT SPT MEL CO 228 E	PSG HOLSTEIN JOHN L	RA19295829	C 2-12
1SG HARE DAYTON L JR	RO33717688	CO B 5TH BN 7TH CAV	PVT HOLT DENNIS E	RA14861762	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC HARLESS JAMES A	US54363233	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV	PVT HOLT GARY R	US56411018	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV

SGT HOOVER GERALD D	RA19603561	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV	SGT JONES JOSHUA T	RA53324136	HMT 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4 HOOVER JAMES	US92592915	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC JONES TRACY L	US55829202	B 5-7
PFC HOPKINS IRVIN J	US52633913	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC JOSLER PHILLIP D	US53841007	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC HORN JOHN E	US508012556	A 1-9	PFC JOUJON-ROOHE EDWAR	US54313602	BTRY C 6TH BN 14TH ARTY
SGT HORTON FLOYD M	RA19514013	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SFC JUREK DALMER D	RA18392545	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC HORWITZ STANLEY L	RA19809479	HMC 1ST BN 5TH CAV	PFC KAISER RONALD H	RA26822172	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT HOSUTTLE HERMAN	RA13633883	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	CPT KANE CHARLES F JR	O-0093048	HMC 15TH MED BN
PFC HOUDE DOUGLAS D	US55888418	B 1-8	PFC KARGER RICHARD T	RA19859197	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG HOUDE MATTHEW	RA14361395	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC KAZIKOWSKI JEFFREY	RA19813701	C 1-8
SGT HOUSTON J H	RA26815004	C 2-8	PFC KEAD JOHN K III	US50611451	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC HOUSTON JOHN W	RA18977757	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC KEAVEREY THOMAS R	US51560847	B 1-12
SP4 HOWELL PHILIP	RA13614053	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4 KEETON TOMMIE	US53378785	CO A 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC HUBICSAK FRANK C	RA12772186	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV	SP4 KEIFER JOE H	RA18729363	HMC 1-9
SP4 HUDSON DALE F	US55769608	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV	PFC KELLER DODD C	US55786314	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4 HUDSON JOHNNY	RA14820822	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC KELLER PETER J	RA16890178	D 2-8
PFC HULL ARNOLD H	US51390241	D 1-12	PFC KENNEDY ALTON R	US52659547	HMC 1-12
SP4 HANE CARL H	RA19786408	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SSG KENNEDY GLENN A	RA14990080	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 HART BOB C JR	RA19605852	CO A 4TH AVN BN	PFC KENNEDY JAMES JR	US52618211	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4 HART ISAAC E JR	RA14865545	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC KENNY RONALD	RA13867922	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT HARTLE PAUL E	RA13327813	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SGT KERNS JOHN E	RA19565617	CO A 13TH SIG BN
SGT HAYLER CECIL	RA44117130	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4 KILLILEA MARTIN F	RA11446951	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC ILLI DANIEL J	US55829351	CO B 5TH BN 7TH CAV	2LT KING FELIX D JR	OF-0103422	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SFC IRLAND LEROY	RA44000327	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4 KING ROBERT L	US52675768	A 2-5
PFC ISAACSON GARY A	RA27990074	TRP C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC KING STEVEN R	RA16850354	D 1-8
PFC JACKSON ALPHA R	US54346184	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4 KIRKLAND VIRGIL JR	US53978533	CO A 5TH AVN BN 229TH
SP4 JACKSON DEAN A	RA26813684	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV	SGT KITTLE CECIL W JR	RA13639812	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 JACKSON JAMES C	RA14605145	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SSG KNAPP MARTIN C	RA13333524	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC JACKSON JOHN G	US52627523	HMT 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC KNAUS RICHARD A	US51574849	B 2-19 ARTY
SFC JACKSON PAUL G	RA14282159	C 1-12	SP5 KNIGHT BILLY H	RA18564067	TRP C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SSG JACKSON ROBERT B	RA14484234	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV	SGT KNIGHT RICHARD	RA15411168	C 1-8
SP4 JACKSON SANFORD L	RA12355351	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV	SGT KNIGHT TROY L	RA14933590	C 1-8
PFC JACOBS RICHARD C	US50012495	B 1-8	SGT KNIGHTON MIRAM J J	RA53366991	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG JAMES BOBBY J	RA18436069	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV	PFC KNOPP JOHN F	US51533933	CO B 5TH BN 7TH CAV
PFC JAMES JACK L	US55799832	CO A 2D BN 5TH CAV	PFC KOCH THOMAS N	US52615087	CO C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4 JAMES JOE H	RA29599744	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SFC KOHLBECK VICTOR J	RA14218578	HQ BAND SPT COMD
SGT JAMES THOMAS	RA51467276	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4 KOLZ JOHN J	RA17584436	HMC 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC JANROS RICHARD K	US55786085	11TH AVN GP	PFC KOONE JACK R	RA19666897	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SGT JARZENSKI JAMES H	RA23789034	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV	SP4 KOSAROWSKI GERALD	RA18762776	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG JEDRZEJEWSKI HARRY	RA33922558	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4 KOVAR JAMES R	RA55445219	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4 JEFFERSON HERMAN L	RA54178751	194TH ASLT SPT MEL CO 229T	PFC KRASHOFF ARNOLD R	US51800524	C 1-5
SGT JENKINS FRED H	RA14824111	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC KRUMER DUNCAN F	RA16802142	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC JESSIE MARSHALL	US51554796	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV	SP4 KUMBLEY GERALD L	RA17499466	110 AM CO 229TH AVN BN
SSG JIVINS JERRY	RA14215769	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SP4 KULAN-OLIVERAS RA	RA50161603	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SFC JOHNSON BEN JR	RA37765433	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	2LT LA BONETE ROGER E	O-5239890	C B ENGR BN
SGT JOHNSON BOBBY G	RA54396720	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV	SP4 LA FASO JOSEPH S	US51525497	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 JOHNSON CHARLES JR	RA14669399	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SSG LANGARD ROBERT H	RA14491293	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT JOHNSON FRED L	RA17554896	D 1-9	CPL LAJKO ROBERT D	US55828608	HMC 11 AVN GP
PFC JOHNSON HARVEY III	US52676967	C 1-5	PFC LAMBERT GARY K	US51347438	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SSG JOHNSON JACK	RA51238958	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV	CPT LANE ROBERT C	M-3150729	478 FLY CRABE
2LT JOHNSON JERRY J	O-3323590	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4 LAMBOLIS JAMES T	RA32509534	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT JOHNSON JIMMY A	RA14678691	BTRY B 3D BN 18TH ARTY	PFC LANIER KENNETH W	RA15735187	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC JOHNSON MARION E	US51810907	C 1-5	PFC LARSON JOHN G	RA19843852	HMC 1-12
PFC JOHNSON ROBERT	US51590221	D 2-8	PFC LASCHER JAMES A	US55889705	A 2-12
SP4 JOHNSON RONALD J	RA19823053	A 1-12	PFC LAUFER BILLY L	RA19748034	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV
MAJ JOHNSON TAYLOR D	O-4021075	1330 ASLT SPT MEL CO	WO1 LAMMON CHARLES R	M-3153011	TRP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC JOHNSON TIMOTHY H	RA16759243	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV	SSG LANSON ROGER W	RA16523011	B 2-12
SGT JOHNSON WILBERT A	RA13647588	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC LANSON THOMAS A	RA16685702	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 JOLLEY DAVID H JR	RA15674030	CO C 1ST BN 8TH CAV	PFC LAY JOHN E	RA15698027	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC JONES ALLEN W	RA14905005	CO C 5D BN 8TH CAV	PFC LE BRUN LAURENCE P	RA13986364	CO C 229 AVN BN
PFC JONES CARROLL H	US52485280	C 1-5	SP4 LEACH DOUGLAS H	RA14837944	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC JONES DOUGLAS W	US55810923	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SP4 LEACH WALTER D	US56390779	B 5-7
PFC JONES GEORGE M	US63044159	B 2-8	SGT LEANIO MILARIO B J	RA50011008	A 1-8
SP4 JONES JAMES H	US64106149	A 2-5	SP4 LEASE RICHARD F	RA15610222	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV

PFC LEDERHAUS DONALD H	RA16834588	B 2-19 ARTY	PFC MASTER WILLIAM S	US52657484	B 2-20 ARTY
PFC LEDFORD JEFFERY L	US55829455	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4 MASTERSON ROBERT A	RA15706576	CO C 15TH TC BN
SP4 LEE GARRETT F	US55794267	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC MASTERSON EDMUND H	RA16825476	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC LEE PAUL R	US51536884	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV	SP4 MATHEIS RONNIE T	RA14789665	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SSG LEEHMAN DONALD	RA18286878	D 1-12	SSG MATTHEWS JAMES M	RA19678381	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SGT LEMAY PAUL L	RA16722055	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV	PFC MATTINGLY TIMMY	US55841025	D 2-7
SP4 LEMON JOE L	RA18711117	D 1-12	PFC MATYSZAK GEORGE E	RA12739317	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT LESTER JAMES T	RA14740032	CO D 1ST BN 8TH CAV	PFC MAULDIN MICHAEL B	RA19839567	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SFC LETBETTER BOBBY W	RA54148152	C 1-5	1LT HAYER THOMAS J	O-5326278	CO B 2 BN 8 CAV
SSG LEWIS HARVEY L	RA14689751	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV	SP4 HAYES DAVE JR	RA14665258	HMC 3RD BDE
SP4 LEWIS ROBERT L	US52586095	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	PFC HAYES JAMES W	US52621833	CO A 5TH AVN BN 229TH
PFC LEWIS THOMAS	US53395167	TRP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC HAYWARD THOMAS H	RA19826737	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC LICHTA DENNIS	US55801117	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV	SGT HAYS PICARDO R	RA13521514	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SSG LILLY ROBERT C	RA13636040	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV	SP4 MC ALUN ERNEST F	RA24669892	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT LINDLEY MARVIN L	RA19599040	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV	1LT MC AULIFFE ALBERT	O-5329320	C 1-9
PFC LINDSEY WILLIAM J	US53390024	CO D 1ST BN 5TH CAV	SSG MC CANNON GLENN E	RA52345260	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP5 LLOYD FREDDIE G	RA23277318	BTRY A 2D BN 20TH ARTY	2LT MC CAHR WILLIAM G	O-5326938	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC LOCATELLI VINCENT	US56368291	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV	CPT MC CARR HAROLD C	O-2269144	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG LOCKHART ROY	RA55063697	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV	2LT MC CARTHY HOWARD D	O-5326939	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT LOERLEIN RONALD J	RA52496091	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV	1LT MC CARTHY TIMOTHY	O-5326746	C 1-5
SGT LOEHN JOHN T	RA13638346	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC MC CASLIN GARY E	US53423458	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4 LONG DENNIS L	RA16713610	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV	PFC MC CLELLAN BRENT A	US52623347	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC LONG ELDON D	US55811025	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC MC CLEMMAN CHARL	US51583579	D 1-12
SGT LOPER NILES H JR	RA13639541	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV	PFC MC CONNAUGHTY DAVI	US52607737	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC LOPEZ EDWIN JUAN A	US50179128	CO A 2D BN 5TH CAV	PFC MC CONNELL GERALD	US51377215	CO C 1ST BN 6TH CAV
PVT LOPEZ ELMER C	US56404267	A 5-7	SP4 MC CONNICO DONALD	US53381202	CO A 8TH ENGR BN
PFC LOVE HUGH A	RA14818231	CO D 2D BN 5TH CAV	PFC MC CORBICK JEROME	US53386346	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4 LOVE J C	US53382462	CO C 1ST BN 8TH CAV	PFC MC COY EUGENE T	US55799340	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
SSG LOVELL EDWARD A	RA30117976	CO C 2D BN 12TH CAV	1LT MC CRAW DOUGLAS H	O-5324222	C 5-7
PFC LOZANO JOSE R	RA18767408	C 2-8	PFC MC CRAY MELVIN	RA14834902	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 LUCAS WILBUR R	RA17604617	CO A 8TH ENGR BN	SP4 MC DONALD JAMES H	US56414985	C 2-7
PFC LUDWIG BYRON M	US52629295	BTRY B 2D BN 20TH ARTY	PFC MC DONALD MICHAEL	RA12709406	CO B 1ST BN 2TH CAV
PFC LUKE RONALD H	RA14885072	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV	PFC MC DONALD SAMUEL L	RA23998672	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC LUNA ANGEL R	US61002737	D 1-12	WO1 MC DONNELL JOEL W	M-3153288	C 1-9
SP4 LUNA FORTUNATO JR	RA18600244	133D ASH SPT HEL	PFC MC ELROY GRADY E	RA18752249	CO C 5 BN 7 CAV
PFC LUNA HENRY T	RA19596471	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC MC GRAN THOMAS E	RA12680464	CO A 2ST BN 2TH CAV
PFC LINDOELL WAYNE T	US52587258	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV	PFC MC GRIFF DAUNY J	RA19786559	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT LUTE HARRY G	RA54233828	CO D 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SP4 MC HELLOW GEORGE S	US53389939	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC LYECK DOUGLAS R	US55846730	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	PFC MC KILLIP WILLIAM	RA15731320	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC LYNCH JUSTIN M	RA14877441	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV	SSG MC MANUS CHARLES V	RA14491078	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC LYNN JACK D	RA15694213	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV	CPT MC MILLAN DONALD F	O-0093242	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC MACK HAROLD JR	RA14879739	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC MC PHEBSON ALFRED	RA14643881	CO C 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC MACK ROBERT L	US92628695	HMC 1ST BN 12TH CAV	PFC MC WILLIAMS GEORGE	US53400203	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SGT MADDOX PHILIP H	RA17349637	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	SGT MEDLEY CLARENCE	RA24383871	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC MAGUIRE GERALD J	US52666266	B 1-8	SFC MELENDEZ CRISTOBAL	RA29140479	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT MAGYAROSI JOHN J	RA19713736	BTRY C 2D BN 19TH ARTY	SP4 MELTON EARL JR	RA13778077	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC MAHARA VANNY C	US54380811	D 2-5	SGT MERDENMALL WILLIAM	RA17472887	CO B 5TH BN 7TH CAV
PFC MAHONEY RONALD J	RA55788660	HMC B ENGR BN	SP4 MERDEZ ERINEO	RA18715267	B 1-8
PFC MALEWICZ EDWARD A	US51506013	CO B 1ST BN 12TH CAV	SP4 MERDOZA DAVID L	US52594504	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG MALONE CHARLES K	RA25125049	C 1-5	SP4 MERCER CARL S	US63005037	B 1-8
PFC MANGAT FREDERICK C	US56346650	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV	PFC MERCK ROGER E	RA14843988	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC MARRA JOSEPH P	RA16779603	BTRY B 1ST BN 21ST ARTY	SGT MEROMEY BATHMELL J	RA14677936	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC MARGANO-DIAZ GAMAL	US50184529	C 1-5	SP4 MERRILL ROBERT D	RA53340574	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4 MARCHAVE ROBERT J	RA13847971	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV	PFC METCALF GERALD E	RA11449058	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 MARION HARRY L	US56403277	D 5-7	CPT METSKER THOMAS C	O-5313682	HMC 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC MARSHALL RICHARD A	RA19834677	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV	SP4 MICHAEL DAVID W	US55779931	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG MARTIN RONALD R	RA23783257	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV	SP4 MIDDLTON KENNETH	RA27022264	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT MARTINEZ DANIEL T	RA18649663	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV	SGT NILES PALMER B	RA13691160	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC MARTIN-TORRES JULI	US50183879	CO B 1ST BN 6TH CAV	SP4 MILK ALLAN A	US51579507	CO B 5TH BN 7TH CAV

PFC MILLER MICHAEL J	US55782727	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 MILLER NORMAN	RA52483007	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
2LT MILLER RONALD A	O-5417798	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC MINOCK JOSEPH P	RA12728881	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
SGT MIRACLE DANIEL L	US52983524	B 2-19 ARTY
PFC MIRANDA PEREZ NOE	US50179027	CO 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC MIS RONALD H	US51579507	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4 MITCHELL EUGENE E	RA14502756	C 1-5
PVT MITCHELL ROCHESTER	US53394620	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4 MITCHELL WILLIAM B	US52596261	HMC 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 MIZE JAMES W JR	RA14884248	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC MOBLEY DANIEL M	RA15754465	D 1-8
PFC MONROE JAMES H	US54801435	HMC 1-8
SGT MONSIEZ LLOYD J	RA14353297	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT MOODY ARTHUR R III	RA14771466	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
2LT MOOG PHILIP J	O-5326443	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC MOONEY JAMES	US53381565	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP3 MOORE CHARLES T	RA15654815	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC MOORE FRED JR	RA22981958	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV
PSG MOORE JOSEPH W	RA53168846	D 3-8
SP4 MOORE LEE A JR	RA53339246	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC MOORE NORMAN J	US53417220	HMC 5-7
PFC MOORE ROBERT L	US53370386	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC MORALES-GONZALES J	US50172782	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC MORENO ROBERT	RA19826331	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 MORGAN WILLIAMS II	RA12721989	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT MORLEY JAMES R	RA16674613	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
SFC MORRIS MOYER	RA18094417	CO A 8TH ENGR BN
PFC MORRIS JAMES L	US53413993	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PVT MORRIS WINSTON	RA16812768	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4 MOSLEY RICHARD J	RA12740082	HMC 2-12
PFC MUELLER CARL W	US52653854	A 5-7
CPL MULLER ALBERT G	RA13749884	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC MURPHY ISALAH JR	US51539975	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
CPT MUSGROVE JOHN D	O-3003535	ATTACHED HHT 1/9 CAV
SP4 MYERS CHARLES L	RA19877694	B 1-5
PFC MYERS EDWARD G	US56386727	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC NAASZ LARRY D	RA19832128	C 1-5
PVT NADEAU HAROLD B	RA11471016	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SGT NAGALLAN ROE	RA25971991	HMT 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC NAKAYAMA JUMRY D	RA28674501	CO C 8TH ENGR BN
SGT NAYLOR RAYMOND L	RA16449280	CO A 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC HEAD ELWOOD F JR	US56406998	CO B 15TH TC BN
PVT NEBRON RODRIGUEZ JO	US50174933	CO C 2D BN 11TH CAV
PFC NELSON ALLAN J JR	US56422456	C 1-9
SP4 NELSON HENRY J	RA11470979	D 1-12
1LT NELSON MILES H	O-5326769	A 1-5
SSG NELSON ROGER T	RA17402101	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC NENCHICK MICHAEL J	RA13831786	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
SGT NEVIN PATRICK C	RA55723561	CO B 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC NICHOLAS TOMMY L	US53461964	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
1LT NICHOLS COLTR K	O-5532928	BTRY C 2D BN 20TH ARTY
PFC NICOLAS GILBERT A	RA12688984	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC NIELKE RICHARD A	RA19826483	HMC 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC NORICK JAMES J	US51642786	D 1-9
PFC NORRIS BERNIE E	US53409023	C 4-16 ARTY
WO1 NORVILLE CLYDE L J	W-3152341	TRP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC NOVOTNY RICHARD D	RA16878305	HMC 2-3
SP4 NUNLEY JAMES E	US55836091	C 1-12
SSG OBRICK CLYDE H	RA11360183	D 1-9
PFC ODIER STEVEN K	US55846062	A 2-12
SP4 OGLES KENNETH W	RA14864336	C 1-8
PFC OGLETHORPE THOMAS	RA19824250	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV

SGT OLIVER WALTER R	RA15571465	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC OLSON RODNEY J	RA17721178	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC OLZAK RAYMOND D	RA13864835	A 1-12
SGT OMANA RALPH W	RA14939442	CO D 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4 ORPHANOS THEOPHILO	US51531302	CO A 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC ORTIZ-COLON ULISES	US50189479	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC OSTO-AZA MALDONADO	US50176286	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SFC OSUNA ANTONIO R	RA19633168	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC OTIS SHERMAN E	RA14819900	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG OTT RICHARD D	RA13296828	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
WO1 OMER HARVEY G JR	W-3153265	C 1-9
SGT PADILLA ROBERT L	RA19671574	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SSG PAGAN-LOZADA WILFR	RA12639932	D 2-5
PSG PALMER CARL L	RA44135445	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP3 PAREDES ISMAEL J	RA50007577	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT PAREDEZ AUGUSTIN C	RA18607691	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT PARKER BENNIE F	RA28170486	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC PARKER MARK E	RA12726916	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 PARKER RICHARD O	RA19767204	BTRY C 1ST BN 7TH ARTY
PFC PARKETT JAMES R	RA16672214	TRP C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SFC PASCUAL FLORENDO B	R-50000523	TRP C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
WO1 PATERSON ROSS J	W-3152623	BTRY A 2D BN 20TH ARTY
SSG PATINO PABLO	RA56271517	B 5-7
2LT PATZMELL JAMES G	O-5328294	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC PAULAK JAMES W	US55892148	B 1-8
PFC PELLUCCI EDWARD S	US52652398	A 9-7
PFC PENDOLA ANTHONY E	RA28221349	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC PERKINS DAVID D	RA28053715	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV
PSG PEAPETA RODNEY JR	RA18106904	D 1-12
SGT PETEY CHARLES L	RA18394473	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
WO1 PETERS DAVID E	W-3152677	BTRY C 2D BN 20TH ARTY
SP3 PETERSON DONALD C	US53777746	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC PETERSON JESSIE E	RA19470493	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC PETERSON REWOLD W	US53580064	B 2-8
PFC PETRINOULX ROBERT	US53866982	A 2-8
PFC PHILLIPS ANTHONY B	US56414097	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV
SP4 PHILLIPS DONNELL	RA54337637	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 PHILLIPS EARL G	RA13794599	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
CPT PHILLIPS HOWARD E	O-403-836	CO A 249 AVN BN
PFC PHILLIPS JAMES E	US52616789	HMC 2D BN 5TH CAV
PSG PHILLIPS WILEY L	RA14186823	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
1SG PICKETT KENNETH W	RA23184478	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC PICKETT WILLIE C	US53381542	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC PIERRE CARRIER	US51322692	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4 PIREZ BERGES CAMLO	US51396086	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC PITT ROBERT L	RA19832347	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC PIZZINO THOMAS C	US52698825	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT PLATT GARY W	RA17694821	CO A 1ST BN 8TH CAV
SP4 PLEANANT WILLIAM A	US51526103	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC PLISAR MICHAEL D	US52629734	CO 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC POLANO HARRY T	US52444295	C 1-12
PFC POLK PRESTON W	RA19832043	C 2-8
PFL POLKINGHORNE ROBERT	W-5597904	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4 POPE DERRICK B	RA19414445	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 POSIUS ROBERT	US55771180	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT POSS TRAVIS O	RA15629823	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 POST DANIEL B	RA13894342	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SGT POSTON JAMES	RA16623127	CO A 2D BN 5TH CAV
SP4 POSTON RAYMOND R	RA18678027	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC POTTY-OTTER JAMES V	RA15721129	CO D 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4 POWEN EDWIF L	RA17167621	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT POWELL DAVID W JR	RA18964673	CO A 1ST BN 11TH CAV
PFC POWELL ELMER F	RA12721104	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV

PFC POWER RICHARD W	RA11469551	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 POWERS CHARLES R	RA18692408	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC PRATHER HARVEY M	RA15725052	HMC 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 PHELAN DOMINIC J J	RA11422210	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4 PRINLE DANNY V	RA15739084	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC PROVENAL ROLAND A	RA11453042	HMC 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT PRYON PRWEST P	RA52548445	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT QUINN JOHN H	RA12692407	CO C 1ST BN 11TH CAV
PFC QUIRUE JOSEPH A	US53832510	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC RAMON JOSEPH L	RA14944653	C 1-5
SGT RAMIREZ HONCRIO JR	RA16521600	CU D 1ST BN 8TH CAV
CPL RANDLES JOHN P	RA19804442	CO A 1ST BN 11TH CAV
SP4 RANGEL RICHARD	US56382612	CO A 1ST BN 11TH CAV
SP4 RANKIN DONALD I	US52653856	CO A 5TH BN 7 CAV
SSG RASMUSSEN NEAL A	RA19327914	CO 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG RATLIF OSCAR E	RA14762661	D 1-8
PFC REA PHILLIP K	RA16811855	D 1-8
PFC REAGAN NORMAN R	US5431975	C 1-8
SGT REED FLOYD L JR	RA18543614	BTRY A 1ST BN 21ST ARTY
PFC REESE ABRAHAM B	US55895175	B 2-12
PFC REESE WILLIAM J	US52652661	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFL REYEV DAVID L	W-56386659	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SSG REGO JOHN H	RA50082646	BP 8
PFC REID JOSEPH H	RA12693792	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC REYNOLDS KENNETH A	RA13794042	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC RHODES CLIFFORD G	RA18893031	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC RICCI GERALD	US53896746	B 2-8
WO1 RICE GEORGE W	W-3152626	HMC 15TH MED BN
D 1-12	RA28252422	CO 2D BN BN 12TH CAV
PFC RICE RONALD F	RA17682569	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC RICH THOMAS E	US53373391	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC RICHARDSON LOUIS D	US53942959	B 1-8
SP4 RICHARDSON RAYMOND	RA14817463	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4 RICHARDSON THEODOUR	RA17649973	IMP D 1ST BN 9TH CAV
PFC RICHMOND CHARLES	RA19835513	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SSG RIGGS ROSE	RA53363004	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC RILEY HOWARD C	US52605442	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT RILEY JAMES L	RA13372532	TRP C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC RINGOLD LAWRENCE	US52619145	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4 RIPPY TERRY A	RA19465301	CO D 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC RITTER ALLEN J	RA17704571	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT RIVERA REYES JOSE	RA50129406	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC ROBINSON HOWARD C	RA11459976	TRP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4 ROBINSON JOSEPH L	RA13648434	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV
SGT ROBINSON RAYMOND C	RA27018660	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4 ROBINSON SHEPPARD	RA53294288	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC ROOBY DONALD G	RA16408743	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC RODEMECK RODEMECK	US55844067	D 2-12
PFC RODRIGUEZ JESSE H	RA18725477	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
CPL RODRIGUEZ RUDOLPH	RA28244461	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC RODRIGUEZ ESTHEMER	US50176546	CO B 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PSG ROGERS CLAYTON JR	RA18354446	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4 ROGOFF JAMES B	RA56278307	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC ROMAN AGUILAR CARM	US51595558	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC ROMANO WILLIAM H	RA16811999	CO B 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4 ROMEO BERNIE	RA18425038	HMC 2D BN 19TH ARTY
CW2 ROOP FRANK	W-3150763	123D 226 AVN BN
SSG ROSE CHARLES W	RA13533202	CO D 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC ROSE LARRY E	RA17716760	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4 ROSE ONSEY R	RA19697809	CO D 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC ROSS LARRY D	US55429239	D 5-7
SSG ROSS SAMUEL	RA52350929	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV

SP4 RONLARD GEORGE JR	US52645398	B 2-8
SP4 ROY RICHARD W	RA11432024	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC ROYAL FRANCIS P	US53829414	CO B 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4 RUDOLPH RUDOLPH	RA10128218	A 2-8
PFC RYBE ROY L JR	US56389784	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC SABERS JERRY D	RA15750047	CO C 1 BN 5 CAV
CPT SABINE JOHN S IV	O-5316397	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4 SAENZ ALFRED J	RA18646365	C 1-8
SP4 SAIZ FRED B	RA18704079	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC SALAZAR ROY	US53885294	CO B 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC SALDANA PERINER R J	RA18727083	CO D 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC SALLEY WALTER	US52659129	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC SAMARIPA JESS E	US54381760	CO B 5TH BN 7TH CAV
PFC SAMPY JOHN F	US51540867	CO B 8TH ENGR BN
SP4 SANCHEZ FRANKIE	RA26940515	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC SANDERS DANIEL W	US52516419	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 SANEZ ALFREDO J	RA18448365	C 1-8
PFC SANTIUS PABLO PEDR	US50177946	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC SANTOS-TRUJILLO DA	US52174673	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC SAPP FREDDY L	US54372316	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT SAWARE YARIS JR	RA52516009	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4 SAWICKI RICHARD P	US59735782	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC SCANILL EDWARD J	RA12734047	C 1-5
PFC SCAMMROUGH EMILIS R	US53361793	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SNR SCHAPIR RICHARD A	RA13842454	HMC 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC SCHAEFFER GARY L	RA12728528	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 SCHALLIP HARVEY	US53779449	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SSG SCHELL DUANE C	RA19754054	CO D 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC SCHLECHT JOHN III	US51942490	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT SCHLESMAN JERROLD	US53783371	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4 SCHNECKER JOHN L	US51541819	B 2-8
PFC SCHNELTZ JERRY E	US53880625	C 1-12
PFC SCHNELTZ KENNETH E	US53868912	D 1-9
PFC SCHNICK MARTIN F J	US53782267	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC SCHUCUTELLA JOSEPH	RA12764030	C 1-8
SP4 SCOTT EDDIE J	US53994283	A 2-8
PFC SCOTT EMERIE C	RA17641062	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC SCOTT HAROLD	US51828262	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC SCOTT RANDOLPH C	RA14880961	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC SELLENA RUDOLPH C	RA17704748	TRP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC SEMLER STANLEY A	US54401271	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC SEITON JERRY C	RA14895727	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4 SHAFFER CHARLES R	RA13833400	B 3-7
SP4 SHALDON DANIEL F	RA19638671	CO B 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC SHAW JOHN A	US53776690	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 SHAW THOMAS W	RA11481900	HMC 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4 SHERMAN RONALD J	US51897386	C 1-12
SP4 SHEFFIELD LARRY G	RA53316409	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 SHELBY JAY C	US53813097	B 1-7
SGT SHELTON EARL S	RA17404086	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC SHELTON FRANK T	US53392805	CO D 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC SHELTON MATHEWS	US52464290	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PSG SHEPHERD EDWARD	RA53048406	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC SHERMAN HARLEY E	US53444018	B 2-12
PFC SHERMAN RONALD E	RA11441576	HMC 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4 SHERROD RONALD A	RA14619824	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT SHERROD LOUIS	RA1387834	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC SHETTON WILLIAM H	US53444406	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC SHETTERS JOHN H	US53420048	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4 SHOOLEY THURMAN B	RA14864380	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4 SHUALTER WALDENRA	RA18944840	TRP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4 SHRIVER ROBERT B J	RA19756936	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV

SP4	SMUCK ROBERT L	US95000081	CO B 5TH BN 7TH CAV
PFC	SIEGEM EDWARD H	US95004524	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	SINCOCK THOMAS P	US91949321	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	SIMMONS EDWARD L	RA14718259	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	SINHAU ROBERT A	US95771893	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT	SINK OTIS B	RA13570725	B 1-9
PFC	SIPES RICHARD E	US66001304	MHC 2-12
SGT	SKIPPER HUGH S	RA14757714	MHC 1-12
PFC	SLAVIN RICHARD B	US91604829	B 2-9
PFC	SLIGH ALVIN C	RA14607181	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4	SMITH CARL B	RA17700512	B 1-9
PFC	SMITH CHARLES W	RA13636966	BTRY C 2D BN 20TH ARTY
CPT	SMITH CLIFFORD	O-9221413	C 1-9
PFC	SMITH GARY D	US93370497	CO O 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT	SMITH HENRY F	US93370100	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT	SMITH JAMES D	RA95252541	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SG	SMITH MARSHALL B	RA14846846	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC	SMITH MICHAEL T	US91930660	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT	SMITH RALPH R	RA14940079	CO B 3D BN 8TH CAV
WO1	SMITH RALPH R	W-9183996	TMP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SP4	SMITH ROBERT L	RA24481624	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC	SMITH ROBERT L	US93469992	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
SP4	SMITH ROBERT W	US92644490	A 2-20 ARTY
PFC	SMITH SAMUEL W	RA19909694	C 1-9
2LT	SMITH SIDNEY C	O-9224962	BTRY B 1ST BN 21ST ARTY
PFC	SMYTHE JAMES E	US95026355	C 1-9
SGT	SODERSTROM WILLIAM	RA18639992	TMP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SG	SOLTOV NORMAN V	RA26301361	CO A 1ST BN 9TH CAV
SG	SOMERS FRANK J	RA12699658	B 1-9
SP4	SOMMER ALBERT W	RA18509927	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	SPANR DENNIS R	US92657942	B 1-9
PFC	SPENKER NORMAN	RA92597174	BTRY B 1ST BN 7TH ARTY
SP4	SPIKES AV	RA24922680	CO C 1ST BN 18TH CAV
PFC	SPAL LEONARD W	US92622937	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
CPT	ST PETER ROBERT E	O-0077701	CO A 6TH AVN BN
PFC	STAFFORD FREDERICK	US92627404	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SG	STAYTON ROONEY D	RA13783145	B 2-19 ARTY
PFC	STEEL KENNETH L	US95049393	B 2-9
PFC	STEIER WILLIAM E	US91512821	CO C 229TH AVN BN
SP5	STEINER CHARLES T	RA19726770	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	STEPHENS ANDREW L	US94363456	C 1-9
PFL	STEPHENS GEORGE J	RA12726565	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	STEPHENS JAMES R	RA14653410	BTRY C 2D BN 19TH ARTY
1LT	STEPHENSON WILLIAM	O-9224654	TMP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SGT	STENART JERRY D	RA27945131	TMP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SGT	STEWART JIMMY G	RA19614853	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4	STEWART WILBERT JR	RA19059085	C 1-9
PFC	STICE LARRY D	RA17694402	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC	STILL FRED H	RA14001008	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	STINSON GEORGE W J	US94370638	C 1-12
SGT	STOCKHAJ PAUL J	RA12943096	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP5	STOCKDALE MELVIN J	RA27012536	CO A 4TH AVN BN
PFC	STOFFEL MICHAEL H	US95057490	CO A 5TH BN 7TH CAV
SGT	STOKES ROBERT L	RA19629706	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SGT	STONE ROGER A	RA14619781	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	STONE WILLIAM J B	RA17754688	CO C 1ST BN 9TH CAV
SG	STOREY CHARLES W	RA44180681	MHC 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	STOUT CLIFFORD R	RA12751720	CO C 1 BN 3 CAV
PFC	STRICKLAND MIRAM D	RA14044920	BTRY B 2D BN 17TH ARTY
PFC	STROM LARRY A	US95040409	D 2-12
SP4	STUBBARD FRIS H	RA14621368	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT	HALLIVAN WILLIAM A	RA14349499	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV

PFC	SIMMONS DONALD L	J594970084	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC	SIMPSON CLAUDE C	US92671770	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SG	SUTHERLAND HERBERT	RA24231509	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT	SUTTON GARRETT G J	RA14609928	CO C 1ST BN 8TH CAV
PFC	SWANSON WELLS W	US95012066	CO C 1ST BN 8TH CAV
SGT	SZIJARTO STEPHEN	RA95671391	D 1-9
WO1	TALLEY BILLY J	W-3152637	TMP C 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC	TAKATO JOEL	RA18743914	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC	TART CLIFTON L	US91934010	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC	TASTE MADE	RA14908467	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC	TATE BRADLEY M	RA13842172	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	TATE JAMES E	RA14833683	CO C 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4	TATSUNO ALBERT H	RA29047683	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	TAYLOR ERNEST E	US95737409	CO C 4D BN 7TH CAV
PFL	TAYLOR JAMES R	RA14004981	MHC 11TH PATFINDER DET
PFC	TAYLOR THEODORE F	RA13833769	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
MAJ	TAYLOR WILLIAM E	O-0084004	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC	TEAGUE JOHN N	RA16809361	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	TEFFELTIN GORDON R	RA18729002	B 1-9
SGT	TEGLAS SPIA T	RA10013408	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SGT	TERLICKI WALTER A	RA11400345	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4	TERRY TOMMY J	US95029144	D 9-7
PFC	TESTA RICHARD	RA12721096	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	THOMP ALEXANDER	RA19634594	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4	THOMAS ANTHONY	US95411883	O 2-9
PFC	THOMAS FRED L	US93396300	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT	THOMAS JACK JR	RA93389915	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC	THOMAS L V JR	US94352121	TMP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC	THOMAS ROYD THALD N	US95099973	C 1-12
SGT	THOMAS RICHARD G	RA15691304	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4	THOMAS STEPHEN E	RA14627747	TMP B 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
SG	THOMAS WALTER R	RA16440100	C 2-9
PFC	THOMPSON ALFRED L	RA14676609	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4	THOMPSON JAMES E	RA19612004	CO A 1ST BN 8TH CAV
1LT	THOMPSON WILLIAM W	O-9535454	A 2-9
SGT	THORNTON LEO K	RA96340082	CO A 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	THORPE DAVID L	RA19609947	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP5	TILLER ROBERT	RA93395533	MHC 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	TILLOUSTI ROBERT A	US91900092	MHC 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC	TIMPA JOSEPH JR	US91934988	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
CPT	TITUS CHARLES H	O-0091096	A 1-9
SP4	TOINS FRED	RA16455111	CO B 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SG	TOLBERT PAUL D	RA95597368	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	TOLLEY CALVIN C JR	RA24267941	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	TORRES PRISMADO J	RA90009296	CO O 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	TORREY RAYMOND D	US91940526	D 1-12
WO1	TOWNSEND DELMAS S	W-3152410	CO C 42D AVN BN
SGT	TRAVIS JON P	RA12681780	CO B 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	TRETTISORNI GERALD	US92640223	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	TROUPE HERMAN L	US93427499	CO D 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP5	TRUDEDALE LARRY L	RA19663237	2ND AM CO 220TH AVN
PFC	TUCKER OLLIE	US93431908	D 2-9
SP4	TUCKER THOMAS E	US93374606	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	TULLER DENNIS J	RA19030037	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	TUMING JOHN J	US91904002	CO D 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP5	TURNER CLAUDE T	RA14974937	155D ABLT 228 AVN
PFC	TURNER SPURGE A	RA14009675	B 1-77 ARTY
SG	TUTTLE AMLEN C	RA14274936	CO A 8TH ENGR BN
2LT	THEODOY STUART E	O-9226502	CO A 1ST BN 8TH CAV
SGT	TYLER EARTHILL	RA14361344	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
1LT	ULRICH JAMES C	O-9419411	C 1-12
SP4	UNGER LIPSTER E JR	US92607612	C 1-9

PFC	VAN DEJESSECKE JOHN	RA16740393	TMP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC	VAN RAEMDONCK ROMA	US95046810	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV
SP4	VANCELETTE DAVID	RA11442562	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	VASQUEZ JIMMY	US96416338	D 1-9
SG	VANUGH JAMES O	RA92246240	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4	VALDEZ JOSE A	US91579451	CO B 9TH BN 7TH CAV
SP4	VERA-DURAN MIGUEL	US91746412	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	VERNON DONALD G	US95018369	C 1-9
SP4	VICTORY WILLIAM E	US92546110	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
CPL	WILLIARD JOSEPH GI	RA12349960	BTRY B 1ST BN 21ST ARTY
SP4	VINASSA MICHAEL G	RA19835678	CO C 1ST BN 8TH CAV
SGT	VINLUAN DOMINGO B	RA10326993	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	VINSON ROBERT C	US93374254	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	VINSON WIMBY H	RA93359437	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC	WADY DONALD J	RA19833388	CO C 2D BN 5TH CAV
PFC	WADEN JOHN F	US91937799	C 1-9
PFC	WAGE-JESSE F	RA16011649	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4	WAGMAN JEFFREY B	RA16944422	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SG	WALT BERNARD J	RA21910122	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
SGT	WALDEN TRAVIS G	RA17723721	C 2-9
SP4	WALDOYOGEL ROBERT E	RA17649104	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SG	WALKER JOE F	RA13648887	D 9-7
1LT	WALLACE JERALD D	O-9324822	C 1-12
PFC	WALTMAN RICHARD A	RA14883242	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC	WARD DONNIE L	US93005134	A 3-7
SP4	WARD IVORY JR	RA95499497	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	WARD JAMES C	RA16817824	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	WARE HACK A	RA93353587	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SG	WARE RAYMOND	RA14469421	A 1-9
SGT	WATKINS REGINALD A	RA14691478	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SG	WATSON WILLIAM B J	RA14373403	MHC 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SFC	WATTS ASTER	RA16429905	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4	WEBSTER RICHARD	RA92520086	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	WEDD VINCENT J JR	US91603389	A 1-9
SGT	WEIAND RAYMOND D	RA13639732	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
SGT	WEINMAN DONALD F	RA14686519	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	WEISMAN ALAN R	US91970594	A 3-7
PFC	WEISS DOUGLAS J	RA12726780	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	WELCH JACK A	US95046495	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	WELLER TERRY L	RA13608111	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP4	WENHRE DONALD W	RA13611736	TMP D 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV
PFC	WHEATON ALLEN T	RA13845044	CO A 1ST BN 11TH CAV
SP4	WHEELER JAMES	US95034234	B 1-7
SG	WHEELER MORRIS E	RA92440926	CO C 2D BN 8TH CAV
PFC	WHITE COLEY P	US92641832	A 9-7
PFC	WHITE JAMES D JR	RA17660037	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	WHITE LARIS JR	US93381840	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC	WINGATE RICHARD E	RA93330142	CO B 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC	WINSTON JAMES C	US93428406	A 2-12
MAJ	WISDOM SELWEN D	O-0062836	MHC 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4	WITCHER ALBERT	US92579996	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SG	WITNEY FRED D	RA98750461	CO C 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	WONNACOTT WALTER L	US96884792	C 15 MED BN
PFC	WOODRUFF EDWARD W	US96425359	A 3-7
PFC	WOODS CHARLES S	US96499492	CO B 1ST BN 9TH CAV
PFC	WOODS CHARLES W	US92628706	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
CPT	WOODS LAWRENCE D	O-0092491	CO B 229 AVN BN
SG	WOODSHALL MAE H	RA16722213	C 1-9
PFC	WOODS JOHN H	US93990168	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	WORKMAN JOSEPH H	US95780029	CO D 2D BN 7TH CAV
SGT	WORLEY ROBERT E	US92580666	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	WRIGHT EDWARD O JR	RA13791089	TMP A 1ST SQDN 9TH CAV

SG	WRIGHT ROBERT	RA13904638	CO A 1ST BN 5TH CAV
CPL	WRIGHT ROSCOE JR	RA25712379	C 6-16 ARTY
PFC	WRIGHT TERRY T	RA16828047	CO D 1ST BN 12TH CAV
1LT	YATES BRUCE E	O-9419420	BTRY C 1ST BN 21ST ARTY
PFC	YATES DONALD F	US91901448	D 2-9
SGT	YOUNG CHARLIE H	RA14642118	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SP4	YOUNG GORDON P	RA13767455	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SG	YOUNG RICHARD T	RA93191440	CO B 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	YOUNG STEVE G	RA19706310	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP5	ZAPORA CARLOS JR	RA16642042	219 AVN 19AASLT
2LT	ZELDES MARK H	O-9406780	BTRY A 1st BN 7TH ARTY
SP4	WHITE MARCUS D	US92649639	D 2-12
PFC	WHITE ROGER D	US95428588	C 6-16
PFC	WHITE WYLSSES	US96415531	C 1-12
PFC	WHITER DAVID E	RA19771451	CO B 2D BN 5TH CAV
SG	WIDEMAN ELYEN J	RA17904012	A 3-7
SGT	WIGFALL NEOPOLIS	RA13431145	CO A 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	WILSON JACK L	RA19942799	D 1-12
PFC	WILSON ARLO C	RA19942799	CO B 2D BN 8TH CAV
SP4	WILKINS HAROLD E	US93370400	110 AM CO 229TH AVN BN
SGT	WILLIAMS ALEXANDER	RA93441468	CO A 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC	WILLIAMS CARTER L	US93397102	CO B 1ST BN 5TH CAV
SGT	WILLIAMS CHARLES C	RA16770130	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
PFC	WILLIAMS GIBRETT	US93399468	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
SP5	WILLIAMS GENE W	RA26490332	MHC 2D BN 5TH CAV
SP4	WILLIAMS JOSEPH T	RA13954676	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
SP4	WILLIAMS JAMES	RA92417745	CO A 4D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	WILLIAMS LARRY D	RA14619933	BTRY B 1ST BN 21ST ARTY
PFC	WILLIAMS LONNIE C	RA13944949	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4	WILLIAMSON THOMAS	RA23885261	CO A 2D BN 12TH CAV
PFC	WILLIS LARRY J	US95014949	C 1-12
PFC	WILSON HARRELL W	RA19870996	D 1-12
SGT	WILSON GEORGE A	RA16740965	CO C 2D BN 7TH CAV
SP4	WILSON GALEN L	RA17750492	B 1-9
SGT	WILSON JOHN C	US94369409	CO C 1ST BN 5TH CAV
PFC	WILSON HARVEY J	RA17672571	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
SP4	WINDMAN JAMES E JR	RA12704608	CO C 1ST BN 12TH CAV
PFC	ZIEGLER DAVID B	RA13678049	CO A 1ST BN 7TH CAV
PFC	ZITIELLO RONALD J	US92650091	C 6-16 ARTY

Appendix II

CITATIONS

Thousands of men of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) distinguished themselves by outstanding heroism in battle.

The following partial list of the principal awards is representative of the much larger total of citations awarded for gallantry in action in Vietnam.

Additional awards of the Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, and Silver Star, for the period of this report, are now pending.

The names of the men who won Bronze Star Medals, Air Medals, and Purple Hearts, are far too numerous to publish here.

In very many instances deeds deserving of awards could not be recognized because of circumstances which prevented preparation of recommendations.

Awards for outstanding gallantry in action have been made to the following named men:

CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR

Marm, Walter J., Jr. 1 Lt A 1/7 14 Nov 65

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

Name	Rank	Unit	Date of Action
Day, Stephen	PFC	B 5/7	1 Dec 66
Gartan, Gary B.	SGT.	B 2/5	16 Feb 66
Hamilton, George E.	PFC	A 1/7	8 Aug 66
Hammer, Martin J.	1 Lt	B 1/8	6 May 66
Harrison, Paul J.	Sp4	C 1/12	15 May 66
Hughes, George W.	1 Lt.	D 1/7	5 May 66
Martin, Ray D.	Cpt	B 1/8	21/22 May 66
Moore, Harold G. Jr.	Col	HHC 1/7	14/16 Nov 65
Ortiz, Raymond	Sp4	HHC 1/8	4 Nov 65
Savage, Clyde E.	Sgt	B 1/7	14/15 Nov 65
Stoflet, Michael H.	PFC	A 5/7	1 Nov 66
Tackaberry, Thomas H.	Lt C	HMC 2/8	19 Sep 66
Taylor, William E.	Maj	B 2/5	14/15 Aug 66
Tillquist, Robert A.	Sp4	HHC 2/12	4 Nov 65
Vinassa, Michael G.	Sp4	C 1/8	21 May 66
Wideman, Elvin J.	SSG	A 5/7	19 Nov 66

SILVER STAR

Name	Rank	Unit	Date of Action
Achica, Eddie	Sgt	A 2/12	10 Aug 66
Allen, James L.	PFC	HHC 2/8	10 Nov 65
Allen, Vernon E.	Sp4	B 2/7	24 Jun 66
Ambrose, Warren	SSG	A 1/12	17 Dec 66
Arrellano, Arnold A.	Sp5	B 1/8	22 Jun 66
Ayer, Frederick D.	SGT	B 1/5	15 Sep 66
Ball, Francisco, Jr.	1 Lt	D 1/9	5 May 66
Boss, Charles W.	MSG	HHC 2/7	10 Dec 65
Bennett, Larry T.	Cpt	HHC 2/5	15 Nov 65
Blizzard, Bardon, Jr.	1 Lt	11th AVN	1 Dec 66
Brennen, John F.	PFC	A 1/7	14 Nov 65
Brown, Thomas W.	Col	HHC 3 BDE	30 Nov 65
Bryoni, Caesar	SGT	A 1/9	17 Dec 66
Budge, Larry D.	Cpt	C 5/7	7 Nov 66
Coil, John E., Jr.	Sp4	C 2/12	9 May 66
Campanella, Charles	1 Lt	C 1/12	27 Dec 66
Cantu, John R.	Sp4	HHC 1/8	27 Sep 66
Carr, Robert H.	PFC	B 1/5	15 Jun 66
Castle, James A.	2 Lt	B 2/8	20 Nov 65
Coudill, Estel	SFC	B 2/5	14 Aug 66

Name	Rank	Unit	Date of Action
Chapman, John J.	Sp4	C 15/TC	28 Feb 66
Coe, Sidney	Sp4	D 1/7	30 Jan 66
Comee, William C., Jr.	1 Lt	A 2/12	20 Feb 66
Coulter, Wayne E.	Cpt	B 1/9	6 May 66
Crum, Robert H.	2 Lt	B 1/8	21/22 May 66
Cumberpatch, James	Sp4	C 2/7	23 Jun 66
Dalton, Edward J. Jr.	2 Lt	A 1/5	15 Aug 66
Dillon, Otto	PSG	A 2/12	23 Sep 66
Dalby, David C.	Sp4	B 1/8	21/22 May 66
Duryea, Lyman C. Jr.	Cpt	C 2/7	8 May 66
Dye, Dennis	PFC	B 2/8	19 May 66
Elliatt, Ardean	SSG	A 2/12	20 Feb 66
Ennis, James E.	Sp4	HHC 1/12	17 Dec 66
Faglier, Billy C.	PFC	HHC 2/5	21 Sep 66
Fernandez, Xavier	Sp4	B 5/7	1 Dec 66
Fields, Harold T., Jr.	CPT	A 1/12	2/3 Oct 66
Franklin, Albert L.	PFC	C 2/7	25 Oct 66
Frederick, Donald W.	PFC	A 1/7	8 Aug 66
Gallagher, Barry P.	1 Lt	A 5/7	24 Nov 66
Gaylard, Lynn P.	PFC	A 1/9	2 Oct 66
Gez, Charles E.	Cpt	B 2/8	8 Oct 66
Gilliom, Lawrence L.	Sp4	B 1/7	14 Nov 65
Gonzales, George	SSG	D 1/7	22 Nov 65
Gooding, Lloyd I.	PFC	A 2/12	23 Sep 66
Grady, Bernard E.	Cpt	C 5/7	24 Nov 66
Grigg, Donald E.	1 Lt	A 1/12	2 Oct 66
Hanlon, John B.	1 Lt	A 1/8	4 Nov 65
Harmon, J. D.	1 Lt	A 5/7	19 Nov 66
Harris, Phillip D.	2 Lt	C 2/7	28 Jan 66
Harvey, Oscar M.	SSG	B 2/12	18 May 66
Haskett, Willie P.	SSG	C 1/9	1 Dec 66
Hawsey, Kenneth	1 Sg	B 2/5	14/15 Aug 66
Hewitt, Southern W.	SSG	A 1/7	31 Jan 66
Hillyer, Robert A.	1 Lt	B 2/7	15 Feb 66
Horn, John E.	PFC	A 1/9	17 Dec 66
Houston, Darrell G.	Cpt	C 1/12	2/3 Oct 66
Hughes, William D.	2 Lt	B 1/8	22 Jun 66
Hyle, Archie R.	COL	HHC 1 BDE	28 Sep 66
Jackson, Paul G.	SFC	C 1/12	2 Oct 66
Jackson, Sanford L.	Sp4	C 1/5	15 Aug 66
Jankowski, Raymond	2 Lt	B 1/7	29 Jan 66
Jenkins, Murray A.	Sp4	C 1/12	23 Feb 66
Jenkins, Rinso	SSG	A 5/7	19 Nov 66
Johnson, Comar A.	SFC	C 1/12	27 Dec 66
Johnson, Roy L.	PFC	C 2/7	28 Jan 66
Jolley, David M. Jr.	Sp4	C 1/8	21 May 66

INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS

SILVER STAR (Continued)

Name	Rank	Unit	Date of Action
Kail, William E.	1 Lt	B 5/7	1 Nov 66
Kalla, Michael A.	Cpt	B 2/7	24 Jun 66
Kelly, Patrick J.	2 Lt	A 2/7	20 Jan 66
Kennedy, Glenn A.	PSG	C 1/7	15 Nov 65
Knaus, Richard A.	PFC	B 2/19 Arty	27 Dec 66
Knowlen, Charles B.	Cpt	C 1/9	8 Nov 65
Koga, Henry Y.	Cpt	C 1/7	31 Jan 66
Kouvavos, Constanti	SGT	C 1/21 Arty	7 Nov 66
Labonte, Roger E.	2 Lt	C 8 Engr BN	8 Dec 66
Landon, John A.	Sp4	C 228 Avn	30 Mar 66
Lane, James L.	2 Lt	B 2/7	14 Dec 65
Larson, John G.	PFC	C 1/12	17 Dec 66
Le Febvre, Louis R.	Cpt	D 1/7	25 Feb 66
Leverett, James M.	PFC	A 1/9	1 Nov 66
Lindley, Marvin L.	SGT	B 2/12	30 Jun 66
Lindley, Nathaniel	Sp5	HHC 1/8	4 Nov 65
Long, James F.	SSG	B 1/5	15 Mar 66
Lowery, Andy J.	PFC	C 1/9	13 Feb 66
Luke, Ronold	PFC	A 2/8	14 Nov 65
Lynn, Otis Clyde	LTC	HHC 2/12	17/18 May 66
Madrid, Cleofas M.	SSG	A 5/7	4 Oct 66
Mahoney, Ronald J.	PFC	HHC 8 Eng B8	8 Dec 66
Martin, Roy D.	Cpt	B 1/8	21/22 May 66
Massey, Gary L.	Sp4	C 1/9	13 Feb 66
Moyer, Frederick F.	Cpt	B 1/12	2/3 Oct 66
McCarron, William	1 Lt	B 1/8	21/22 May 66
McClintic, David R.	1 Lt	C 1/8	28 Oct 66
Miller, Errol W.	Sp4	C 1/12	23 Feb 66
Mis, Ronald H.	SGT	A 1/9	2 Oct 66
Nadal, Ramon A.	Cpt	A 1/7	14 Nov 65
Nehrer, Jeffery B.	SSG	B 5/7	1 Nov 66
Nieto, Gregario A.	SSG	C 1/16 Arty	27 Dec 66
Oliver, John H.	Cpt	B 1/9	1 Nov 65
Ortiz, Raymond	Sp4	HHC 1/8	4 Nov 65
Osborne, David W.	Sp4	C 1/12	27 Dec 66
Padilla, Robert L.	SGT	B 2/8	20 Nov 65
Page, John L.	2 Lt	C 2/8	4 Feb 66
Palmer, Bernard	Sp4	C 1/8	27 Sep 66
Palpallatoc, Albert	SGT	A 5/7	1 Nov 66
Parish, Willard F.	Sp4	C 1/7	22 Dec 65
Pearson, Nathaniel	SSG	B 2/7	1 Aug 66
Peasley, Gory W.	Sp4	C 1/12	27 Dec 66
Perpetua, Rogue, Jr.	SFC	D 1/12	17 Dec 66
Pincsak, Richard J.	Sp4	A 2/12	13 Nov 65
Plummer, Gerrall V.	Cpt	B 1/8	21/22 Jun 66
Pope, Leroy F.	SSG	B 2/12	19 Nov 65
Porreco, David P.	2 Lt	A 2/12	18 May 66
Pridmore, Bobby R.	PFC	A 1/9	23 Feb 66
Rotliff, Gregory M.	PFC	HHC 1/8	22 Jan 66

SILVER STAR (Continued)

Name	Rank	Unit	Date of Action
Rescorla, Richard C.	2 Lt	B 2/7	15/17 Nov 65
Rhoten, Larry W.	Sp4	B 2/7	22 Jun 66
Riley, Paul V.	SSG	C 5/7	24 Nov 66
Ritter, Allen J.	PFC	B 1/8	21/22 May 66
Riveer, Kenneth	SFC	A 1/8	4 Nov 65
Rodriguez, Mario	PSG	B 1/8	22 Jun 66
Roat, James T.	Ltc	HHC 1/12	2/3 Oct 66
Rubio, Oscar	SSG	D 1/12	24 Nov 65
Sabine, John S. IV	Cpt	A 1/9	30 Mar 66
Sampson, Jimmie	Sp4	C 1/8	21 May 66
Samuel, Lannie G.	SSG	C 1/9	1 Dec 66
Savage, Clyde E.	SGT	B 1/7	14/15 Nov 65
Shay, Thomas W.	Sp4	B 1/5	15 Jun 66
Sherrrod, Donald A.	Sp4	A 1/7	7/8 Aug 66
Shoemaker, Robert M.	1 Lt	HHC 1/12	17 Oct 65
Shue, Henry J. Jr.	SSG	A 1/9	30 Mar 66
Siegrist, Robert H.	LTC	HHC 1/5	21 Nov 66
Silva, James M.	Sp4	A 1/12	17 Dec 66
Sipp, Terry L.	Sp5	B 1/9	6 May 66
Sizemore, Saurgean	MSG	C 1/8	17 Dec 66
Smith, Thedaria	SSG	HB2/17 Arty	14 Feb 66
Spahn, Dennis M.	Sp4	B 1/8	28 Dec 66
Stephens, Rufus	1 Lt	B 2/5	7 Mar 66
Stinson, George W.	PFC	C 1/12	17 Dec 66
Sturgies, Birdell J.	SGT	A 2/12	10 Aug 66
Swanson, Nels W.	PFC	C 1/8	2 Jan 66
Tockaberry, Thomas	LTC	HHC 2/8	1 Oct 66
Tainatongo, Vincent	SGT	A 1/12	30 Mar 66
Torrez, Daniel	Sp5	HHC 1/5	2 Dec 65
Trainer, Grady	1 SG	C 1/8	18 Dec 65
Turner, Jay	PFC	B 2/5	17 Feb 66
Valley, Donald M.	Cpt	A 1/9	10 Nov 65
Vavrek, Frank R.	2 Lt	C 1/8	21 May 66
Vinassa, Michael G.	Sp4	C 1/8	21 May 66
Wagner, Edward H.	Cpt	HHC 1/12	17 Dec 66
Wallace, Jerald D.	1 Lt	C 1/12	27 Dec 66
Ward, Clarence J.	PFC	B 2/5	14 Aug 66
Warren, Edward L.	CPL	11 Avn Gp	2 Aug 66
Watson, Payton	SFC	B 2/8	27 Nov 65
Way, Ronald A.	SGT	C 2/12	10 Aug 66
Weber, James J.	Cpt	HHS2/19AR	17 Sep 66
Welch, Norman G.	PSG	A 2/8	19 Nov 65
Williams, Charles C.	SGT	C 2/7	23 Jun 66
Williams, Donald M.	SGT	D 1/9	1 Feb 66
Williams, Joseph T.	Sp4	A 2/12	23 Sep 66
Wise, A. J.	Cpt	A 5/7	4 Oct 66
Wiseley, William G.	Sp4	HHC 1/12	2 Oct 66
Woodhouse, James C.	Sp4	B 2/12	17 Nov 65
Woods, Charles G.	PFC	B 1/5	15 Jun 66

The 1st Cavalry Division Association

Founded in 1944 in the Admiralty Islands, the Association was incorporated in the District of Columbia in 1949 as a non-profit, fraternal Veteran's organization, dedicated to preservation of friendships formed in battle, to the honor of comrades killed in the war, and to the perpetuation of the traditions and esprit of THE FIRST TEAM.

The Association underwrites annual reunions, publishes and distributes SABER NEWS quarterly to all Life Members without cost, encourages formation of regional and local Chapters and their meetings, publishes at irregular intervals Directories listing Life Members and current addresses, and is now planning the incorporation of this Report with past and future operations into a comprehensive History.

A Scholarship Fund is now being developed to aid dependents of men killed or disabled in action while serving with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in Vietnam.

The Association maintains a Trust Fund (current value in excess of \$65,000) which provides income for publication of the paper.

Metal miniatures, decals, and insignia cards and decals displaying the big bright patch are distributed in an effort to acquaint all Americans with the achievements and history of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

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
Every man who served honorably in the 1st Cavalry Division or in the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) at any time is eligible for membership, which costs \$10.00 (a one-time membership fee with *no* subsequent dues) and provides life time subscription to SABER NEWS, copy of the history, copy of the directory, and copy of any other material published, plus decals, insignia cards, and pins.

Membership in the Association enables members to keep in touch with comrades who shared the hardships and dangers, and the elan and successes, in serving with THE FIRST TEAM.



1st Cavalry Division Association
Alumni of THE FIRST TEAM

P. O. Box 11201
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87112



MAP II